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9EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
■  e accession of the states of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU in 
May 2004 was frequently perceived in the EU-15 as strengthening the 
Atlanticist element in Europe. e Atlanticism of the new member states 
is tempered by CEE governments who are trying to ensure that the EU 
and the US act together on the most important issues in international 
relations. 
■  e importance attached to the assumed Atlanticist dimension of the last 
wave of enlargement has been overestimated. e new member states have 
not proven to be the “Trojan horses of the US in Europe” as some senior 
political ﬁgures predicted prior to accession in May 2004. On the contrary, 
the new member states were instrumental in repairing the transatlantic 
ris over Iraq. 
■  Poland is likely to remain the most committed Atlanticist, along with the 
Baltic countries. e smaller Central European countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, are likely to voice their support 
for US policies more cautiously, giving greater regard to the opinion of 
the major EU players. 
■  e degree to which the foreign policy of the new member states will 
remain associated with idealistic goals is diﬃcult to predict. But it can be 
assumed the longer the CEE countries are members of the EU, the more 
pragmatic their foreign policy will become. 
■  During the ﬁrst year of membership, the new member states took some 
strong stances on foreign policy issues such as the Czech Republic on 
Cuba or in case of Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary on the issue of (not) 
opening the accession negotiations with Croatia. 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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■  Poland and the Balts have had mixed results in their attempt to shape 
the EU’s relationship with Russia. eir push for a more comprehensive 
EU-Russia policy is mainly driven by domestic considerations. However, 
such an assessment needs to be balanced with the fact that with no real 
EU-Russia policy Poland and the Balts have acted similarly to France, 
Germany or Italy who also tend to pursue national rather than European 
interest in this respect. 
■  Poland has played an important role in engaging the EU in Ukraine, 
especially during the electoral crisis in 2004. However, to what extent 
Poland remains committed to pushing the other member states to recog-
nize Ukraine as a candidate country is not clear yet.
■  e diversity of the EU’s new neighbours implies that it is diﬃcult for the 
new member states to agree on which third states should be prioritised in 
terms of CFSP and to set a common front. Such diversity makes it diﬃcult 
for CEE member states to propose a convincing plan to its EU partners 
for dealing with these new neighbours. 
■  Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are likely to have strong stakes at shaping 
the EU foreign policy in the future, particularly by getting the Black Sea 
region higher on the EU agenda. 
■  e main dividing line across “New Europe” is likely to run between 
Poland and the Baltic states on one hand and the smaller Central European 
Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) on the other, 
with the ﬁrst group being more Atlanticist, more committed to push for 
a hard stance on Russia and recognition of the European aspirations of 
the countries in the EU near abroad. e second group is likely to keep 
a lower proﬁle and “Europeanize” its foreign policy more quickly. 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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1. INTRODUCTION
A year has already passed since the ten countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe joined the European Union. is period allows us to make the ﬁrst 
reﬂections as to how the new member states have been behaving as full-
ﬂedged EU members. While a lot of attention has been paid to the integration 
of the newcomers into the core policies of the Union, especially economically, 
what is oen neglected is how the new members contributed to shaping the 
external relations of the enlarged EU. 
is paper will look at the impact of the new member states in the area 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.¹ It will make reﬂections on the 
track record of those states in the period since they joined the Union. How-
ever, it will try to look beyond that and see what will be the likely path of their 
involvement in the domain of EU foreign policy in the future, with speciﬁc 
reference to the EUs “near neighbourhood” and the internal dynamics of the 
integration process. It will try to give a broader picture of the region, with 
particular emphasis on points and areas that are relevant in this respect. It 
will also try to reﬂect to some extent on the positions of countries that are 
currently not EU members but which might become members in the future 
(candidate countries) and whose contribution to the way the EU acts in the 
world should be discussed and acknowledged even at this early stage. 
Prior to the “big bang” enlargement, Wolfgang Wessels suggested that 
three main scenarios could explain the behaviour of the new member states 
in the area of CFSP. e ﬁrst scenario has been labelled as neutral where the 
newcomers would act passively and more or less follow the lead of the stron-
gest players in foreign and security policies, i.e. EU-15 heavyweights such as 
France, Germany and the UK. Another scenario was labelled as pessimistic, 
suggesting that the newcomers will not behave constructively in CFSP and 
would in fact pursue their national interests, even if this meant damaging 
the internal cohesion of the EU. e third scenario, marked as optimistic, 
assumed a very active involvement of the CEE countries in the shaping of 
1)  The notion of CFSP is for the purposes of this paper viewed in a very general sense and will include a wide range of EU external 
activities such as enlargement. On the other hand it will not focus too much on ESDP – a specific element of CFSP.
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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CFSP, bringing in new impetus, visions and expectations and thus helping 
to enforce the external action of the European Union. is study will try 
to demonstrate that none of these scenarios can be applied to the group of 
new member states as such because in many aspects of foreign policy they 
simply do not act as a block. It will try to show that the elements of all the 
three scenarios can be traced in the behaviour of the new member states in 
EU foreign policy. 
One characteristic oen quoted in connection with the likely behaviour of 
the new member states in CFSP was that the May 2004 enlargement would 
be a strongly “Atlanticist” one. is assumption was further reiterated by 
the fact that ﬁve out of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 almost 
acceded to both the EU and NATO simultaneously. Not long prior to the 
signature of the treaties of accession, most of the soon-to-be members of the 
EU showed their commitment to the United States during the Iraq crisis, 
by signing the so called “Letter of Eight” (Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic) and the “Vilnius Letter”. is action was quoted to have caused 
very deep and serious splits in what was soon to become the enlarged Euro-
pean Union, giving ground to an infamous division of the continent into 
Old and New Europe. 
is paper will argue that the importance attached to the assumed Atlan-
ticist dimension of the last wave of enlargement has been grossly overesti-
mated. e new member states did not prove to be the “Trojan horses of the 
US in Europe” as some politicians in the old-EU liked to put it. e ques-
tion remains to what extent this has been due to the recent rapprochement 
between the EU and the US and to what extent it was the enlargement that 
caused this rapprochement. is paper will argue that the divisions evident 
during the Iraq crisis are not likely to be long lasting in nature. Further-
more, future divisions within the EU are probably not going to run between 
the old and the new member states but will emerge (or in fact are already 
emerging) within the New Europe as well as they are already evident within 
the Old Europe. 
Another point that deserves attention is the motives of the new member 
states with regard to EU foreign policy. ese are oen typiﬁed as being 
idealistic rather than pragmatic. It is not unreasonable to expect that the new 
member states would place greater stress on the role of values such as human 
rights, democracy, rule of law, etc. when dealing with third parties through 
CFSP. e experience that the new members of the EU went through dur-
ing communist times and also during the transformation period make them 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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more sensitive to these issues and their importance within EU foreign policy. 
Most of the countries we are referring to have direct experience of the strong 
impact of the EU’s inclusion of democratic principles and conditionality in 
its foreign policy agenda. For this reason they do not underestimate the role 
of these instruments in precipitating internal policy changes in countries 
outside the EU. However, the question remains to what extent this phenom-
enon will prevail once the newcomers understand that EU member states 
oen act pragmatically. 
Commentators have also discussed the geographical scope of the activity 
of the new member states in CFSP. It was expected that the newcomers would 
not be equally interested in all aspects of CFSP, but that they would focus 
on the Eastern component of EU foreign policy. is has proved to be only 
partially true. is is because the new member states do not act as a unitary 
bloc. In fact, it is more appropriate to see each of the new members as having 
a foreign policy agenda in Eastern Europe that reﬂects a multitude of factors 
that are oen speciﬁc to the history and aspirations of each state. 
At this juncture it is necessary to highlight the point that the three ele-
ments (i.e. Atlanticism, idealism and geographical preferences) regarding 
CEE countries behaviour in CFSP cannot be treated in isolation but should 
be seen as being interlinked and complementary strategies and processes. In 
this respect, factors such as Atlanticism, idealism and the geographical focus 
of CFSP will be treated in this paper in an integrated manner where each of 
these factors is seen to condition the impact of the others. 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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2. SETTING THE STAGE
New Member States during Accession Negotiations,
Convention and Intergovernmental Conference
Let us start with some general considerations relating to the involvement 
of the new member states in EU foreign policy. e ﬁrst consideration is 
the negotiation of the CFSP chapter during the accession negotiations. It 
is hardly surprising that this chapter was usually among the ﬁrst ones to be 
closed. is occurred for two main reasons. First, a relatively low portion of 
the acquis is devoted to the CFSP domain, which did not require an extensive 
process of adoption into domestic legislation. e most notable examples 
where the candidate countries had to adapt to EU requirements were related 
to the creation of political directors and European correspondents in foreign 
ministries, or putting a mechanism in place that would enable a swi imposi-
tion of sanctions vis-à-vis third parties. e other reason for relatively swi 
progress in negotiations was that since 1995 the candidate countries were 
oen invited to join EU common positions and demarches, although their 
choice seemed at times rather arbitrary.² e few examples of non-alignment 
with EU common positions mainly related to problems of a technical nature 
(for instance Poland in the case of the EU’s declaration on land mines could 
not subscribe to a common stance as it had not ratiﬁed the Ottawa Conven-
tion), or in cases where the issue at stake were more sensitive because it 
concerned an area of particular interest,³ or it concerned other candidate 
countries.⁴ Hungary was the only candidate country that supported all EU 
common positions, statements and demarches without reservations. 
All the new member states (or earlier with the status of candidates or later 
acceding countries) had a chance to participate substantively in the discus-
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
2)  The candidate countries were not invited to subscribe to EU common positions on the Middle East, the former Soviet Union or 
former Yugoslavia. 
3)  For example, Poland did not condemn the government of Belarus in 1998 after it had expelled EU diplomats as it was holding the 
OSCE Presidency at that time (see ‘Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP,’ Institute for Security Studies, April 2002). 
4)  Some candidate countries did not support EU statements on OSCE missions and the state of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia.
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sions on how the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will be framed 
in the future, including the work of the Convention and subsequently the 
Intergovernmental Conference. It can be argued that this particular area was 
of a strong interest to most of the new member states. eir positions on 
CFSP were not determined by the necessity of a detailed knowledge of the 
acquis and EU decision-making procedures. Although the representatives of 
most of the new member states kept a rather low proﬁle in the Convention 
deliberations, it was in the area of CFSP and defence that they made their 
voices heard most. 
is can be explained by several motives. One of the most important was 
certainly the preoccupation of the accession countries with ensuring a strong 
transatlantic link especially in the area of security and defence, ensuring the 
compatibility between ESDP and NATO, and ensuring that the USA as the 
major ally will get involved in any future debates relating to the shaping of 
European security. e relations between ESDP and NATO were one of the 
focal points and posed a serious problem especially for those countries that 
were about to join NATO aer the invitation issued by the Prague summit 
of the North Atlantic Council in November 2002, just as the Convention 
was starting to debate these issues. eir representatives looked rather sus-
piciously at attempts to put NATO aside and enhance the role of the EU in 
the defence arena. e representatives of the then candidate countries showed 
a rather reserved approach to some of the progressive arrangements suggest-
ed in course of the Convention deliberations, such as inclusion of a mutual 
defence clause in the Constitutional Treaty. ere were even greater reserva-
tions in candidate countries about the Convention’s Presidium proposals for 
structured co-operation. is was perceived by many as a strategy for creating 
a European avant-garde in the area of security and defence. A self-constituted 
group of countries to be included in an additional protocol attached to the 
Treaty with an unclear guarantee of who could be admitted at a later stage 
caused much concern in Central and Eastern European capitals at the time. 
Such unease related to the fact that participation in structured co-operation 
would not allow most CEE countries to participate, because their military 
capacities were not suﬃcient and in many cases undergoing major restructur-
ing. is led to frequently expressed fears that the CEE states could be le 
out of the core areas of further integration. 
Equally, one must not forget that the Convention debates coincided with 
the escalation of the Iraq conﬂict which demonstrated deep and damaging 
cleavages in the EU, putting the EU candidate countries in a particularly 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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uncomfortable position. Most of the candidate countries sided – at least 
rhetorically – with the US and its “coalition of the willing” which was 
strongly opposed by many important EU players, notably France and Ger-
many. For this they earned some very critical remarks not only from Jacques 
Chirac but also from Commission President Prodi.⁵ From the perspective of 
the candidate countries, many clauses as suggested in the dra text of the 
Constitutional Treaty seemed to be aimed at institutionalising the divorce 
of Europe from the US in the security and defence ﬁelds, underlining the 
fact that the two sides of the Atlantic are likely to take diﬀerent paths in the 
future. is was something that Central Europeans wanted to avert at any 
cost. However, they did not have enough power to do so, not least because 
according to the Convention rules of procedure they did not enjoy the same 
rights as the member states, in a sense they could not block the consensus 
among the existing EU members. ey, however, found very strong sup-
porters amongst the more Atlanticist members, namely the UK. Together 
they made a strong push at the IGC and achieved important amendments 
to the dra treaty which made the ﬁnal dra of the mutual defence clause 
less “competitive” with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and “structured 
co-operation” more inclusive and NATO interconnected. But in this sense, it 
could be argued that the crucial point was the British “yes” to the proposal 
for structured co-operation. e positions of the candidate countries were 
seen to be less important. 
On the other hand, the candidate countries showed relatively strong sup-
port for some other progressive measures in CFSP, including the creation 
of the post of EU foreign minister as well as the European External Action 
Service. ese two initiatives can be considered major improvements in the 
Constitutional Treaty in enhancing the coherence and eﬃcacy of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. e objections of the candidate countries, if there 
were any, did not concern the concept of an EU foreign minister as such but 
rather his or her job description. Aer the dra Constitutional Treaty was 
adopted, some representatives claimed that the role of the foreign minister 
should be clariﬁed, especially in relation to the President of the European 
Council and the College of Commissioners where he/she would act as one 
of the Vice-Presidents. e intergovernmental conference subsequently made 
major improvements in terms of clarifying these points. 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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e motives of candidate countries for supporting this move may be 
explained by diﬀerent considerations. e fact that most of the candidate 
states are small or at best middle-sized countries means they are not likely to 
view EU foreign policy as a way of projecting their own interests and ambi-
tions. On the contrary – a stronger CFSP with a European foreign minister 
and its own diplomatic service might give them internally more inﬂuence over 
the way Europe acts on the world stage than they would have as separate 
actors in international relations, through the possibility of pulling together 
with more important players. e rather low proﬁle of the candidate countries 
on many issues of international relations would allow them even to sacriﬁce 
more unanimity for QMV in EU foreign policy, because their stakes in many 
issues are not so strong and they do not necessarily want to keep their “red 
lines” like some of the major players. is assumption, however, proved 
somewhat disputable in the ﬁrst year of EU membership, as will be explained 
later. A similar consideration would apply to the “anchoring” of the new post 
of EU foreign minister. Not surprisingly, many new member states would like 
to see this post attached more to the Commission rather than to the Council. 
e Commission provides for a much better way of inﬂuencing the policy 
processes by small and middle sized countries than the Council where there 
is a much greater risk of these countries being bullied by the larger member 
states. e truth is that the Constitutional Treaty does not yet provide for 
a deﬁnite answer as to whether the EU foreign minister will be acting more 
under the hat of the Council, being commanded by the member states, or in 
the Commission, acting more in the interest of the Union and being inﬂu-
enced by fellow commissioners. If the current political deal is that Solana 
would become the ﬁrst EU foreign minister, the ﬁrst scenario is more likely 
to prevail. Solana has been anchored in the Council for many years now and 
his way of running EU foreign and security policy will probably not change 
too much in the ﬁrst years aer the creation of the new post. 
For similar reasons the new member states are supportive of the European 
External Action Service. As many of the diplomatic services of the new mem-
ber states are under strong pressure from ﬁnance ministries to cut down their 
political representation in third countries, especially where there are no par-
ticular ties, the European Foreign Service might turn out to be an attractive 
alternative. Especially because it is supposed to recruit its employees from 
the Commission, the Council and also from the member states’ diplomatic 
services, which would enable the European foreign service to utilize the 
expertise of certain diplomats and maintain existing links. A European for-
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eign service may give CEE countries a greater opportunity to set the agenda 
than is the case at the moment in the Council, because of its scarce resources 
and the less pro-active role of the current High Commissioner for CFSP who 
does not enjoy the right of initiative. 
But an important consideration will apply to where the future EU dip-
lomatic service is anchored. At the moment, no deﬁnite scenario is on the 
table either – it could be under the Council, under the Commission, under 
both of them or it could be totally independent. e viewpoints of the new 
member states on this issue are not yet known, but it is certainly one of the 
things that politicians and foreign ministries in Central and East European 
capitals should start addressing very soon. 
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3. NEW EUROPE’S ATLANTICISM:
 AN EVER LASTING LOVE?
As suggested earlier, the accession of the new member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe to the EU has oen been perceived in the EU-15 as the one 
that will ultimately strengthen the Atlanticist element in Europe. Although 
it is diﬃcult to provide a generally accepted deﬁnition of Atlanticism, in this 
paper it is perceived as foreign policy that tends to act in line with the posi-
tion of the United States. In relation to membership in the EU Atlanticists 
prefer the EU and the US acting together in international relations rather 
than the EU adopting a diﬀerent policy or acting on its own. 
e main reason for the alleged Atlanticism of the new EU member states 
prior to accession demonstrated itself during the course of the Iraq crisis 
when most CEE governments sided with the Bush administration. Firstly, 
there were the leaders of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic who put 
their signatures along with representatives of the UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Denmark to the so-called “Letter of Eight”that appeared in the Wall 
Street Journal. Only later, did a similar initiative of the so-called Vilnius 10 
group,⁶ (i.e. new members of NATO and/or states hoping to join the NATO 
in the CEE region) make a similar move. is made some EU leaders think 
that these countries will act as committed Atlanticists even aer their acces-
sion to the EU (given the proximity of EU accession), putting good relations 
with Washington ﬁrst and acting in support of the US no matter what the 
other EU governments think. It would be premature to assess only one year 
aer accession the accuracy of this judgement. However, what is certain is 
that the picture in Central and Eastern Europe is much more complex than 
this simple assumption of committed Atlanticism. Here one may identify two 
key reasons for expecting a more complex reality. 
Firstly, it would be wrong to assume that the alignment with US foreign 
policy is absolutely unconditional and non-contested in the new EU member 
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states. Nonetheless, all the CEE countries that recently acceded to the EU can 
be labelled at least as “instinctive Atlanticists”⁷, meaning that they strongly 
believe in the value of the transatlantic partnership and any situation which 
forces them to make a choice between Washington and Brussels puts them 
in a very uncomfortable position. 
Secondly, the “instinctive” Atlanticism of the new member states derives 
mainly from their historical experience. e Central and Eastern Europe region 
has been for centuries dominated by diﬀerent great powers. To a considerable 
extent all the countries in the region (with the exception of Hungary or Bul-
garia), tend to view themselves as victims of the “concert of powers” up to 
World War I as well as of Western European paciﬁsm prior to the outbreak 
of World War II. On the other hand, the United States is historically viewed 
very positively ﬁrstly as the champion of independent states in Central Europe 
(thanks to US President Wilson’s stance at the Versailles conference in 1919), 
and secondly because the United States honoured their commitments in the 
region, contributing to the defeat of communism leading to the end of the 
Cold War as well as supporting CEE countries joining NATO. 
Nonetheless, despite the undoubted importance of these two key factors the 
degree of Atlanticism varies signiﬁcantly across Central and Eastern Europe, 
depending on factors other than those that underpin “instinctive Atlanticism”. 
It would thus be a mistake to view the new EU member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe as a compact block who will always act in a uniﬁed manner 
in CFSP negotiations on the issue of future US-EU relations. 
3.1 Security Considerations and Atlanticism 
Much of the evidence presented thus far supports the contention that dif-
fering perception of security threats determines the degree of each country’s 
Atlanticism. It has been suggested and demonstrated with regard to the 
involvement of candidate countries in the Convention that all the CEE 
countries see the USA and NATO as the best guarantees of their security. 
But the threat assessment arising from various international risks (i.e. “hard” 
or “so” security threats) varies signiﬁcantly across the region. For the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary, the perception of external threats 
is much less intense than that of the Baltic states or Poland, and most likely 
also for Romania and Bulgaria aer their accession. For this reason it is easy 
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to understand that the perceived importance for hard security in the Baltic 
region (including Poland) is much stronger than in Central Europe. 
For the Baltic states (or Balts) this has to do with their complicated rela-
tionship with Russia that is still perceived as a threat for various reasons. Here 
brief mention may be made of recent moves towards authoritarianism, Russia’s 
self-appointment as advocate of the rights of Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia, economic and political pressure or so security threats such as envi-
ronmental hazards or trans-border crime. e recent developments show very 
little evidence that the EU could at the moment provide the Balts with strong 
leverage on Russia. Firstly, there is no consistent EU policy towards Russia and 
Putin deals with the major EU players separately. Oen, some EU leaders even 
initiate these separate dealings, as a summit in March 2004 of France, Germany, 
Spain and Russia summoned by Mr Chirac demonstrates. Secondly, the percep-
tions on how to deal with Russia between the old-EU member states and the 
Baltic countries oen diverge, a topic that will be treated in more detail in the 
next section. e old member states, and the big players in particular, hardly 
ever share the Balts’ fears and concerns of Russia as a suspicious neighbour 
not to be trusted. irdly, the Balts do not have enough international weight 
to deal with Russia on their own – for Putin they are simply not partners. So 
they have to look to other states to get them on board when dealing with the 
Russian government. In this respect, from the Baltic perspective the US at the 
moment is seen to be a more reliable partner than the EU. Consequently, the 
Baltic states rely more on the US than on the EU in dealing with Russia. Unless 
EU policy towards Russia changes considerably in the coming years, one may 
expect an enduring Atlanticism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
e Russian question also plays a key role in Polish Atlanticism as well. 
A long-term motivation for Polish support of US military presence in Europe 
has been to counterbalance the Russian inﬂuence in the region and also 
because of the historical experience of Poles being sandwiched between the 
competing ambitions of Germany and Russia. 
e strong Atlanticism in the Baltic countries and Poland compared to 
the other Central European counterparts might be explained by regional 
geopolitics as well. e Baltic Sea region, which includes some older member 
states, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, can certainly be considered as 
inclined to align more closely with the US rather than with France and Ger-
many (representing “autonomism” as a counter concept to “Atlanticism”) on 
many foreign policy and security issues. Denmark might be taken as a prime 
example, being a member of NATO but having an opt-out from ESDP and 
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not having participated in the West European Union. Denmark also strongly 
supported the accession of the Baltic states into NATO.⁸ Although Finland 
and Sweden might adopt a low proﬁle due to their non-alignment, it seems 
that both countries realize the importance of NATO for security in the region 
and most especially in the cases of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Given the 
very good relations between the Scandinavian and Baltic neighbours, strong 
Atlanticism is likely to prevail in the whole Baltic Sea region. 
e Baltic states and Poland, unlike their Central European counterparts, 
border on potentially much more unstable and vulnerable regions and states, 
such as authoritarian and unpredictable Belarus, (and to some extent still the 
Ukraine); and in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania – the Black Sea region 
or Western Balkans. For countries that are exposed to these unstable regions, 
it is understandable that they prefer closer alignment with the US who is 
seen as the most reliable source of “hard security”. As long as the EU does 
not demonstrate a ﬁrm commitment to engaging (militarily if necessary) in 
the so-called “EU close neighbourhood,” these countries will probably prefer 
to keep a closer dialogue with Washington rather than relying on the EU’s 
rather toothless foreign policy. Consequently, very much will depend on how 
actively the enlarged EU is willing to be involved in its close neighbourhood 
through policies such as ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) and to 
what extent it will be able to deploy its so as well as possibly hard power 
to stabilise the regions surrounding it. 
3.2 Political Elites and Atlanticism
e other point that has to be acknowledged in connection with the pre-
sumed Atlanticism of the new EU member states is that much will depend on 
the political constellation in the individual countries, namely the composi-
tion of the respective governments. In the CEE region there are countries, 
notably Poland and the Baltic states, where the pro-US orientation will not 
be questioned politically, at least not for the time being, regardless of who 
is in power. But looking at the other Central European countries (the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia), the picture may change from 
government to government. A good illustration of this phenomenon is the 
case of the Czech Republic during the Iraq crisis, which witnessed deep 
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political divisions across the political spectrum as to how to respond to the 
proposed military strike and to what extent to engage in the US-led “coalition 
of the willing”, but also across the major ruling coalition party – the Social 
Democrats. As a result of complicated intra-governmental negotiations the 
Czech Republic eventually decided not to participate in the Iraqi Freedom 
operation. is decision was heavily criticised by the opposition Civic Demo-
cratic Party (ODS). It can be assumed that if the ODS were in power during 
the Iraqi crisis, the position of the Czech Republic would have been much 
more pro-American and thus Atlanticist. 
A similar phenomenon could be observed in neighbouring Slovakia. An 
analysis by the Bratislava-based Institute for Public Aﬀairs (IVO),⁹ drawing 
on a number of interviews with high ranking Slovak politicians, shows that 
the Iraq crisis marked steep division between very strong pro-US support 
within the governing coalition, while the opposition parties such as SMER 
(centre-le) or the Slovak Communist party were strongly opposed. On the 
basis of this observation, IVO classiﬁes the attitudes of Slovak political elites 
in terms of their inclination to view the US-EU relations into three categories: 
those in favour of a stronger and more independent EU role on the world 
stage, those who favour the primacy of NATO as a source of stability and 
prefer a balanced partnership between the US and EU, and ﬁnally those who 
would prefer to keep a strong bilateral tie with Washington even at a cost 
of not acting along with the other EU member states. As in the case of the 
Czech Republic, such diﬀerences exist not only between political parties but 
also across parties as well. 
Hungarian foreign policy and Atlanticism is reputed to be more consistent 
than that of the Czech Republic. is reputation is based on the strong co-
ordinating role of the Prime Minister on issues regarding external relations 
and relatively high levels of apathy among the general public toward foreign 
policy issues. Nonetheless, the domestic political constellation has had an 
impact on the consistency of Hungary’s Atlanticism. FIDESZ, although 
largely Atlanticist and a dominant right-wing party, has used in the past 
a more anti-American rhetoric than one would have expected, in its goal 
to attract more nationalist voters. is “nationalist” strategy is similar to 
Václav Klaus’s opposition in the Czech Republic to the US strike on Iraq 
in early 2003.¹⁰ 
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In contrast, Poland throughout 1990’s demonstrated long-lasting and con-
sistent support for US foreign policy over many issues, starting with the First 
Gulf War, Kosovo air campaign, Afghanistan and later Iraq. is attitude 
was never questioned by Polish political elites,¹¹ a situation that diﬀers mark-
edly with the political elites of the Czech Republic (over military actions in 
Kosovo and Iraq). Poland’s pro-US stance remained constant despite the fact 
that the political scene had changed frequently during this period. And there 
is another explanation why Atlanticism is so deeply enshrined in the thinking 
of Polish political elites – the strong Polish diaspora in the US plays a very 
important role in lobbying Polish interests with US administrations. On the 
contrary, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary relations with the US 
(and foreign policy in general) play a very minor role in general elections. 
In Latvia and Estonia the pro-American (and, at the same time, anti- Russian) 
political consensus is quite robust across existing party lines. e one factor, 
which might change this in the future, is a greater enfranchisement and mobilisa-
tion of Russian speaking minorities. us in countries where the broad political 
consensus on an Atlanticist orientation in foreign policy is weaker, political actors 
in those countries can just use the fact they are in opposition as leverage on the 
ruling government, without this position having necessarily to reﬂect their long-
term strategies on the desirability of siding with either the EU or the US. 
It is possible to argue that the Iraq crisis was such a speciﬁc case of a trans-
atlantic ri that it is not possible to draw general conclusions on the assumed 
“Atlanticism” of the political actors in CEE countries on the basis of their attitude 
to this issue.¹² Furthermore during the Iraq crisis, the new member states were in 
the ﬁnal stages of accession into the EU, and were thus not eligible to vote or take 
part in the deliberations.¹³ is enabled them to take a slightly more independent 
approach, and their stances perhaps can even be perceived as a “revenge” for 
not being admitted to the deliberations at an earlier stage.¹⁴ is situation was 
a unique one and is not a reliable indicator of future behaviour. 
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12)  The analysis of IVO noted earlier shows that even representatives of parties who otherwise tend to favour a pro-US policy strongly 
contested the legitimacy of the action. Note for example ANO (J. Banáš, K. Glončáková-Golev), the Christian Democratic KDH party 
(V. Palko) and the HZDS (Sergej Kozlík). 
13)  The participation of the accession countries in the deliberations of the EU bodies happened only after signing the Accession Treaty 
on 16 April 2003. 
14)  The accession countries were not invited to join the European Council meeting on 28 February 2003 that adopted a common position 
on Iraq. It was decided that the accession countries would be immediately informed on the conclusions after the summit. 
27
However, the new member states have been instrumental in repair-
ing the recent transatlantic ri over Iraq. e fact that Washington now 
understands that there are more friendly countries in the EU might lead 
the US administration to adopt a more open approach to the EU as such. 
is was clearly demonstrated during the visit of George Bush to Europe 
in February 2005. e highlight of his journey was the Bratislava summit 
with Putin. Signiﬁcantly, even in Brussels, it was Slovak Prime Minister 
Mikulas Dzurinda who spoke for Europe with regard to Iraq. is can also 
be viewed as a sign of understanding among the older EU members that 
the good relations of Central European states with Washington might work 
to the beneﬁt of the EU. But once the CEE countries are members of the 
EU, depending on domestic political constellations, their positions in the 
Council regarding issues where relations with the US are at stake might dif-
fer, depending on who is in power. is situation might be similar to that of 
Spain immediately aer the March 2004 elections, when there was a U-turn 
in the attitude of the new government on Iraq. Consequently, a country that 
was one of the strongest supporters of US military action decided almost 
overnight to pull out of Iraq. 
Support of US policies, especially if they are viewed to be somewhat 
controversial from the European (i.e. EU) perspective, may not emerge just 
because the United States is viewed as the primary guarantee of CEE security. 
e countries in the region do expect the United States to oﬀer something in 
return, exactly because sometimes they opt for policies that are not always 
popular with their respective electorates or with the other EU leaders. e 
most frequently articulated issue over the last year or so has been the inclu-
sion of the new member states in the visa waiver programme which would 
enable the citizens of Central and Eastern European countries to travel to 
the US for a period of up to three months without visas. At the moment, only 
Slovenia enjoys this status. e visa waiver programme contains a number 
of conditions that all new EU member states fulﬁl – with the exception of 
a refusal rate that is not supposed to exceed 3%. e argument of most of the 
governments in the region is that with EU membership, the CEE countries 
do not pose signiﬁcant security concerns for the US administration in terms 
of possible large-scale trans-Atlantic migration. Moreover, the move is seen 
largely in symbolic terms as the minimum that the United States could do 
in return for the CEE allies strong supporting on the Iraq issue. 
But their eﬀorts are not likely to be successful in the short-term. Inclu-
sion in the list of countries to which the visa waiver programme applies 
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would require a change in legislation by Congress. is would be diﬃcult, 
not least because of increased concerns over national security among both 
Democrats and Republicans. ere were even proposals to abolish the visa 
waiver programme completely, reintroducing visas for all the countries 
currently on the list.¹⁵ e issue was touched on during the visit of George 
Bush to Bratislava in February 2005 but his message was rather ambiguous 
with uncertain promises being made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the gov-
ernments in Central Europe will continue to raise this question in bilateral 
relations with the US.¹⁶ If the United States resists embarking on a road 
toward liing the visas, such US intransigence might lead to a cooling of 
bilateral relations with Washington and less enthusiastic support for its 
policies. Moreover, the new member states might – if they feel their voice 
is not heard – try to use the EU as leverage to achieve a change of policy in 
Washington in this respect.¹⁷ 
3.3 Public Opinion and Atlanticism 
Another point that ought to be considered in connection with the Atlanti-
cism of the EU newcomers in CFSP is public opinion in these countries. In 
all of the accession states, in relation to Iraq, an overwhelming majority of 
the populations in the region opposed military intervention in Iraq. But Iraq 
is not the only example. e recent Transatlantic Trends Survey published by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States shows that in many ways, the 
new member states are not necessarily more Atlanticist than the old members. 
Although the last year survey (2004) included only Poland and Slovakia from 
the group of the new member countries, it can still provide very useful guid-
ance on attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe in general.¹⁸ 
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15)  This idea was eventually turned down. However, citizens of countries participating in the visa waiver programme will in the future 
have to carry passports containing biometric data. 
16)  The issue was for instance discussed during the visit of Marek Belka (Polish Prime Minister) in Prague in September 2004 where 
he agreed with the Czech Premier Stanislav Gross that they would coordinate their efforts to achieve the ultimate goal of lifting 
US visa for the citizens of Poland and the Czech Republic. 
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agenda for policy concerning visas, asylum, immigration and internal security in the EU. 
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For instance in the thermometer readings, it shows that the “warmth” of 
feeling towards the US in Poland is 56˚, but still lower than for instance in the 
UK (62˚) or Italy (61˚). Moreover for Poland this ﬁgure represents a decline 
of ﬁve points since 2003.¹⁹ On the contrary, Slovakia (50˚) can be found at 
the very opposite end of the spectrum, with only Turkey (28˚) and Spain 
(42˚) exhibiting signiﬁcantly lower degrees of sympathy towards the United 
States. On the other hand, looking at sympathy towards the EU, Slovakia 
ranks much higher with a score of 72˚ (even higher than France) and Poland 
with 65˚. erefore the Polish public feels (9 points) warmer toward the EU 
than the US. An Atlanticist index, developed from the Transatlantic survey 
places Poland in the middle of the countries surveyed, with a score of 47 
which is lower than Germany (53), Italy (57), UK (58) or the Netherlands 
(60), while Slovakia is at the bottom of the table with a score of 37.²⁰
Thermometer Readings
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19)  A special type of survey question that measures the attitudes of citizens in selected countries towards the US and EU using the 
convenient and easily understandable format of a thermometer reading. 
20)  Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, Pierangelo Isernia: “Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in US-European 
Relations”. “The Atlanticist Index” was based on questions such as the sympathy to the US, desirability of the US global leadership, 
NATO’s essentiality, the share of common values between the US and EU or the importance of having allies when acting militarily 
Published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004. More information is available at www. gmfus.org
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According to a similar survey undertaken in the Czech Republic by the 
STEM agency (December 2001), 75% of Czech population was in favour 
of coordinating Czech foreign policy with the EU. Coordination with US 
foreign policy was favoured by 37% of respondents. Moreover, when answers 
to these survey questions were combined a majority (over 50%) of the public 
regarded Czech foreign policy as following the right direction because there 
was no blanket decision of coordinating with the US.²¹
To look at the public opinion in the region more broadly, use can also be 
made of the latest Eurobarometer survey, undertaken in October/November 
2004.²² Examining public perceptions of the United States in promoting 
world peace and stability, the survey shows that only three countries out of 
the 30 surveyed view the role of the US positively, all of them being new 
member states or accession countries: the Czech Republic, Lithuania and 
Romania. A similar scenario would apply to perceptions of the US in the 
global ﬁght against terrorism. While a majority of the public of the new mem-
ber states view the US role positively, there is in contrast a negative view of 
the US among a majority of the publics in most of the EU-15 member states 
with the exception of those belonging to the traditional supporters of US 
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David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
21)  See, Věra Řiháčková: ‘Czech Republic: Europeanisation of a hesitant Atlanticist?’ EUROPEUM, Prague, 2005.
22)  http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62firsten.pdf. This is one of the most recent comprehensive 
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policy, i.e. the UK and the Netherlands. e role of the EU in promoting 
peace in the world and the ﬁght against terrorism is viewed most positively 
by Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which show the highest 
positive assessments in the EU. Most of the other newcomers are scattered 
around EU average, with only Poland viewing the positive role of the EU in 
these domains rather sceptically. 
On the other hand, this Eurobarometer survey also suggests that the 
populations of the new member states are much more receptive to the idea 
of having a genuine CFSP. Public support for CFSP is strongest in Slovenia 
(81%), Poland (78%) and Slovakia (75%), but also in the Baltic states it is 
above the EU average (Latvia and Lithuania at 71%, Estonia at 70%, the EU 
average being 69%). Only Hungary and the Czech Republic demonstrate 
less enthusiasm for a genuine CFSP, with 69% and 59% in favour respectively. 
e picture becomes more mixed when an examination is made of attitudes 
towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). An interesting 
observation is that all the new member states are overwhelmingly in support 
of ESDP, as opposed to some of the old member states, with support rang-
ing between 88% in Slovenia to 84% in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Estonia, with only Lithuania exhibiting a lower level of support (but still 
quite high at 81%, i.e. at the same level as France). 
One has to be cautious in interpreting these ﬁndings for two reasons. 
First, the high level of support in the CEE region might also result from 
a lower level of familiarity with what CFSP/ESDP actually entail, including 
for example a more complicated relationship with NATO or with the United 
States, or the necessity for increasing defence spending, or the willingness to 
engage militarily beyond EU borders. Secondly, it is questionable to what 
extent public opinion is really shaping government stances in foreign policy. 
Over the past few years, mass surveys have shown large support amongst EU 
citizens for a genuine CFSP, and yet the member states have not been able 
to move forward signiﬁcantly on this issue. More generally, national govern-
ments are rarely under strong electoral scrutiny with regard to foreign policy 
issues. In fact, the example of Iraq shows that the governments of countries 
such as Italy or Spain adopted very ﬁrm pro-American positions, despite 
strong opposition within public opinion.²³ erefore the fact that public 
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32
opinion in Central and Eastern Europe might not be more Atlanticist than 
in old EU-15 does not necessarily exclude the fact that the governments in 
the region will keep a stronger pro-US proﬁle. 
To summarise the discussed observations, the presumed Atlanticism of 
the new member states is likely to bear two main consequences in the near 
future. First, most CEE governments will try in the foreseeable future to 
ensure that the EU and the US act together on the most important issues 
in international relations. Second, the degree of their willingness to support 
the US in situations where there are divergent opinions with the EU will vary 
across the region, as it varies within the EU-15. Poland is likely to remain 
the most committed Atlanticist, along with the Baltic countries. e smaller 
Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Slovenia, are likely voice their support for US policies more cautiously, 
giving greater regard to the opinion of the major EU players. 
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4. GEOGRAPHICAL PRIORITIES
 IN THE ACTIVITY OF THE NEW
 MEMBER STATES
e area in which we might expect to see the most diverging stances of 
the new member states vis-à-vis CFSP is arguably the geographic focus in 
which these countries would like the EU foreign policy to evolve most. EU 
foreign policy is obviously a complex phenomenon, with many diﬀerent 
countries pushing for privileged relations or close engagement of the EU in 
various parts of the world. It can be argued that each enlargement brought 
about a new dimension to the external action of the EU – the accession of 
the UK brought closer ties with the Commonwealth countries, Spanish and 
Portuguese accession increased the focus on Latin America, and the acces-
sion of Finland and Sweden fostered a Nordic dimension. With the entry 
of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, it was assumed that these 
countries would push the Common Foreign and Security Policy eastwards. 
But the term “East” in itself does not say much. It is not any precisely deﬁned 
area, and it would be more accurate to describe the goals of the newcomers 
as wishing to develop a consistent EU policy towards neighbours who are 
outside the EU, especially those in the East as opposed to the neighbours at 
the southern shore of the Mediterranean. 
e focus on neighbours is understandable for several reasons. Firstly, 
none of the newcomers have more “global” aspirations with the possible 
exception of Poland, whose control of one of the occupation sectors in Iraq 
can be considered as a sign of stronger foreign policy ambitions. But even 
Poland can at the very best aspire to be a regional leader but hardly ever it 
behaves as such, it does not aspire to become a regional speaker on issues 
such as the Middle East peace process (arguably it does so on other issues 
such as Ukraine). Moreover, the regional leadership of Poland is strongly 
contested in neighbouring countries, especially in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. Secondly, all of the newcomers, again with the exception of Poland, 
are relatively small countries, a fact that obviously inﬂuences their foreign 
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policy goals. During the transition to democracy, apart from the primary 
goals of joining the EU and NATO, the foreign policies of these countries 
were focused mostly on achieving and sustaining friendly relations with 
their neighbours. With membership of the EU, the CEE “neighbourhood” 
remains the main focal point but the focus shis to countries remaining 
outside the EU. And precisely because the CEE countries are rather small, 
acting through the EU becomes a very convenient tool for these countries to 
achieve their goals. ere is the hope that the 2004 accession states expertise 
with the EU’s new neighbours (being “old” neighbours for CEE countries) 
will be acknowledged by the other EU partners and they will be allowed to 
take the initiative and give a new impetus to pre-existing relations between 
the EU and these countries. 
In this respect one important point has to be borne in mind. ere are 
many new neighbours and they constitute a rather heterogeneous group. 
ey stretch from Russia in the North (although Russia is stricto sensu not 
a new neighbour due to the previous Finish accession, but the inclusion of the 
Baltics certainly gives EU-Russian relations a diﬀerent dimension) to Croatia 
and Serbia and Montenegro in the South. ese new neighbours are very 
diﬀerent in many respects: they include countries that will soon join the EU 
such as Romania or those who are expected to join at a later stage, e.g. Croa-
tia. ey also include countries whose eventual accession is beyond doubt, at 
least politically, such as Serbia and other Western Balkan countries.²⁴ But the 
group also includes the Ukraine where recent developments shed some more 
optimism and the EU will soon have to tackle the issue of how to respond 
to European aspirations within the Ukraine. Belarus is a particular case in 
that relations between the EU and this failed state are practically frozen and 
nothing much can be achieved as long as Lukashenko stays in power. Finally, 
Russia is a very special case in many respects, not least because of its size, 
economic importance and the fact that it is still – if not a superpower – at 
least a very important actor on the world stage. 
us, the diversity of the EU’s new neighbours implies that it would be 
very diﬃcult for the new member states to agree on how third states should 
be prioritised in terms of CFSP. Such diversity makes it diﬃcult for CEE 
member states to propose a convincing plan to its EU partners for dealing 
with these new neighbours. 
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4.1 Russia – Will the Balts Be Able to Prompt a Common EU Voice? 
As has been already suggested, Russia represents a very special case in 
relation to the EU. Not only is it by far the largest neighbour of the EU, it 
is economically and arguably strategically the EU’s most important regional 
partner. It is quite evident that there is at present no common EU stance as 
to how to deal with Russia. On the contrary, it seems that the EU’s dealings 
with Russia are a sum of bilateral diplomacies rather than a consistent front. 
A few recent examples where certain old EU member states (France, Germany 
and Italy) took very speciﬁc and independent positions vis-à-vis Russia 
underscore this point. At times it seems as if some of the old-EU leaders were 
competing for Putin’s attention. Perhaps the most striking example is that 
of Berlusconi when during the Italian Presidency in 2003 he openly spoke 
in favour of Russia joining the EU or showing understanding for the tough 
stance of Putin on Chechnya. e question remains whether there is any real 
substance behind these gestures. However it is certainly the case that many 
of the EU-15 member states’ relations with Russia lack strong tensions and 
they do not want to see a hardline approach that some of the new members 
would like the EU to adopt. 
Looking at how to deal with Russia from the perspectives of the new 
member states, there is no doubt that this is a number one issue for the Balts 
and very important for Poland as well. Russia still poses a risk for the Balts 
in various respects – ranging from cultural pressure to geopolitical, economic 
and political threats. e cultural pressure stems mainly from a continuous 
raising of the question of Russian minorities in the Baltic states at various fora, 
including OSCE or EU-Russia summits. is is particularly sensitive in the 
case of Latvia where the Russian speaking minority constitutes close to 40% 
of the total population,²⁵ and in the past there has been pressure from Russia 
to turn Latvia into a bi-communal state. Estonia has a large Russian speaking 
population as well (28%),²⁶ which leaves Lithuania the only Baltic state where 
the Russian minority is not a contentious issue in bilateral relations. 
But there is some strong evidence that Russia is exerting economic and 
political pressure on the Baltics. All the Baltic states are heavily dependent 
on Russian energy supplies, as well as on the willingness of Russia to pay for 
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transit costs through Baltic pipelines.²⁷ ere is a strong fear of the extent 
to which Russia can inﬂuence politics in the three countries, through use of 
intelligence, blackmail and espionage, as demonstrated by the impeachment 
of former Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas in April 2004 for alleged 
links with Russian organized crime and secret services. 
Apart from these issues, there is a worrying uncertainty over the borders 
with Russia. Lithuania until recently remained the only country in the Baltics 
that has signed a border treaty with Russia, although it is still awaiting ratiﬁ-
cation by the Duma (the Russian parliament). Estonia followed suit only in 
May 2005. Although the ratiﬁcation was awaited in Duma in course of this 
year, Russia withdrew its signature from the Treaty. Such a move followed 
the decision of the Estonian parliament to attach a preamble to the ratiﬁca-
tion act, claiming the legal continuity of the Estonian state with the period 
preceding the Soviet occupation of Estonia, thus disputing the current border 
demarcation (although without legal eﬀect). ere is no agreed border treaty 
between Russia and Latvia. e border question is understandably one of 
the issues that make the Baltic countries suspicious of Russia’s intentions, 
an idea until recently fostered by very strong Russian opposition to NATO’s 
enlargement to include these three Baltic states. 
e situation has certainly changed aer the twin “accession” of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia to NATO and the EU in 2004 and it is clear that Russia 
is now perceived to be a less imminent threat. But there is a certain frustra-
tion among the Baltic leaders arising from the inability of the EU to speak 
with one voice to Russia and address the enduring concerns of the Balts over 
both internal developments within Russia as well as with what can be seen 
as revived Russian imperialism. 
is has been demonstrated on several occasions where the three Baltic 
states have tried to guide the EU’s attention to issues concerning Russia. 
Salient examples include the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the “Orange 
Revolution” in the Ukraine, Putin’s dealings with Chechnya or criticism 
of Russia’s reversion to authoritarianism aer the Beslan attacks. However, 
the Balts were not very successful in convincing their EU counterparts that 
a tough line had to be taken on Russia on these issues. is is due to several 
factors. Firstly, the Baltic republics are newcomers and small states, therefore 
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they carry relatively little weight in the formulation of EU foreign policy. 
Secondly, they are still weakly represented in key EU institutions dealing with 
EU foreign policy – namely in the Council secretariat and the Commission 
where they do not hold any top posts (apart from the respective Commis-
sioners or members of cabinet).²⁸ irdly, as was highlighted earlier, many 
old EU member states hold particular relations with Russia that they are 
unlikely to sacriﬁce for the sake of intimidating Russia through automatically 
accepting the Balts’ arguments. 
But it can be expected that the Balts with the support of the Poles will 
continue to raise the Russian card in the EU, in which they are also likely to 
be joined by some of the countries in EU-15 who prefer a hard-line approach 
to Russia, such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Although 
it might be diﬃcult for the Balts to shape the common position in the Coun-
cil or to inﬂuence the Commission agenda, one body that they can use as 
leverage in this respect is the European Parliament (EP). Here we could wit-
ness a strong activism of Baltic and Polish MEPs on issues relating not only 
to Russia but on other issues that have direct implications on EU-Russian 
relations, such as Georgia or the Ukraine. e deliberation on the report of 
EU-Russian relations, tabled before the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee of the 
EP by Cecilia Malmström in April 2005, shows a large number of amending 
proposals made by Baltic and Polish MEPs who are attempting to give the 
report a much tougher line than is evident in the dra.²⁹ 
One of the points that occupy the minds of the Baltic leaders is that 
Russia should admit responsibility for the events following the liberation of 
Eastern Europe from Nazism, leading to a forceful occupation of the region 
by Stalin. In this they have been joined by the demands from Poland for Rus-
sia to admit some responsibility for the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact of 1939. 
For this reason, the Presidents of Lithuania and Estonia refused a Russian 
invitation to mark the Sixtieth anniversary of the end of WWII in Moscow 
on May 9, 2005, although the President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga 
accepted. But Vike-Freiberga during an oﬃcial visit to Sweden underlined 
that although she agreed to join the aforesaid celebration in Moscow, she 
still believed a re-evaluation of the post-WWII era by Russia was necessary. 
It is also quite interesting to see what tactics Putin used in this respect – in 
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amending proposals at http://www.europarl.eu. int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/AM/562/562208/562208en. pdf
38
order to lure the Baltic leaders to attend the anniversary, he implicitly prom-
ised that the border treaties that Latvia and Estonia desire could have been 
signed in May 2005. Such implicit promises came to nothing. 
However it is important not to portray Baltic interests as being so clear-cut 
in nature. It must be acknowledged that the three Baltic states do not have the 
same priorities and goals in relation to Russia and in fact there is not much 
co-ordination among them. Lithuania has probably best managed to tackle 
bilateral relations with Russia.³⁰ e mutual relations between Moscow and 
Vilnius embrace fewer points of conﬂict emanating from their mutual history. 
eir mutual border was recognized at a relatively early stage and a treaty 
was signed in 1997 (albeit not ratiﬁed). Furthermore, the absence of a huge 
Russian minority takes some tensions oﬀ bilateral relations between the two 
capitals. us, the most controversial issue has been the settlement of the 
status of the Kaliningrad exclave where Lithuania is the principal transit cor-
ridor for travel between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad oblast. While 
this issue was dealt with mainly through the EU, Lithuania could hide behind 
various Commission reservations. It was the Commission in fact, who refused 
to contemplate the idea of retaining a visa free regime, or a transit corridor, 
through Lithuanian territory – an idea Russia favoured.³¹ 
Estonian politicians seem to keep a rather low proﬁle in relation to its 
Eastern neighbour, and it seems as if political representatives are a bit afraid 
of intimidating Russia. Recently Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts 
rebuked Latvia for its outspoken criticism of Russia because such criticism 
was viewed as being potentially damaging to Baltic-Russian relations.³² 
On the other hand, the decision of the Estonian Parliament to attach the 
aforesaid preamble during the ratiﬁcation of Russian-Estonian border 
treaty speaks for the opposite – this was a purely symbolic gesture without 
any practical eﬀect, and speaks for the belief that Russia would eventually 
give up, perhaps issuing a similar clause during the ratiﬁcation in Duma. 
Perhaps the strongest Estonian voices in relation to Russia may come from 
the European Parliament from MEPs such as ex-foreign minister Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves. 
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Latvia remains the most vicious of the Baltic states from the Russian 
perspective. And it is at the moment pushing the hardest to get the EU to 
recognize Soviet aggression against the Baltic states aer WWII and to make 
the EU speak to Russia with one voice. In this respect, Latvia has been par-
tially successful – it secured the support of Tony Blair and George Bush. e 
latter spoke in favour of the Baltic states position at the NATO summit in 
February 2005. In addition, the stopover of George Bush in Riga on his way 
to Moscow for the Sixtieth anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazism was 
an important diplomatic success for Latvia. On the other hand, it underlines 
the thesis that when the Baltic states (and in this case particularly Latvia) do 
not feel their voice is being listened to in Brussels, they turn to Washington 
where they are more likely to be successful – and this again illustrates the 
Atlanticist inclination of these countries. 
Although Poland does not have such strong concerns regarding Russia as 
the Balts, Polish leaders still see Russia as a risk. is perception is based less 
on Russia’s internal political and economic activities and more on renewed 
imperialist tendencies of Russia in treating its neighbours. Undoubtedly 
both factors are linked. Consequently, Poland wants for mainly geopolitical 
reasons to get as many countries out of the Russian sphere of inﬂuence as 
possible through promotion of the beneﬁts of a pro-Western and pro-Euro-
pean orientation. at is why Poland is also supportive of the EU’s new 
neighbourhood policy and calls for recognition of the choice of countries 
that chose to follow the lead of the EU. e ultimate aim is, however, to 
minimise Russian inﬂuence on Polish aﬀairs. 
It is beyond doubt that it will be very diﬃcult to build a genuine com-
mon EU stance on Russia in the near future, despite the fact that it would 
beneﬁt the Balts very much as their capacity to have an inﬂuence within the 
CFSP framework will grow the longer they are members of the EU. But the 
recent shi to realpolitik where the bigger states ostentatiously ignore their 
EU partners and pursue their self-interest is unfortunately very likely to 
apply to EU-Russian relations, perhaps more than to any other region. It 
cannot be expected that Russia will be too enthusiastic about the emergence 
of any signiﬁcant pro-active EU presence along its borders – the status quo is 
extremely convenient for Russian politicians as it enables them to play EU 
members against each other and this gives them a much stronger negotiating 
role than they would have otherwise. 
But it is also possible that we might witness the Baltic states pushing the 
EU to engage more closely in other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely 
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in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. Firstly, this is because of the deep-
rooted conviction that the other former “brotherly nations” have the right to 
opt out of the Russian sphere of inﬂuence and chose a pro-European path 
just as the Balts did. Secondly, there are pragmatic reasons, where the Balts 
favour more opposition to Russia’s pervasive inﬂuence. is stance is under-
lined by the fact that many of the old-EU states are not ready to view Russia 
as interfering with the internal business of small neighbouring countries. 
us it makes perfect sense for the Baltic countries and Poland to encourage 
a more pro-Western stance among Russia’s small neighbours. Ideally these 
small states would eventually join the EU.
4.2 Poland – Paving the Way for the Ukraine to Join the EU? 
Even before Polish accession to the EU, it was obvious that the Ukraine is 
a priority country for Warsaw. e Polish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs was very 
active in the formulation of its position on how the EU should deal with the 
Ukraine aer the 2004 enlargement. In January 2003 it circulated its own vision 
of the new neighbourhood policy in a non-paper (i.e. discussion paper). is 
document brought forward a number of broad as well as concrete proposals, 
including, inter alia, the establishment of a European Democracy Fund enabling 
NGOs to implement EU-funded projects, strengthening democracy and the rule 
of law in neighbouring countries or use of the European Investment Fund to 
help the SMEs in the region. Although the non-paper does not refer speciﬁcally 
to the Ukraine but covers other countries such as Moldova or Belarus, it makes 
special recommendations such as EU recognition of the “European choice”. 
Furthermore it advocates that the existing Partnership and Co-operation agree-
ment should be upgraded to a standard association agreement. 
Apart from long-standing historical, social, political and economic links 
between the two countries, there seems to be an overwhelming political 
consensus in Poland that the Ukraine should be given the right to join the 
EU. Prior to the European Parliament elections in June 2004, none of the 
eight major political parties in Poland opposed the European aspirations 
of Ukraine, including the two populist parties that are sceptical about the 
EU – Self-defence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families. Accord-
ing to the League, the Ukraine would be a natural ally of Poland in the EU 
and would obviously increase its weight in the club.³³ 
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e positions of the main Polish political parties show that there are at least 
two reasons why Poland should strive for the EU accession ambitions of the 
Ukraine to be recognized. Firstly Poland generally sees its role as pushing 
the EU neighbourhood policy to the East rather than to the South. e argu-
ment here is that there has to be a clear diﬀerentiation between the southern 
neighbours of the EU (i.e. Mediterranean countries of the southern shore) 
who are not European and recognition that Eastern neighbouring countries 
are European. Some political parties, most notably the Law and Justice party, 
even believe that the Ukraine rather than Russia should be the main focus of 
the European neighbourhood policy³⁴. e second argument in favour of the 
Ukraine has to do with geopolitics – the Ukraine is seen as a buﬀer between 
Poland and Russia that is important because of a deep-rooted perception 
that Russia is a potential threat. If the right of the Ukraine to join the EU 
is not recognized, there is a risk that it will tighten its relations with Russia 
and will remain in its “sphere of inﬂuence”. 
e willingness of Poland to retain “special” relations with Ukraine was 
self-evident even in the period of the run-up to accession. Poland strongly 
lobbied the European Commission to retain a visa-free regime for Ukraine 
and later to impose visas on Ukrainian citizens only at the date of accession. 
It should be noted in this respect that the Czech Republic and Slovakia had 
introduced such visa regulations as early as 2000. In the end, Poland agreed to 
introduce visas for Ukrainian citizens six months prior to accession. However, 
Poland managed to extract some important concessions from the Ukraine. 
Poland undertook to issue free visas to Ukranian applicants and in return the 
Ukrainian government agreed to retain a visa free regime for Polish citizens. 
is issue demonstrates how important bilateral relations with Ukraine are 
for Poland – for other former CIS countries such as Russia and Belarus visas 
were introduced at an earlier stage partially because of a failure to conclude 
re-admission agreements. 
Poland was also concerned with the EU not being willing to grant market 
economy status to the Ukraine.³⁵ is, had the practical consequence of setting 
quotas on steel imports from Ukraine to the EU at 185,000 tons in 2004, far 
below what Poland itself was importing from the Ukraine before the accession.³⁶ 
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e Polish focus on the Ukraine was thus strong from the very moment of 
accession. Obviously, the events of December 2004, leading to a re-running of 
the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine and ﬁnal victory for 
the pro-European presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko, gave a completely 
diﬀerent dynamic to Polish policy. e instrumental role of Poland in dealings 
with the Ukraine can be demonstrated by the fact that it was the Polish Presi-
dent Alexandr Kwasniewski, along with the EU foreign policy chief Solana 
and Lithuanian President Adamkus, who were entrusted by the EU to travel 
to Kiev aer negotiations following the ﬁrst (second round) presidential elec-
tions were contested leading to a dangerous political deadlock. It shows that 
EU leaders are able to recognize the leading role of Poland. However, it also 
shows an apparent lack of interest in the Ukraine among the leaders of the EU 
heavyweights, a situation that contrasts sharply in how these leaders normally 
deal with Russia. 
e victory of the strongly pro-reform and pro-EU candidate in the Ukraine 
obviously shed a completely changed the European aspirations of this Eastern 
European country. Although this issue was in the past played down by many 
top EU politicians, not least by former Commission President Prodi,³⁷ it is clear 
that it will be very diﬃcult to maintain this rhetoric from now on. Interestingly 
enough, the Ukranian factor was evident in the December 2004 European 
Council decision to launch accession negotiations with Turkey. e point some 
countries, and notably Poland, are making now, is that once we agree that 
Turkey can become a member of the club, the EU cannot possibly say no to 
Ukraine. is has led to a lack of opposition from Poland to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey. is is because if Ukranian accession were not at 
a consideration, the attitude to eventual Turkish accession would probably be 
much more reserved due to Vatican unhappiness about such a development. 
e events of December 2004 showed ﬁrstly the reluctance of some old-EU 
member states to give Ukraine a green light immediately, partially because 
of fears of antagonising Russia. But it turns out that Putin might not have 
a problem with Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU – it seems that for Putin 
Ukrainian membership in NATO is much more problematic.³⁸ Putin accepted 
the Yuschenko victory in the re-run elections in January 2005 without any 
reservations, despite showing indisputable support for Yanukovych ahead of 
the elections. 
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e visit of Yuschenko to Brussels in February 2005 did not leave anyone 
in the EU in doubt that for the new Ukrainian president there are no alterna-
tives to the aspiration of full membership. Not even the fact that the EU and 
Ukraine were able to move ahead with European Neighbourhood Action Plan 
quickly. Yuschenko spoke openly of his ambition to start accession negotia-
tions in 2007. But again, there is an inter-institutional cleavage: while the 
European Parliament called very openly to acknowledging candidate status 
for the Ukraine and applauding Yuschenko during his speech, the reaction 
from the Council was much more lukewarm. Jean-Claude Juncker as the 
incoming Council president “warned against oﬀering Ukraine the prospect 
of full membership” (e Times, December 10, 2004). e Commission has 
kept a rather low proﬁle in the debate so far, but it clearly would like to move 
ahead with the Ukraine in the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). 
What is going to be the future of the Ukrainian card in the EU and how 
active Poland and perhaps some other new member states will be in this 
process remains to be seen. However, recognition of the possible candidate 
status of the Ukraine now depends on the internal political development in 
the EU as well as on the progress of the reform process in the Ukraine itself. 
e complications with ratiﬁcation of the EU Constitutional Treaty in some 
member states, underlined by the recent rejection of the Treaty in France and 
the Netherlands, will lead the EU to rethinking its strategy towards further 
enlargements (i.e. aer Bulgaria and Romania) beyond 2007. And it is highly 
unlikely that if the ratiﬁcation process fails the EU would be willing – at least 
for the time being – to give a green light to Ukrainian wishes to commence 
negotiations on EU membership. 
4.3 The Central European Countries – 
Pulling South Rather than East?
e geographical focus of the remaining new member states – the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia – is not as clear-cut as in the case 
of Poland and the Baltic republics. To some extent, they are interested in the 
Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) but not 
to the same degree as Poland and the Baltic states. 
Russia does not pose an imminent threat to the CEE countries even though 
it is still sometimes viewed with suspicion; because of internal political develop-
ments rather than as a security threat to the Central European region. Bilateral 
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relations with Russia are for the most past normalised where recently the focus 
has been on the settlement of Russian debts. Although the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia are still quite dependent on Russian energy 
supplies (crude oil and natural gas), this dependency especially in the cases 
of Slovenia and the Czech Republic is much less than for other countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.³⁹ Since the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
or Slovenia do not share a border with Russia this eliminates many contentious 
issues. Historical legacies are also much less controversial than in case of the 
Baltics and Poland. Russia has never been a dominating power in the CEE 
region except during the Cold War period. Although there were Soviet troops 
in Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the Communist era, they pulled out 
very soon aer the democratic changes at the beginning of 1990’s. Slovenia 
is a very special case in this respect, because it was part of Yugoslavia, and 
so Russia exerted very little inﬂuence over this country and which had much 
closer links with its Western neighbours such as Italy and Austria than with 
the former Soviet bloc countries. 
In relation to the Ukraine and perhaps other countries falling under the 
ENP, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent. Two of the Central European coun-
tries – Hungary and Slovakia – share a common border with Ukraine, and 
there are certain cultural as well as economic links – given by the presence of 
a Hungarian minority in the Western region of the Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia or Trans-Carpathia) as well as the historical links of Slovakia to this 
region (which was in the interwar period part of Czechoslovakia) and the pres-
ence of a Ruthenian minority in Slovakia. But these links are much weaker and 
far less important than in case of Poland. Still, these two countries are likely to 
support a viable neighbourhood policy in relation to the Ukraine in particular. 
But to what extent the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia will 
push along with Poland for recognition of the candidate status of the Ukraine 
is not very clear. On the other hand, as the Ukraine is so dominant in terms 
of Polish foreign policy priorities, the other countries in the region may try 
to ﬁll the gap and take the initiative in fostering links with other states in the 
East, such as Moldova, Belarus or the Caucasus states. But there is very little 
evidence at the moment to prove that this will indeed be the case. Furthermore, 
aer the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the level of support for 
seeking closer relations with Moldova and the Caucasus states will increase.
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
39)  The Czech government intentionally kept Russian bidders out of the privatisation of Unipetrol, the state-owned oil refining company. 
45
e region that draws much more attention from the perspective of the Cen-
tral European countries is South-Eastern Europe or the Western Balkans. ere 
are both general and speciﬁc explanations for this interest. In general terms, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia enjoy special relations 
with the Western Balkan countries in many respects. In the case of Slovenia 
relations are perhaps strongest. Since Slovenia was once part of Yugoslavia 
it has very good knowledge and close links to the South-Eastern European 
region. But there are also more pragmatic explanations – Slovenian companies 
and enterprises have invested heavily over the last decade in many ex-Yugo-
slav countries,⁴⁰ and for this reason the prosperity of the region and eventual 
accession into the EU is undoubtedly in Slovenia’s self-interest. Despite the 
fact that there were some contentious issues particularly in relation to Croatia, 
concerning the dispute over territorial waters in the Adriatic, this is not likely 
to pose any huge obstacles to support of the Croatian bid for EU membership 
(an issue to be examined later in this paper). 
Hungary’s interest in the region is determined by two particular factors: ﬁrst 
is the presence of Hungarian minorities in Serbia (Vojvodina/Western Banat), 
the other one is a thousand-year historical link with Croatia. e minority issue 
has always been an important element behind Hungarian foreign policy think-
ing. e assurance of privileged treatment and the well being of the Hungarian 
diaspora will be one of the focal points for Hungarian priorities in CFSP. e 
degree to which the issue is important for Hungary was demonstrated during the 
Convention and the IGC, where the Hungarian delegation was very successful 
in pushing through the inclusion of a special reference to minority rights among 
the values of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty. In practical terms, the question 
intensiﬁed with the accession of Hungary into the EU. Consideration had to be 
made prior to accession of the large number of ethnic Hungarians living outside 
the EU, and practical problems such as having to possess a visa when travelling 
to Hungary. e question of a large Hungarian minority, who live in Slovakia 
(estimated around 450,000 ethnic Hungarians), was settled by the simultaneous 
accession to the EU and for Romania (with about 1.5 million ethnic Hungar-
ians) this will probably happen in 2007. us the largest remaining Hungarian 
minority dwelling outside the EU relates to the approximately 290,000 ethnic 
Hungarians (2002 estimate) living in the Vojvodina region of Serbia.⁴¹ 
David Král – Enlarging EU Foreign Policy
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Montenegro amounted to about 65% of overall Slovene foreign investment. 
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e other strong motive for the Hungarian focus on Western Balkans 
is the long-standing historical and cultural links with Croatia. Since the 
12th century Croatia was joined to Hungary by virtue of a dynastic union 
that combined the Hungarian and Croatian crowns. Croats have always 
enjoyed autonomy (even aer the establishment of Dual monarchy in 1867) 
and privileged treatment compared to other nationalities living under the 
Hungarian crown. Croatia has been traditionally viewed as one of the least 
complicated of Hungary’s neighbours, partially because of the absence of 
a large Hungarian minority. 
In case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, links to the Western Balkan 
region can also be explained mainly by historical and cultural motives. is 
stems from the fact that the Southern-Slavic nations – Croats, Serbs, Slovenes 
and Bosnians who lived in Austria-Hungary oen went to study in Prague 
which was the main centre of Slavic education in the Empire and there was 
a very lively intellectual exchange especially during the national revival in 
the nineteenth century. Today Croatia remains the most popular destina-
tion for Czech and Slovak tourists during the summer. Moreover, during 
the conﬂict in Yugoslavia Czech and Slovak diplomats were very active in 
the search for peace. Two examples illustrate this activism. First there was 
the appointment of the ex-minister of foreign aﬀairs Mr Jiri Dientsbier as 
the special UN envoy for human rights in ex-Yugoslavia. Second, there was 
a Czech-Greek peace initiative that tried to avert military action during the 
imminent humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999. 
e strong interest of the Central European states in the Western Bal-
kans relationship with the EU was clearly evident when the EU Council of 
Foreign Ministers decided not to open accession negotiations with Croatia 
on March 17, 2005. e decision not to open the accession negotiations in 
accordance with the original timetable was due to alleged non-compliance 
and co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) – a position based on the opinion of its chief prosecutor Carla del 
Ponte. e main sticking point was seen to be the failure of the Croatian gov-
ernment to organise the surrender of General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY.⁴² 
e decision of the Foreign Aﬀairs Council was strongly opposed by Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Austria. e Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsány 
even accused those member states that were most strongly opposed to the 
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or at least indicate where he is hiding. The Croatian government claimed that General Gotovina is no longer in Croatia.
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opening of negotiations, namely Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden, of not treating all EU candidates in the same way. However, success 
for the Central Europeans came when the European Council in April 2005 
agreed, with the proposal of Austria and Slovakia, to re-evaluate the progress 
of Croatia by May 2005,⁴³ thus leaving the option for the issue to be reopened 
in the summer of 2005. Nonetheless the prospect of this happening seems 
to be very unlikely since del Ponte has repeatedly claimed that Gotovina is 
within reach of Croatian authorities. Moreover it was made clear during the 
Luxemburg Presidency that failure to settle this issue would make the launch 
of accession negotiations impossible. 
e stance taken by the Central European states has to be understood not 
as a justiﬁcation of the attitude of Croatian authorities towards the Hague 
Tribunal but within the broader context of EU policy towards the Western 
Balkans. e leaders of the states who support opening accession negotiations 
with Croatia believe that it is necessary to give a positive signal to the other 
aspirants that accession might become a reality. ey also fear possible nega-
tive consequences of any decision that would lead to a drop in public support 
for EU integration not only in Croatia but all right across the region.⁴⁴ On the 
other hand, the proponents of delaying accession negotiations argue that the 
EU has to show the other countries in the region that without full co-opera-
tion with the ICTY in the Hague, the prospect of joining the EU becomes 
highly unlikely. is stance relates particularly to the two most wanted war 
criminals – Karadzic and Mladic whose surrender is required from Serbia. 
And it seems that in this respect the Serbian authorities have understood the 
message conveyed by the recent decision of the Council.⁴⁵
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5. IDEALISM VERSUS PRAGMATISM
 IN FOREIGN POLICY:
 An Enduring Cleavage between Old and New Europe?
In this section consideration will be made as to whether there will be an 
enduring cleavage between the so-called ‘old’ (EU-15) and “new” member 
states in terms of pursuing idealistic rather than pragmatic goals in foreign 
policy making. e concept of idealism in foreign policy in this respect is 
viewed as an emphasis on issues such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, 
or more generally respect of obligations under existing international law as 
opposed to an approach that neglects some of these concerns for the sake of 
keeping good and friendly (not least economic) relations with the govern-
ments of third countries. 
e hypothesis examined here is not meant to suggest that the EU-15 
have not pursued idealist goals in its foreign policy. On the contrary, the 
EU has consistently used its economic bargaining power to promote human 
rights, rule of law, democracy and conditionality in a number of countries, 
including the new member states before accession. It is beyond doubt that 
many of these ideals helped tremendously in transforming the societies of 
Central and Eastern Europe to become market economies, with standard 
democratic political systems and a high degree of human rights protection 
and legal enforcement. Without the EU’s insistence on the so-called Copen-
hagen criteria, it is likely that the transformation process would have taken 
much longer. And the same is happening, or at least beginning to happen, in 
countries that aspire to EU membership in regions such as the Balkans, the 
Caucasus or more recently the Ukraine. But the other side of the coin is that 
this policy is applied only in relation to countries where the EU can clearly 
apply its “carrot and stick” tactics. States that aspire to membership, or at 
the very least the economic beneﬁts of closer ties with the EU, are in eﬀect 
compelled through speciﬁc eligibility criteria to develop European institu-
tions of law, democratic politics and respect for human rights.
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If we, however, take a broader look at EU policy towards countries and 
regions that do not currently enjoy preferential treatment by the EU, the 
picture becomes much more mixed. Such a mixed picture applies especially 
to CFSP – a domain that is still under the command of member states. Since 
the other areas of external action, such as trade agreements, humanitarian 
aid or enlargement, are mainly developed and implemented by the Commis-
sion, this framework provides for less involvement by member states, and 
consequently the opportunities for certain member states who have a strong 
interest in a particular region or a country to set the agenda at the EU level 
is much weaker. 
e presumed idealism in foreign policy of the new member states stems 
from their own transformation experience. All of these countries widely 
acknowledge and accept the strong inﬂuence that the principles of demo-
cratic conditionality and related issues in foreign policy can exert over in 
precipitating domestic changes and reforms. And this would apply not only 
to political elites but also to vast portions of the populations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Many of the political elites in the new member states are 
former dissidents who were persecuted under communism, and have a deep 
empathy for those who still suﬀer under authoritarian or undemocratic 
regimes. Some of the leading proponents of idealism in foreign policy in the 
last ﬁeen years came from Central Europe; examples include Václav Havel 
or Lech Walesa, who held top constitutional posts in the Czech Republic and 
Poland respectively. us, the emphasis of projecting these issues into EU 
foreign policy from the perspective of new member states is understandable 
for historical reasons. ere are some very good examples of this idealist ori-
entation despite the relatively brief involvement of CEE countries in CFSP. 
e most recent one relates to the deliberations of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in January 2005 over the issue of liing diplomatic sanctions 
against Cuba. EU foreign ministers had imposed sanctions on Cuba in 2003 
aer Fidel Castro arrested about seventy-ﬁve dissidents in March of that year. 
In the autumn of 2004 Spain proposed a partial liing of these sanctions aer 
Castro’s administration released fourteen of these political prisoners. ere 
seemed to be an overall consensus emerging among the member states that 
diplomatic relations should be, at least partially, restored. Spanish proposals 
went even further, arguing that the representations of EU member states in 
Havana should stop inviting Cuban dissidents to their embassies. is was 
seen as a necessary pre-condition expected by Castro’s regime for restoring 
diplomatic relations with the EU. In fact by 2004 some of the member states 
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had already stopped inviting dissidents and Havana in response had started 
to gradually restore diplomatic relations with these countries. 
But there was very strong opposition from a handful of member states, 
headed by the Czech Republic and supported by Poland. e Czech Republic 
made a very bold move, threatening to use its veto over any decision of the 
Council that did not make restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba 
conditional on further improvements in the situation of the dissidents. For 
this reason the Council agreed to re-evaluate the liing of diplomatic sanc-
tions within six months. Furthermore, the Czech Republic insisted that it 
would keep inviting dissidents to receptions at the Czech embassy in Havana, 
a policy viewed as giving strong moral support to Cuban dissidents and their 
families. In the Czech press, the issue was called the Czech Republic’s “ﬁrst 
foreign policy victory since joining the EU”.⁴⁶
One may wonder why the Czech Republic was so vehement on this issue, 
arguing strongly against anything that might be viewed as a conciliatory 
gesture towards the last dictatorship in Latin America. Apart from the general 
background outlined above, there were other particular factors that played an 
important role in the Czech case. First, the existing links between the Czech 
Republic and Cuba from communist times still resonate in Czech society.⁴⁷ 
But perhaps more important is the extent to which the Czech political class 
and Czech NGOs took the issue of supporting the Cuban democratic move-
ment seriously. ere are a number of examples to demonstrate this since the 
late 1990s. e Czech Republic has draed several anti-Cuban government 
resolutions in the United Nations Human Rights Commission since 1999, tak-
ing the initiative from the United States who was previously the main critic of 
the Cuban regime. Leading Czech politicians, including Václav Havel, have 
consistently spoken out against Castro’s regime. Two members of the Czech 
parliament were even arrested during their trip to Cuba in 2001 while on 
a mission aimed at supporting Cuban political dissidents. is occurred aer 
a third Czech initiated UN resolution had been passed in the UN condemn-
ing Cuba. e release of the Czech parliamentarians had to be negotiated 
directly with President Castro by Mr Pithart, President of the Czech Senate. 
And last but not least there is the strong inﬂuence of NGOs most notably 
headed by the People in Need Foundation. is foundation runs one of the 
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47)  Czechoslovakia was one of the leading trade partners of Cuba before 1989; many Cubans studied in Czechoslovakia and much of 
the infrastructure in Cuba has been designed and constructed by Czech and Slovak engineers.
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biggest projects in Cuba aimed at helping dissidents and their families to 
overcome the consequences of political persecution. For these reasons, the 
Czech Republic has become the leading European country on the issues of 
human rights in Cuba. From this perspective, the Czech position during the 
key Council decision of January 2005 is understandable. But it seems that 
promotion of democratic change has indeed become one of the focal points 
of Czech foreign policy. In 2004, a new unit of the Czech foreign ministry 
charged with promoting democratic transition has begun to monitor and 
evaluate the development of human rights and democracy in other parts of 
the world. is unit works in close association with NGOs co-ordinating and 
running programmes related to the restoration of human rights and democ-
racy in various countries such as Cuba, Belarus and Myanmar. 
A clear strategy of putting the human rights and democracy on the foreign 
policy agenda can be sensed in relation to the countries encompassed by the 
EU’s near neighbourhood policy (ENP) and this is particularly true vis-à-vis 
Russia, and to a lesser extent Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It is not sur-
prising that the Balts are the main critics of Russia’s reversion towards more 
authoritarian practices. Chechnya has become the most important issue on 
which the Balts have consistently criticised Russia on alleged human rights 
abuses. An astonishingly harsh criticism came not only from leading politi-
cal ﬁgures in all three Baltic states, but also from Baltic citizens. Interest-
ingly the criticism has also been directed towards the alleged ignorance of 
the international community, including such organizations as the OSCE.⁴⁸ 
But for the Balts, this is quite a tricky game as they are themselves oen 
criticized for their treatment of Russian speaking minorities. Given Russia’s 
pervasive inﬂuence among all of its smaller neighbours it is not surprising 
that the Baltic states, with relatively large Russian speaking populations, 
have developed relatively stringent minorities policies. Unfortunately for 
the Balts these strict minority policies have the eﬀect of undermining their 
democratic idealism strategy.
Another example that demonstrates the rather sensitive issue of adopting an 
appeasing stance towards undemocratic regimes is the question of liing the 
arms embargo on China. In this case, although opposition came mainly from 
some of the old member states, notably the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, 
reservations were also expressed also by new member states, including Latvia, 
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53
Poland and the Czech Republic. But unlike the question of Cuba, it is very 
much doubtful whether they were led by the same motives as Sweden and 
Denmark who opposed the liing of the embargo mainly because of concerns 
over human rights abuses in China. e question of China is more complex for 
a variety of reasons. One important consideration relates to ensuring economic 
opportunities for European companies in China and more speciﬁcally promot-
ing European defence industry interests in the Chinese market. erefore ﬁrm 
opposition to the proponents of liing the arms embargo (mainly France) 
would undoubtedly lead to complications in future relations with fellow EU 
member states. It is, however, rather striking that the new member states, espe-
cially the Balts and the Poles, did not oppose the liing of the embargo because 
of strong opposition from Washington. us it is interesting to examine this 
issue in terms of the Atlanticism of the EU newcomers. On this particular issue, 
there does not seem to be evidence that the US is exerting pressure on the new 
member states to block the liing of the embargo; moreover CEE states have 
not shown much ‘independent’ enthusiasm for this course of action. 
At the same time, this point demonstrates that foreign policy idealism is 
not something speciﬁcally related to “New Europe” but we can see it in EU-
15 as well. Apart from the old member states who opposed the liing on the 
arms embargo to China, we can raise the example of the Netherlands which 
in late 2004 in their capacity of EU presidency criticised the developments 
in Russia aer the Beslan attacks mainly because of idealistic motives . 
e Iraq issue discussed earlier also provides some interesting evidence of 
an idealistic approach to foreign policy. It was suggested that all the new EU 
members supported, directly or indirectly, the US-led coalition of the willing. 
But it cannot be assumed that their support for US policy on Iraq stemmed 
from the same considerations that prevailed within the US administration, 
even at the level of argumentation. e US leadership has consistently 
claimed that the main motive for overthrowing of Saddam Hussein related 
to his attempt to seize weapons of mass destruction, thus posing a threat to 
world peace. For Central European states a much more important motive for 
siding with the Americans was the fact that the regime of Saddam Hussein 
was inhuman, dictatorial and was well known for using terror against its 
own citizens. is idea resonated very strongly when the Czech position was 
debated in the Czech parliament and most especially in the Senate.⁴⁹
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Finally, signs of an idealistic approach to foreign policy may be detected 
in attitudes towards further enlargements. Most of the new member states 
are in favour of extending the EU beyond its existing borders, and this is 
true not only of political elites but also of citizens.⁵⁰ However on this point, 
it is much more diﬃcult to argue that the prevailing motivation of the new 
member states is based on economic considerations or wishes to bury the 
artiﬁcial division of the Old Continent. It is true that one element in this 
type of argument is that the EU should not become fortress Europe, by 
building prosperity inside the Union and not caring about what happens 
beyond the Union’s borders. But there are pragmatic reasons as well, that 
tend toward pushing the external border of the Union further away, thus 
eliminating many risks emanating from it. Geopolitical considerations have 
always been very strong in Central Europe and the idea of the region being 
a buﬀer zone still prevails. 
Furthermore, it may turn out that in many respects, the countries that 
hope to join the EU in the future are likely to become direct competitors 
to the 2004 enlargement states – due to entitlements for regional and struc-
tural aid with accession and their substantially lower labour costs. Moreover 
for those 2004 accession states that want more integration in certain ﬁelds 
(thereby joining the “EU core”) further enlargement poses certain dangers, 
i.e. maintaining both the speed and uniformity of the integration process. 
And ﬁnally the evidence presented with regard to widening the EU illustrates 
that new member states support for future enlargement is for the most part 
predicated on speciﬁc and pragmatic considerations. In the case of Hun-
gary it is the issue of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries. 
For Poland the focus is on the Ukraine because it is a potentially large and 
powerful partner in the EU. us the apparently idealistic approach of the 
2004 accession states towards further EU enlargement in reality contains 
many practical considerations. Such pragmatism is more likely to dominate 
the longer these countries are members of the EU. Long term membership is 
likely to prompt the realisation that the EU is not only about nice idealistic 
goals of European reuniﬁcation but also about the daily bargaining over 
“bread-and-butter” issues (a process that will become ever more diﬃcult with 
an increased number of member states). 
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us predicting the degree to which the foreign policy of the new member 
states will remain associated with idealistic goals is both diﬃcult and complex. 
Idealism in foreign policy during the 1990’s based largely on the actions of 
prominent dissident ﬁgures is likely to fade away. As senior communist era 
dissident ﬁgures begin to retire from public life in the CEE countries a new 
generation of more pragmatic policy makers are coming to the fore. But to 
some extent, foreign policy idealism may remain more associated, at least 
for some years to come, with Atlanticism rather than with the domestic 
legacy of dissidents. It seems that George W. Bush’s doctrine of “spreading 
freedom in the world” might still ﬁnd some ground in the more Atlanticist 
new members. ey may try to use similar arguments in pursuing speciﬁc 
foreign policy objectives. 
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6. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES AND CFSP
e ﬁnal part of this paper will try to highlight some issues that may arise 
with further enlargements in the area of EU foreign policy.⁵¹ e accession 
of the three potential candidates – Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey will also 
be very important in shaping CFSP.
e geographical location of the three countries of the Eastern Balkans 
and Asia Minor puts them in a speciﬁc position and pre-determines them to 
be strong players in the region that is of a crucial importance for the EU in 
the future. In fact, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are crossroads for several 
regions where the EU is already engaged: the Balkans, the Caucasus and 
the Middle East. 
Turkey will play a key role among the candidate countries for a variety of 
reasons: not solely because of its size giving it substantial voting power in EU 
institutions but also due to its role as a regional power and the size of its military 
which could make it a very important asset in ESDP.⁵² Turkey has oen been 
viewed as a very Atlanticist country. Its strategic alliance with the US is oen 
regarded as one of the key elements of Turkish foreign policy.⁵³ On the other 
hand, a certain shi in the attitudes towards the US can be detected recently. 
e AKP (Justice and Development) party of Prime Minister Erdogan has taken 
a much more hard-line stance, especially over Iraq, where the Turkish parlia-
ment voted against the stationing or movement of US troops through Turkey. 
e Transatlantic Trends Survey referred to earlier suggests that Turkish public 
opinion is the most anti-American of all the countries surveyed. erefore there 
is no guarantee that Turkey will be another “Trojan” horse of the US in Europe. 
On the contrary, aer joining the EU, it may seek to be a reassuring voice in 
CFSP aligning itself more with the autonomists rather than the Atlanticists. But 
as the AKP government clearly is more nationalist and traditionalist, much will 
depend on domestic political developments in Turkey. 
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Turkey will probably be instrumental in developing closer ties between 
the EU and the Caucasus region, because of its historical and economic 
ties and not least because of its position as an energy hub through which 
oil and gas supplies from the Caspian basin pass to Europe (e.g. the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline). And this is also where one of the main problem 
lies, namely Turkey’s complicated relations with Armenia. At the moment, 
relations are frozen and it seems obvious that normalisation of relations will 
become one of the litmus tests in the EU accession negotiations. e key 
issue will be recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the deeply 
rooted conviction among Armenians that Turkey is an enemy and not to 
be trusted. is is linked to the fact that Armenia is still looking towards 
Russia as the main guarantor of its security, which gives Russia substantial 
inﬂuence, especially aer the “loss” of Georgia. On the other hand, a strong 
Armenian diaspora in France has the potential to use the issue of unsettled 
history to block Turkish accession. us, the normalisation of relations 
between Armenia and Turkey is crucial in many respects. 
As for the Middle East, it has oen been argued that Turkey could be 
crucial in acting as an example to Muslim countries that Europe is not 
hostile to Islamic societies and cultures. In this respect Turkey could act 
as a bridge to the whole Middle East region. But this potential impact may 
be rather limited, due to Turkey’s complicated relations with Iran, Iraq 
and Syria, i.e. countries where EU diplomacy is already quite active. e 
strong links between Turkey and Israel also pose questions regarding the 
extent to which Turkey can act as an interlocutor with Arab countries in the 
region. On the other hand, as in the case of relations with the US, recent 
Turkish-Israeli relations have cooled with Prime Minister Erdogan being 
quite critical of the Sharon government. Undoubtedly Turkey has a lot 
of vital interests in the Middle East, ranging from water resources to the 
Kurdish issue. For this reason it is likely to be a very assertive player and 
unlikely to submit to any decision that could undermine its own concerns 
and interests. In any case, it is rather diﬃcult to estimate at the moment 
what impact Turkish accession might have on CFSP. A lot will depend on 
internal developments in Turkey as well as on what the Middle East and 
Black Sea regions are going to look like in some ﬁeen to twenty years, 
and obviously on the outcome of the accession negotiations which do not 
automatically guarantee a full membership. With the complicated political 
developments in Europe these days, the Turkish accession seems to be very 
much oﬀ the table for the moment. 
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e impact of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on CFSP is easier to 
predict, as both countries will join the EU soon, probably in 2007. Consider-
ing ﬁrst the issue of Atlanticism, it is quite likely that these two countries will 
follow the pattern of the other new member states in supporting US led poli-
cies, perhaps even more enthusiastically. Both countries strongly supported 
the US position on Iraq. In order to ensure a swi process of accession into 
NATO, both Bulgaria and Romania sent contingents to Afghanistan and 
Iraq and have demonstrated themselves to be the most loyal allies of the US 
in Eastern Europe. Such a stance obviously complicates their relations with 
some of the older EU member states. From the transatlantic perspective, 
the US administration views Bulgaria and Romania as being very important 
because of their stake in the Black Sea region.⁵⁴ Both countries are viewed 
as prime examples of how successful democracies in the region are clearly 
heading for EU membership, in contrast to some more troublesome parts 
of the Black Sea region, especially along its Northern and Eastern shores. 
Because of close links with the US, Bulgaria and Romania are perceived to 
be supportive of US policies in many respects, including support for pro-
reform movements in various parts of the region. In addition, Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession is likely to lead to EU involvement in so-called “frozen 
conﬂicts”,⁵⁵ and confronting the fears of perceived Russian interference 
amongst its smaller neighbouring states. 
e question remains to what extent the approach of Bulgaria and Roma-
nia will be based on a pro-active policy and to what extent it will remain US-
driven. It is quite clear that Romania and Bulgaria on one hand and Turkey 
on the other may be trying to pull the EU in diﬀerent directions. Turkey may 
be tempted to cosy up to Russia in terms of traditional nineteenth century 
spheres of inﬂuence thinking, especially if the current trends in foreign 
policy making based on nationalism and anti-Western sentiments endure. 
Movement by Turkey in this direction would be undoubtedly bolstered if 
EU negotiations proceed badly. Romania and Bulgaria might call for greater 
involvement of the EU in the region and use its so power to turn the Black 
Sea region into a safe neighbourhood for the wider EU, a strategy very 
likely to be actively supported by the Balts and the Poles. Certainly, Russia 
will remain an important actor in the region and EU involvement will be 
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determined to a large extent by the nature of EU-Russian relations. Given 
the virtual absence of a systematic EU policy towards Russia at the moment, 
Bulgarian and Romanian activities might complicate things further where the 
Black Sea region could potentially become – cum grano salis – another Iraq 
for CFSP. Needless to say, this would be very unfortunate and damaging for 
the credibility of EU foreign policy. 
As for more particular issues, it is quite likely that Romania will try to 
shape EU policy towards Moldova – many Moldovans posses Romanian 
citizenship, and the two countries are oen considered to be culturally and 
linguistically one nation. In the case of Bulgaria, it is likely to align with 
countries that are active in the Western Balkans. International cooperation 
in the Western Balkans region is already well developed and this cooperation 
is enhanced by a signiﬁcant NGO presence. 
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7. CONCLUSION
is paper has shown that the track record of the new member states 
in the CFSP during their ﬁrst year of membership is not as clear-cut as is 
sometimes assumed. e new member states have not and are not going 
to automatically side with the US on many issues regarding foreign policy, 
because of diﬀerent domestic considerations, varying degrees of public sup-
port for alliance with the US and because of diﬀerent threat perceptions. As 
the geographical interests of the new member states will vary signiﬁcantly, 
a united “New Europe” push towards particular regions and issues cannot be 
expected. Finally, although in the recent past the political leaders in the new 
member states tended to act with what could be broadly described as an ideal-
ist approach to foreign policy, this phenomenon is not likely to endure either, 
because with membership of the EU, these countries are starting to realize 
that European integration is very much a pragmatic project – a characteristic 
that also applies to the domain of foreign policy. 
Given that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not going to 
act as a homogenous bloc in shaping CFSP, certain dividing lines can be 
drawn across the region. ese dividing lines are determined by the com-
bination of three factors. e main dividing line will run between the three 
Baltic republics and Poland on one hand and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Slovenia on the other. 
e ﬁrst group will be characterized by a strong emphasis on making CFSP 
compatible with US policies, not only in terms of defence (demonstrated by 
a strong focus on NATO) but also on other issues, such as policy towards 
Russia, the Ukraine, or the Black Sea region. ese countries will also pri-
oritise EU external action in the East, namely ﬁnding a common EU stance 
towards Russia, oﬀering incentives to the Ukraine to keep its pro-European 
path chosen during the Orange Revolution and possibly to encouraging 
democratic changes in other parts of former Soviet Union. And because 
of their motivation in keeping Russia out and as far away as possible from 
Central and Eastern Europe, they will be prepared to commit themselves to 
helping the countries surrounding Russia to emerge from the Russian sphere 
of inﬂuence and to tie them more closely to the EU. For this reason, the 
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Baltic republics and Poland will use the rhetoric of democracy (as opposed 
to authoritarian rule), rule of law and the right of countries to choose their 
own destiny as an integral part of their foreign policy activities. 
Poland is in a particular position because it is in terms of foreign policy 
priorities strongly linked to the Baltic states but remains anchored in Central 
European co-operation initiatives (e.g. Visegrád and the Central European 
Initiative) a situation that makes it a bridge between the two groups. is 
certainly underlines its aspiration to remain a regional power and to speak 
on certain occasions on behalf of the CEE region, a fact which is only 
accepted with reservations, or not accepted at all, by Poland’s Central 
European neighbours. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are oen perceived as one bloc but the 
reality is more complex. Firstly, there is no consistent co-ordination among 
them on foreign policy issues. ese countries oen chose to work through 
diﬀerent channels. For example, Lithuania has aligned with Poland to 
steer the EU policy on the Ukraine aer the Orange revolution, a move 
that is understandable for historical reasons. Estonia seems to be trying to 
keep a lower proﬁle and co-ordinate its activities with Finland, which has 
a considerable inﬂuence in Brussels, given its size. Latvia, who seems to be 
lacking strong allies in the EU, is le to pursue perhaps the most Atlanticist 
course, which is apparently understood in Washington and was underlined 
by the stopover in Riga of President Bush on his way to Moscow on May 
6-7, 2005. is demonstrates that the Balts, given their relatively small size 
and particular concerns, are aware of the necessity of having strong allies to 
be able to contribute to EU foreign policy. Furthermore the Balts have seen 
the merits of working through the European Parliament. 
e situation in the remaining Central European states is considerably 
diﬀerent. For them, the issue of developing a strong and coherent policy 
towards Russia is far less important, because Russia is viewed as much less 
of an external or domestic threat. ey are more likely to exert pressure in 
the EU to focus on the Western Balkans where they have strong stakes (albeit 
for diﬀerent reasons). Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia adopted a particularly 
hard line on the issue of (not) opening accession negotiations with Croatia. 
e Atlanticist commitment of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia is not equally intense as there is no uniform consensus among 
national political elites that siding with the US is always the best option. 
Moreover public opinion is less Atlanticist in Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia than in the Baltic/Poland group, which gives the gov-
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ernments in these four countries even more leeway to “Europeanize” their 
foreign policy. e new member states idealism in foreign policy was perhaps 
best demonstrated by the Czech position on Cuba, but this phenomenon is 
likely to be an exception rather than the rule and will probably diminish as 
the main proponent of this policy – Václav Havel – has retired from active 
politics. In general, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia can 
be described as being more “relaxed” in terms of foreign policy, giving them 
more ﬂexibility in shaping their positions or balancing out diﬀerent group-
ings inside the EU. However such a relaxed stance gives them less leverage 
in shaping decision-making within the EU as a whole. 
In conclusion, it is not possible to give a deﬁnite answer to Wessel’s 
contentions as to what scenarios the new EU member states are going to 
follow in CFSP. is is because the 2004 accession states cannot be viewed 
as a compact bloc. It seems that in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Hungary future foreign policy strategies are likely to exhibit patterns 
consonant with both the neutral and optimistic scenarios. ese countries 
have kept quite a low proﬁle on most foreign policy issues discussed in the 
Council since accession, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic on 
the Cuban issue. Such a low proﬁle strategy helped to repair the transatlantic 
ris over Iraq. In the case of Poland and the Balts, these countries have been 
more active in attempting to shape the EU’s relationship towards Russia. e 
impact of Baltic and Polish policy in this regard has been rather mixed. It 
maybe assumed that their push for a more comprehensive EU-Russia policy 
is mainly driven by domestic considerations and this is particularly true in 
the case of the Balts. Such a situation is suggestive of a pessimistic scenario. 
However given the virtual non-existence of any common EU policy towards 
Russia, they cannot be blamed for this as other EU member states, notably 
France, Germany and Italy, have behaved in a similar way. us, we can 
trace elements of neutral, optimistic and pessimistic behaviours and strategies 
among the new member states in their attempts to shape EU foreign policy. 
Whether any of these scenarios will eventually predominate or whether future 
developments will continue to exhibit a combination of all three behaviours 
and strategies remains to be seen. 
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Not all is achievable with military instruments, 
yet nothing is achievable without them. 
Raymond Aron 
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1. INTRODUCTION
e ‘European defence’ idea is as old as the project of European integra-
tion itself.¹ Following a number of long-winded adventures the European 
defence project took shape of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) in 1998 which has been becoming a still more important component 
of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security (CFSP). is intergovernmental 
initiative representing a new dimension of European integration² is surely 
a milestone on the integration journey on which ESDP is as important as 
the single market or the monetary union.³ In relation to the ESDP (and the 
whole CFSP) EU member states have decided to extend – though on the 
intergovernmental level – the scope of the Union’s action to areas which had 
previously been under exclusive control by nation states, in spite of a similar 
military and political cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic 
Alliance for over ﬁy years. ESDP can be said to be a part of European politi-
cal integration while coming in reaction to the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent hot wars on the European continent throughout the 1990s, wars 
that Europe was unable to face with adequate reaction.
In spite of its large population and great economic power (the EU is the 
largest economic superpower in the world and the most populous entity in the 
West) Europe remains a ‘political dwarf’, as claimed by Nicole Gnesotto.⁴ So far, 
Europe has not been able to look aer its own security and take up responsibility 
for what is happening on the European continent, to say nothing of the world.
ESDP could thus be described as an eﬀort at the emancipation of Europe 
so as to leave behind Europe’s legacy of the Cold War and start intervening in 
military conﬂicts and crises on the continent or even beyond, in areas under the 
aegis of Europeans such as in Africa, with the new joint military instruments 
made operable only through cooperative eﬀort (such as armed forces speciali-
1)  Lefebvre, M.: Les perspectives de la défense européenne. In: Montbrial, T. (ed.): Ramses 2004, IFRI-Dunod, Paris 2003, p. 88.
2)  Editorial in: Mezinárodní politika, No. 3, 2000, p. 3.
3)  Brimmer, E.: Conclusion. In: Brimmer, E .(ed.): The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns 
Hopkins Un., Washington 2002, p. 159.
4)  Gnesotto, N.: Introduction. In: Gnesotto, N. (ed): EU Security and Defence Policy: First Five Years. Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris 2004, p. 35.
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sation). ESDP is to allow the Union to undertake military operations without 
ﬁrst US and, later on, also the NATO assistance: so far, the ESDP has been 
linked and complementary to NATO, as part of a larger package of ‘burden 
sharing’.⁵ ese operations shall be undertaken by the European Union in line 
with its values, such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, political and 
cultural pluralism, and peace and prosperity on the European continent and in 
the world. ey shall be carried out according to the Union’s principles which 
include the emphasis on international law, multilateralism, co-operation and 
assistance. Last but not least, ESDP is also geared towards stimulating Europe-
an governments to pay more attention to their own defence – and increase their 
defence spending – to end their security dependence on the United States. 
e ESDP has had a brief but dynamic past record⁶ with a number of 
achievements. Even though the thoughts of an autonomous European 
defence were considered utopian during the Cold War era and found reso-
nance in only some, predominantly French, political circles, the end of the 
Cold War transformed them into a necessary reality. 
ESDP itself has evolved from the previous European Security and Defence 
Identity – the ‘NATO’s European pillar’ – and has been accepted by all EU 
Member States in the end, chieﬂy due to the fact that it was Great Britain 
who co-sponsored the eﬀort along with France aer Tony Blair became the 
UK Prime Minister. Great Britain’s own perception of its role in ESDP is that 
of a driving force. e USA has declared its support to the ESDP project to 
a certain extent and under certain conditions. ESDP is provided for in the 
primary law of the European Union and has its own institutions, along with 
its slowly developing Rapid Reaction Force and Battle Groups. First military 
operations in the Balkans and Congo have been undertaken under the ESDP 
leadership and EU ﬂag even though all of them relied on NATO military 
and planning capacities, except for the Congo operation. ESDP has gained 
wide support from the general public across EU states with people preferring 
ESDP rather than NATO and reliance on the US.⁷ 
And yet, despite all these indisputable achievements the ESDP is still tied 
by substantial constrictions, symptomatic more or less for the whole CFSP or 
European political integration in general. To a large extent, the implementa-
tion of ESDP targets is a compromise struck among the EU Member States 
5)  Layne, C.: Death Knell for Nato? Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, Washington 2001, p. 5. 
6)  Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 11. 
7)  Eurobarometer 62, Autumn 2004, www.europa.eu.int.
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and is hostage to the unity of their positions on foreign policy and security 
issues which is very hard to achieve, especially in issues that are on top of the 
national foreign policy list. Each of the EU states has projected its national 
foreign policy and security preferences into the implementation of ESDP 
goals and each of these EU states has had a diﬀerent perception of the need 
for autonomous European defence and European political emancipation 
or the role of NATO and the USA in European security. Last but not least, 
the ESDP project has been discredited by the ongoing unwillingness by EU 
Member States to spend (even slightly) more on defence because of their 
strained budgets having to bear up the welfare state burden. On the one hand, 
Europe wishes to take on some more responsibility for its defence and become 
a heavier global actor, on the other hand, however, Europeans are not willing 
to spend enough money on that goal (in fact, of all the EU countries, only 
Great Britain, France and to a lesser extent Germany have armies that could 
be used in modern operations). In general, many ESDP and CFSP aspects 
are dealt with on the theoretical level, ‘on the paper’, but the execution falls 
behind the plan, due to a number of reasons.
e ESDP project is not carried out in a vacuum even though that might 
sometimes seem to be the case. It seeks to react to the transformation of the 
security milieu aer the Cold War.⁸ New, ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’ threats 
have emerged upon the disappearance of the communist threat. Terrorism now 
represents the primary threat for the West, as the September 11 2001 attacks and 
other later attacks in Madrid and London conﬁrmed. Along with these changes, 
the understanding of security and security policy have also been transformed 
into much more complex notions, including a broad range of both military 
and non-military instruments. is has had a crucial impact on the security and 
defence policies of European states as new threats have been deﬁned, helped 
to legitimise the very existence of ESDP (the EU as a civilian – and future 
military – power aspiring to become a universal security structure), and some-
what challenged, in the long term, the so far unswerving position of NATO 
as an exclusively military organization.⁹ ese changes in the security milieu 
have met with even more avid response on the other side of the Atlantic: the 
US security policy has been adapted and rationalized, though in a diﬀerent 
way and through diﬀerent methods of ﬁrst choice than in Europe. e very 
deﬁnition of threats, however, is the same for Europe and the USA. 
8)  Cameron, F.: The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union CFSP. Sheffield University Press, Sheffield 1999, p. 69.
9)  Van Ham, P.: Security and Culture, or why NATO Won’t Last. In: Security Dialogue, No. 4, 2001.
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ese ESDP developments have been closely linked to the development of 
transatlantic relationship and the transatlantic security link. e transatlantic 
link was the axis of Western security throughout the Cold War era, largely 
retaining this role in the post-Cold War context as the community of values 
and fundamental interests still means that Europe and North America need 
each other as allies. A debate has started, however, on a substantial transforma-
tion of the transatlantic relationship in relation to the building of a political 
union and CFSP (and ESDP) as well as in the context of a changed US foreign 
and security policy aer September 11, 2001 which has brought unilateralism 
and non-reliance on Europe and NATO and, eventually, caused a rupture in 
the West over Iraq. e two sides of the Atlantic are said to be mowing away 
from each other.¹⁰ e USA has become less interested in Europe and it is in 
this respect that Americans welcome the European eﬀorts to take over from 
them the responsibility for Europe’s own security. At the same time, Washing-
ton – along with some European capitals – is concerned about the EU being 
overambitious in terms of the common EU’s foreign and defence policy by 
seeking to establish ESDP as a defence union, making the EU the world’s 
leader and a global power. e potential (and still more or less theoretical) 
translation of these ambitions into reality might dramatically change or dam-
age, depending on the point of view, the transatlantic relationship and the 
position of NATO, dominated by Americans.¹¹ It might also threaten the US 
interests and the dominance of the USA in the world. 
is paper seeks to analyse the current and future eﬀect ESDP might 
have on the transatlantic relationship while trying to ﬁnd out what form of 
ESDP might disrupt the transatlantic partnership in the future and what 
form would, on the contrary, be beneﬁcial. is paper aims to prove that 
ESDP is perfectly compatible with the transforming transatlantic relations, 
providing speciﬁc conditions are met, which will be speciﬁed in the below 
text. is claim is not made because of the fact that the currently minimal-
ist ESDP is not in conﬂict with the transatlantic relations and the role of 
NATO today as this might change over time, depending on further ESDP 
developments. is assumption is rather made on the basis of a successful 
ESDP being able to bridge the present ‘mental gap’ between Europe and the 
USA stemming from their diﬀerent military potentials and their willingness 
to use military force. 
10)  Layne, 2001, p. 9.
11)  Khol, R.: Introduction. In: Khol, R. (ed.): ESDP: Národní perspektivy. ÚMV, Praha 2002, p. 9.
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e paper will also aim at proving that the existence and development 
of ESDP are inescapable – though problematic – because the very transat-
lantic relation must become more balanced to beneﬁt all stakeholders and 
maintain the transatlantic link for the future since the importance of this 
relation is unquestionable for the whole Western community. e primary 
focus of the future transatlantic relations in security and defence shall be 
on the EU-US relationship whose goal should not be to become absolutely 
conﬂict-free at any costs. e focus shall therefore shi from NATO, even 
though, from the practical point of view, NATO might seem indispensable 
today. We do not dispute NATO’s role in a mutual defence relation. As an 
organisation though, NATO has been losing its political raison d’etre from 
the long-term perspective, we believe, because of the ongoing political 
integration of the EU and the recently changing security milieu and due 
to the transformation of US foreign and security policy. 
e paper builds on a top-down critical analysis method. First of all, 
we focus on general issues such as the changing security environment and 
the post-Cold War developments in the security policy of Europe and the 
United States. A case study comparing the European Security Strategy with 
the US National Security Strategy is used to illustrate this. is case study 
is followed by an assessment of post-Cold War transatlantic relations, along 
with an outline of the ESDP developments so far, follows, tracking the prog-
ress both on paper and in practice, focusing on the key aspects of ESDP. 
Another section of the paper deals with European defence industry which 
is a marginal topic in respect of ESDP but plays an important role in the 
broader security context of our paper. ese introductory – rather descrip-
tive – chapters serve as a backdrop to some more speciﬁc issues such as the 
positions of key nations on ESDP. We will focus on Great Britain, France, 
Germany and the USA. ese actors’ attitudes towards ESDP are absolutely 
crucial for this paper: the analysis of these common and divergent positions 
will allow us to predict future ESDP developments and their impact on 
transatlantic relations as it is states, in the ﬁrst place, that determines the 
nature of ESDP and the transatlantic relation. is analysis takes account of 
the long-term and continuous positions of these states represented by their 
governments. Where appropriate, however, some attention is also given to 
other actors, such as opposition parties etc. And, ﬁnally, the concluding 
synthesis seeks to answer the question asked at the beginning: How and 
under what conditions will ESDP inﬂuence transatlantic relations?
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Before starting with the analysis, we shall turn to the state-of-the-art debate 
on this topic. Since ESDP and post-Cold War transatlantic relations are 
extremely topical and fast evolving issues, there is quite little consensus among 
experts on these themes. ere is practically no disagreement among the 
authors about the fact that some European defence policy is deﬁnitely needed 
today to remove the burden from the US shoulders and that a transatlantic 
defence alliance must be retained. Little consensus, however, is found in what 
the defence policy should look like and whether it should go hand in hand 
with an overall political emancipation of Europe or rather with the eﬀort to 
make the EU a global player acting independently from or even contrary to 
the USA. ere is a whole range of views on, for example, the future of NATO: 
some authors, in minority now, argue that NATO is irreplaceable, being the 
only eﬀective embodiment of the transatlantic defence relations which is seri-
ously threatened by an extensively evolving ESDP. Other experts perceive 
NATO as an obsolete ‘Cold War relic’¹² which is not to today’s security reality 
and lags behind the transforming transatlantic relations and the changing US 
security policy. (Security is a complex notion: it is necessary to combine and 
complement military and non-military instruments as well as internal and 
external security policies.) ese authors see the Union or the ESDP, operat-
ing with a wider range of instruments than NATO, as the only chance to carry 
out a European security policy in the context of recent developments. ere 
is no consensus among authors on what the security and defence relations 
between Europe and the USA should be like in the future: similar to today’s 
relations, i.e. security interdependence even though Europe is rather depen-
dent on the US in this model; or diﬀerent, with Europe and the USA becoming 
equal and independent partners who may ‘quarrel’ from time to time, aer 
all. A note must be made here that the views of these experts are oen out 
of sync with the views of politicians and administrations of their respective 
countries. Yet, there are clear exceptions to this: French authors unanimously 
pushing for ‘European solutions’ and authors from the ‘New Europe’ coun-
tries – including from the Czech Republic – clinging to the current status of 
NATO because, being ‘orthodox Atlanticists’, they see NATO as the corner 
stone of security of their countries which have only recently joined NATO 
and have still been inﬂuenced by their deeply troubled past.¹³ Despite some 
distrust by US administrations of ESDP, there are many American authors 
12)  Layne, 2001, p. 9.
13)  Bugajski, J., Teleki, I.: Washington’s New European Allies: Durable or Conditional Partners? The Washington Quaterly, No. 2, 2005.
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who rather welcome ESDP and its further progress, including the develop-
ment of a ‘new, balanced transatlantic partnership’¹⁴. is is either because 
they recognise European ambitions as legitimate, or because of the need to 
‘disregard’ Europe as such, in the spirit of the new Republican ‘isolationism’. 
In general, ‘non-believers’ in ESDP and a possible equality in the EU-US 
relationship pointing out the need for NATO retaining its current role, are 
‘closer to the practice’, perceiving NATO as indispensable at this moment in 
time and in practical terms. On the contrary, ESDP supporters who believe 
that an equal security partnership between the EU and the USA is the only 
feasible one for the future are closer to academia and theoretical thinking. 
Little has been written on the very topic of ESDP eﬀects on the wider 
transatlantic relations. Given the complexity of the issue examined, we had 
to rely on a synthesis of a broad spectrum of publications on (current and 
future) transatlantic relations in general and ESDP in particular, along with 
the individual positions of states on security and defence. We also studied 
publications analysing the theoretical aspects of security policy and the cur-
rent trends. As things move very quickly in this area, we had to follow the 
press and news servers as well. A number of publicly available sources were 
relied on, too, such as EU summit communiqués etc. 
We have taken four publications as the main reference documents for 
the analysis of facts, deﬁnitions and views. Two of them – one by a French 
and the other by a Czech author – deal with the ESDP development and 
main features (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003)¹⁵ or the positions of key 
countries on ESDP (Khol, 2002),¹⁶ both being quite detailed. e other two 
publications are written by American authors, one by a US thin-tank CSIS¹⁷ 
focussing on the past and present developments in the transatlantic relations 
(Balis, Serfaty, 2004)¹⁸ and the other by a Johns Hopkins University team, 
dealing with the way how the ESDP eﬀects the transatlantic relations (Brim-
mer, 2002).¹⁹ e last-mentioned volume was the major source of information 
for us in terms of our assessment of the future ESDP scenarios and the likely 
impact on the transatlantic relations. Publications stressing the importance 
of building an autonomous European defence (Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 
14)  Layne, 2001, p. 11.
15)  Dumoulin, A., Mathieu, R., Sarlet,, G.: La PESD. Bruylant, Brussels 2003.
16)  Khol, R. (ed): ESDP: Národní perspektivy. ÚMV, Praha 2002.
17)  Center for Strategic and International Studies.
18)  Balis, C., Serfaty, S. (eds.): Visions of America and Europe. CSIS, Washington 2004. 
19)  Brimmer, E. (ed.): The EU’s Search for Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Johns Hopkins University, Washington 2002.
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2001; Layne, 2001),²⁰ pointing out to the weakening political role of NATO 
(Van Ham, 2000),²¹ and the need for a balanced transatlantic relationship 
(Brimmer, 2002; Sweiss, 2003)²² were of crucial guidance to us as well. On 
the other hand, we had to stand in critical opposition to some Czech authors, 
namely to Jiří Schneider and Michael Žantovský²³ representing a thought 
community insisting on the indispensability of NATO as the single frame-
work for transatlantic relations. As much as ESDP is concerned, we also had 
to somewhat relativise the Robert Kagan’s famous Power and Weakness.²⁴ 
Let us conclude this introductory section with the deﬁnitions of several key 
notions used throughout our paper. By the frequently used term ‘Europe’ we 
mean a political area of Western Europe embracing EU Member State and 
candidate countries and the European NATO members. For the purposes 
of this text, the transatlantic relationship is reduced to security and defence 
cooperation (we refer to a transatlantic link), in spite of the need to take the 
political dimension (i.e. the politically balanced relationship between the 
EU and the USA) into account as well. Security and defence policy shall mean 
a policy providing for the security of a given entity. Nowadays, however, 
this is not limited to the defence of a state territory by force only and to the 
reliance on armed forces and intelligence but it increasingly covers out-of-
area military or other operations²⁵ or international cooperation, in line with 
respective foreign policies. When speaking about European defence or the 
European Union security and defence policy (the EU being composed of nation 
states with their own defence policies), we refer to the latter security policy 
category only, i.e. to operations abroad.²⁶ e European security and defence 
policy (ESDP) is understood very speciﬁcally, as an EU project or policy 
implemented aer 1998 only, despite occasionally dealing with the future 
models of ESDP as well. 
20)  Andréani, G., Bertram, C., Grant, C.: Europe’s Military Revolution. Centre for European Reform, Londýn 2001; Layne, C.: Death Knell 
for NATO? CATO Institute Policy Analysis, Washington 2001. 
21)  Van Ham, P.: Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implications for Transatlantic Relationship. In: Security Dialogue, No. 2, 2000. 
22)  Schweiss, C.: Sharing Hegemony: Future of Transatlantic Security. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003. 
23)  Schneider, J., Žantovský, M.: NATO and the Greater Middle East: A Mission to Renew NATO. Pass Policy Paper No. 1, Prague 2003. 
Schneider, J.: Budoucnost transatlantických vztahů z pohledu České republiky. In: Mezinárodní politika, No. 4, 2005. 
24)  Kagan, R.: Power and Weakness. Policy Review, No. 113, 2002.
25)  Cameron, 1999. 
26)  Krahmann, E.: Conceptualizing Security Governance. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 1, 2003.
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2. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE SECURITY CULTURE OF 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
2.1. Changing Understanding of Security 
and Security Policy after the Cold War 
is paper deals with the post-Cold War period which has brought about 
a fundamental change in the security milieu and, sooner or later, the reactions 
by members of the Western community. e vacuum created by the sudden 
disappearance of the dominant threat from the Communist camp has been 
ﬁlled by ‘asymmetric threats’ posed by non-state actors who did operate prior 
to the end of the Cold War but were not paid much attention to and were 
only recognised by the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001. e transformed 
security environment has necessitated modiﬁcations in the strategic thinking 
of both Americans and Europeans. 
Traditionally, security thinking distinguished between external security 
(reactions to threats from abroad) and internal security (reactions to threats 
coming from within). A distinction used to be also made between hard secu-
rity (reaction to a military threat by a state by using military instruments) 
and so security (reaction to internal and cross-border threats by non-state 
entities by using both military – hard power²⁷– but also non-military – so 
power – instruments).²⁸ Because of the presence and nature of the new, asym-
metric threats it is not tenable to treat these as separate categories since they are 
intertwined: all security threats must be approached in a complex way today.²⁹ 
In other words, post-Cold Ward security is a complex issue covering even those 
areas that had previously not been included in the security category.³⁰
27)  Fatič, A.: Conventional and Unconventional – Hard and Soft Security: The Distinction. South-East Europe Review, No.3, 2002, pp. 93-98. 
28)  Joseph Nye defines the combination of soft power and hard power methods as a ‘carrot and stick’ method. (Nye, J.: The Paradox of 
American Power. Oxford Un. Press, Oxford 2003, p. 10).
29)  Van Ham, 2001, p. 396.
30)  Cf. the concept of ‘securizitation’ – Waever, O.: Securitization and Desecuritization. In: Lipschutz, R. (ed.): On Security. Columbia 
University Press, New York 1995.
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2.2. Comparing the European Security Strategy and the US 
National Security Strategy
e European Security Strategy and the United States National Security 
Strategy provide the best illustration of the new European and American 
perception of threats and the adequate answers to these threats. 
e National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) was 
draed in 2002. In spite of the NSS being a standard document produced 
by every US administration, the NSS of the Bush administration, draed 
aer the 9/11 attacks, holds a privileged position as it is considered to be an 
embodiment of a long-term US foreign and security policy aer the Cold 
War. NSS has identiﬁed three major threats: terrorism, regional conﬂicts and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.³¹ 
e European Security Strategy (ESS), subtitled as ‘A Secure Europe in 
a Better World,’ was draed to serve as a long-term strategic conception of 
the EU Member States (not only) for the purposes of CFSP. e ESS was 
endorsed at the December 2003 summit in Brussels. e ESS identiﬁes the 
same threats as the NSS but adds another two: failed states and organised 
crime.³² e ESS is certainly document providing a fair reﬂection of today’s 
security reality. e strategy, however, is a hurried document – it is not clear 
how the ESS is going to be implemented as it is a joint strategy of twenty 
ﬁve states.³³ But this aspect should be le aside for the moment. 
Europe and the USA agree, in principle, on the deﬁnition of threats. 
ey are, however, at times in disagreement over the way of facing them. 
Europe is generally in favour of an ‘eﬀective multilateralism’³⁴ building on 
the primary role of international organisations (the UN in particular) which 
provides more space for Europe to exert its inﬂuence.³⁵ is method is 
built on an assumption that diplomatic instruments must be used to muster 
support for the use of force (and possible military solutions) from as many 
states as possible to make this use of force legitimate and to ensure that this 
solution complies with international law. Europe also argues that, besides 
force, prevention through humanitarian and economic aid as well as through 
31)  Weiss, T.: Evropská bezpečnostní strategie ve světle Národní bezpečnostní strategie USA. In: Integrace, 27/9/2004. European Security 
Strategy, 2003, s.3-4; National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002, part III, IV,V
32)  Ibid.
33)  Grevi, G.: No Strategy Without Politics. Ideas Factory – European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2004. 
34)  Weiss, 2004. European Security Strategy, 2002, s. 9.
35)  Multilateralism is an idea once promoted by the United States (by presidents Wilson and Roosevelt) as an alternative to the European 
Concert that lead the world into two world wars.
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wider co-operation (so power) can be eﬀective in ﬁghting terrorism where 
no negotiation is possible. 
e United States, on the contrary, generally favour preventive or pre-emp-
tive actions taken without any previous diplomatic negotiations and recourse 
to international law.³⁶ is strategy grows from a conviction that the absolute 
national sovereignty concept in the UN Charter is an antiquated notion and 
that immediate interventions are necessary to safeguard human rights and 
democracy even at the price of an armed conﬂict. (is strategy is undoubtedly 
built on the high-level US armed forces allowing for fast and precise actions 
without substantial harm to civilian populations.) Moreover, the traditional 
US Cold War doctrine of deterrence is not eﬀective in ﬁghting terrorism.³⁷ 
We must note that European countries do not reject the pre-emptive action 
doctrine as such but they understand it in the spirit of the ‘Annan Doctrin’ of 
humanitarian intervention,³⁸ i.e. as a military intervention by the international 
community in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster or a massive violation 
of human rights, such as in Kosovo in 1999. It is clear, however, that the war in 
Iraq, for example, has gone beyond this concept of humanitarian intervention: 
Iraq was not a failed-state type of a threat as deﬁned under the ESS – and failed 
states are to be assisted, on top of that. Instead, it was an implementation by 
the USA of a regime change doctrine³⁹ which does not see the threat in failed 
states that have to be assisted but rather in the rogue states whose regimes need 
to be overthrown by military force. 
e US National Security Strategy is based on the notion that internal 
and external or hard and so security are both part of a larger whole and 
that the USA, with its military capacities, would be ‘better oﬀ’ in exporting 
the eﬀort to safeguard its internal – or so – security (e.g. the ﬁght against 
terrorism) abroad. is means that an internal/so security threat is reacted 
to by using hard security/power instruments.⁴⁰ Europe, on the other hand, 
makes a distinction between external security (through national defence or 
NATO and/or ESDP) and internal security (the ﬁght against terrorism using 
intelligence within national borders or EU-level coordination such as in the 
spheres of police cooperation or an anti-terrorist coordinator). 
36)  Weiss, 2004. Pre-emptive war is what happens when a state targets an enemy that represents an imminent threat of attack. The 
Six-Day War was a pre-emptive war. Preventive war is what happens when a state targets an enemy before they can become an 
imminent threat of attack. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a preventive war.
37)  Föhrenbach, G.: Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p.15.
38)  A concept promoted by Bernard Kouchner, the chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières, in the 1980s. 
39)  Courmont, B.: Washington et le monde. In: Boniface, P. (ed.): L’Année stratégique 2004. IRIS, Paris 2003. 
40)  Shapiro, J., Suzan, B.: The French Experience of Counter-terrorism. In: Survival, No. 1, 2003, pp. 79-80. 
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e USA has a wealth of both hard power/security and so security instru-
ments, Europe (or the EU) has a wide range of purely so power instruments: 
Europe enjoys much more trust in the world due to the weight of a joint 
position of many countries and the ‘power of an example,’⁴¹ it has a much 
greater potential to negotiate and much greater potential to help and cooper-
ate. What is positive about the transatlantic link is the mutual inspiration in 
this respect – in communicating with their US ally, European states realise 
the need for more hard power while the USA recognise the many beneﬁts of 
so power thanks to Europe.⁴² It is therefore quite paradoxical that Europe 
used to be the greatest power in terms of hard security while the USA exerted 
most of its inﬂuence as a so power. 
41)  Nye, 2003, p. 9.
42)  Otte, M.: ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 53. 
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3. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
 AFTER COLD WAR 
3.1. New Reality for an ‘Old Relationship’
e transatlantic relations have been going through a time of signiﬁcant 
change caused by the above-mentioned transformation of the strategic milieu 
aer the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. It is necessary to note that pessimism 
is currently prevailing in terms of the future of the Atlantic alliance, mainly 
due to the Iraq crisis.⁴³ More and more voices point out that the two sides 
of the Atlantic are moving apart from one another and that common values 
no longer have much weight in a world of increasingly divergent interests 
and growing disagreements. All of this goes hand in hand with increased 
anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in the USA.⁴⁴ 
On the other hand, we may assume that the alliance from the Cold War 
era would endure the new threats and challenges and that the Western com-
munity of values has not ceased to exist but has begun transforming into 
a ‘more conﬂicting community,’ a community which is, nevertheless, driven 
by the will to actively deal with and overcome the conﬂicts. Extensive trade 
between the two Atlantic coasts, the largest ﬂow of goods and investments 
in the world⁴⁵ prove the tight bond. (e trade exchange exceeds USD 500 
billion, creating some six million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.)⁴⁶
According to Richard Holbrook, the United States was a ‘European power’ 
throughout the Cold War era.⁴⁷ Back in 1990, the then US President George 
Bush claimed that: ‘We are not in Europe for the sake of the Europeans – we 
are in Europe for our own sake.’⁴⁸ With the end of the Cold War, however, the 
unifying threat of Communism has disappeared and, for many authors, the 
43)  Solana, J: Foreword. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. VII. 
44)  Transatlantic Trends 2004. German Marshall Fund, Washington 2004. 
45)  Up to now, American investment in the Netherlands has been higher than the US investment in China. Similarly, the French 
investment in Texas is greater than the French investment in the whole of China (Němec, P.: Atlantická obchodní válka? Važme 
slova. Hospodářské noviny, 26/4/2005. 
46)  Solana, 2002, p. VII. 
47)  Föhrenbach, 2002, p. 12. 
48)  Penksa, S., Warren, M.: EU Security Cooperation and Transatlantic Relationship. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003, p. 267.
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world has shied from the bipolar to a multipolar model, by the virtue of which 
the reason for US ‘hegemony’ over Europe has disappeared. One thing must 
be highlighted, however: the current condition of the transatlantic security 
relation is largely a legacy of the Cold War. Europe has not been able to cast 
away this legacy and the and so has Europe’s ‘security dependence’ on the USA 
persisted. Western Europe got used to not being engaged in its own security 
during the Cold War and the reactions to the end of the Cold War era were by 
no means adequate. At the same time, and quite paradoxically, this European 
‘dependency’ on the USA deepens the transatlantic divergences caused by the 
fact that Europe relies less on military power in dealing with conﬂicts and tends 
to criticise US solutions based on force. Some authors go as far as to speak of 
a new ‘European appeasement’.⁴⁹ American political scientist Robert Kagan 
described this quite aptly in his famous essay Power and Weakness⁵⁰ by claim-
ing that ‘the USA come from Mars and Europe from Venus’ – whereas it was 
exactly the other way round before World War II. is process runs parallel 
with similar developments in the ‘European public opinion’⁵¹ which has – since 
the 1980s – been generally strongly anti-war and even anti-American or at least 
has not largely approved of the current US role in the world, trusting more to 
Europe which, however, is hardly breathing down America’s neck in terms of 
political clout and global role.⁵² 
NATO, born as an alliance to defend the West against the Soviet block, 
is the major security glue in the transatlantic relations which has less and 
less practical use, however, aer the Cold War and whose future is not quite 
clear.⁵³ Both Europeans and Americans continued to speak about the nec-
essary reform of the alliance aer the Cold War in order to modify NATO 
to be able to operate outside Europe and the North Atlantic region. Some 
substantial reform steps were taken at the 1999 Washington summit where 
a new strategic concept was endorsed. On the 2002 Prague summit NATO 
Rapid Reaction Forces were created, and, ﬁnally, at the 2004 Istanbul summit 
out-of-area operations were oﬃcially promoted on the basis of the NATO-
headed operation in Afghanistan. As much as there is no doubt about the 
actual irreplaceability of NATO’s operational and planning capacities, the 
49)  Serfaty, S: Anti-Europeanism in America and Anti-Americanism in Europe. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 6. 
50)  Kagan, 2002. 
51)  The term ‘European public opinion’ is a highly problematic one. Some authors, such as Domique Reynié, point out that it is especially 
in relation to the war in Iraq and the US role in the world that such a phenomenon does exist. 
52)  Eurobarometr 62, Autumn 2004. 
53)  Layne, 2001.
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political meaning of this organisation has become a moot point. More and 
more voices can be heard about NATO being an obsolete political structure 
out of all current and future reality of the EU-US relations.⁵⁴ Given their 
recent foreign and security policy unilateralism, Americans are not increasing 
NATO’s political prestige either: on the one hand, they declare NATO to be 
indispensable (and any autonomous European defence policy redundant). 
On the other hand, their recent political conduct has revealed that they do 
not need NATO at all. 
3.2. Post 9/11 Transatlantic Relations
e terrorist attacks at New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 
have surely brought a similarly important impetus for change in the trans-
atlantic relations as the end of the Cold War. e 9/11 attacks also brought 
an unprecedented conﬁrmation of the existence of new, asymmetric threats 
in the post-Cold War world. 
September 11 was a milestone for the involvement of Europeans in the 
defence of the West. European states expressed enormous solidarity with 
their attacked US ally, promising their extensive engagement in the war 
against terrorism. And they were serious.⁵⁵ European NATO members decid-
ed to evoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the ﬁrst time and many 
of them – Great Britain, France and Germany, in particular – were actively 
involved in the operations against the Taliban and Al-Quaeda in Afghanistan 
as well as in the post-war ISAF administration of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, 
the generally cold reactions by the USA to this European solidarity and 
engagement and the clear choice of unilateralism by the Bush administra-
tion have been disappointing for a number of European politicians, espe-
cially those from France and Germany. In their eyes, this has conﬁrmed the 
interpretation of the USA as no longer considering the partnership with 
Europe to be crucial.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the major crisis of the ‘transatlantic 
trust’ which has probably been more serious and grave than all the previous 
ones, including the Suez crisis or France’s abandoning of NATO military 
structures, came with the war in Iraq. e transatlantic rupture during the 
‘Iraq crisis’ between January and March 2003 was enormous indeed. It was 
54)  Van Ham, 2001. 
55)  Parmantier, G.: Diverging Visions. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 116. 
56)  Ibid, p. 118.
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also extremely confusing for many countries, such as the post-communist 
states. e Iraq crisis split Europe into two camps, showing what a utopia 
the o declared European unity in foreign and security policy is and how 
divergent the views and ambitions of European countries are in relation to 
Europe’s position vis-à-vis the USA the optimum response to the security 
threats of the world today. In a sense, the post-Cold War transatlantic ri 
was, sooner or later, inevitable.⁵⁷ Diverse interests have appeared aer the 
joint threat disappeared and diﬀerent perceptions of the world on the two 
sides of the Atlantic have become apparent. 
  
3.3. Changing US foreign and security policy
e war in Iraq played such a crucial role in the transatlantic relations 
not least for the fact that it was largely a proof of major changes in the US 
foreign and security policy aer 9/11. e foreign and security policy pur-
sued by the Bush administration is, in many a respect, a continuation of the 
policy implemented by the previous administration and could be understood 
within the context of new U.S foreign policy developments in the post-Cold 
War environment. Yet, it has been the administration of President George 
Bush jr. that has reinforced and accelerated this trend in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks, putting foreign and security policy at the top of the US domestic 
policy agenda and making it – as the ‘War on Terror’ – a clear priority of 
President Bush’s ﬁrst term in oﬃce. Some authors go as far as to speak of 
Bush’s ‘revolution in foreign policy.’⁵⁸ What are the major features of this 
‘revolution’ whose main pillars can be found in the above mentioned National 
Security Strategy of 2002 but whose practical manifestation has gone beyond 
this document, a ‘revolution’ oen labelled as ‘neoconservative’ as the so 
called neoconservatives, holding key positions in the Bush administration, 
are the carriers of this change? First of all, it is an attempt to break out of the 
post-war order logic, namely challenge the role of international law and the 
UN while beginning to face global challenges eﬀectively.⁵⁹ President Bush’s 
statement in a conference only a few days aer the 9/11 attacks that ‘there 
are no rules’ in today’s world is a ﬁtting summary of the change in the US 
post-September foreign and security policy that was to come.⁶⁰
57)  Khol, R.: Spojené státy americké: Nová etapa a nová administrativa. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 74. 
58)  Daalder, I., Linsay, J.: America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2003. 
59)  Hurell, A.: There Are No Rules. In: International Relations, No.2, 2002.
60)  Ibid, p. 186.
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In spite of talking about the foreign policy of a Republican administra-
tion – and throughout the US history, Republican administrations inclined 
to realism in foreign policy – a key, if not the dominant, feature of this 
administration’s foreign policy is idealism, even though the protection of 
America’s interests surely is not sidelined. Without any hyperbole we may 
talk about trying to ‘save the world’ under the aegis of the USA. is ideal-
ism, drawing heavily upon the work of Israeli author Nathan Sharansky,⁶¹ 
is based upon a belief that once dictatorships are removed from the world 
and replaced by democracies, permanent peace and prosperity will be 
guaranteed. ese goals are to be striven for with great vehemence (zero sum 
game) and use various tools which may not always be generally acceptable, 
such as pre-emptive war principle and regime change, by and large in the 
spirit of ‘the end justiﬁes the means’. Even though the neocon – and largely 
black-and-white – visions are not something that would appeal to the plural-
istic Europeans, it is chieﬂy the means used by the neoconservative foreign 
policy-makers that raise most doubt across the Atlantic.⁶² ere is a general 
consensus in the Western community over the rightness of the principle of 
humanitarian intervention, such as the one in Kosovo, and looser interpreta-
tions would ﬁnd some support for this principle in international law. What 
is not, however, a matter of consensus, is the unilateralist tendency of this 
foreign policy. According to French security expert François Heisbourg,⁶³ it 
is this unilateralism that may bring the end of the West because it is a sign 
of contempt of – namely European – allies and of a ‘hegemonic temptation’ 
of the single global superpower of today.⁶⁴ e unilateralism of the Bush 
administration and the war on terror marks, in actual fact, a return to the 
Cold War logic of the presence of a permanent enemy. Only Europe is not 
really counted on according to this logic. 
e lesser US interest in Europe is manifested not only through a gradual 
pull-out of the US troops from Europe but also through the unwillingness 
to perceive Europe as a whole while trying to pick the ‘right ones’ from the 
continent, those who are willing to join the USA (New Europe) and the 
‘wrong ones’ who do not share the US visions (Old Europe). is diﬀerentia-
tion presupposes the creation of the ‘coalitions of the willing’ made of those 
world countries that are willing to join in and contribute to the achievement 
61)  The Odd Couple. Economist, 3/2/2005. 
62)  Courmont, 2003. 
63)  Heisbourg, F.: La fin de l’Occident. Odile Jacob, Paris 2005. 
64)  The former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine even talks of a ’hyperpower’: Védrine, H.: Face à l’hyperpuissance. Fayard, Paris 2003.
88
Lukáš Pachta – ESDP in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship
of some US objective, following the ‘coalition does not deﬁne the mission but 
the mission deﬁnes the coalition’ logic.⁶⁵ is, however, is against the basic 
principles not only of the EU’s CFSP but also of NATO itself. 
It is quite obvious that the current American foreign policy is not just 
a matter of the Bush administration and that the development is, to a certain 
extent, irreversible and the next US administration will not be willing and 
able to abandon this course.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there can be and prob-
ably already is a shi in the style of behaviour to and in communication 
with Europe. is was manifest throughout George W. Bush’s February 
visit to Europe during which the US President made a signiﬁcant gesture of 
recognition of the European Union and the EU institutions: he did not visit 
the capitals of the large European states but came to the European Council 
summit in Brussels and visited the seat of the European Commission. Not 
even this ‘reconciliation’ visit did, however, help to overcome mutual disputes 
which are aplenty these days, from the divergent views on the Iran nuclear 
programme and the cancellation of embargo on arms export to China, to 
the disputes over the International Crime Tribunal or the Kyoto protocol, 
to the disagreements in the World Trade Organisation. It appears, though, 
that the desire to overcome the discord is still prevailing on both sides of 
the Atlantic.⁶⁷ e Iraq crisis seems to be forgotten now and common values 
and the ensuing long-term interests of the West are getting prevalence again 
even though the USA and Europe have still more disagreement over how to 
enforce and protect these. e European Security Strategy is a good case in 
point, identifying more or less the same threats as the US National Security 
Strategy and giving the USA a privileged position of a partner in managing 
these threats, in spite of the ways of facing these threats being diﬀerent on 
the two sides of the Atlantic. 
We may thus conclude this chapter with an optimistic claim that the 
transatlantic community is a ‘conﬂicting community’ aer the end of the 
Cold War but it is a community aer all. 
65)  The terms ‘New Europe’ and ‘Old Europe’ as well as the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle have been introduced by the US State 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
66)  Courmont, 2003.
67)  Král, D.: Bushovo evropské turné. Policy Brief, Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, February 2005.
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4. EUROPEAN SECURITY
 AND DEFENCE POLICY ESDP:
 DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY FEATURES
4.1. Pre-ESDP Developments
e European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as we know and analyse is 
today was preceded by a relatively long development starting back in the 1950s. 
European integration evolved over the Cold War era, one of the main objectives 
being to cordon oﬀ Communism from Western Europe. It was politically impos-
sible to distinguish between NATO, the European Communities and parallel 
security structures in Western Europe which were linked to the North-Atlantic 
Alliance during the Cold War era. ese parallel structures included, in par-
ticular, the West European Union and a failed project of the European Defence 
Community – the ‘Pleven Plan’ – geared towards the remilitarization of West 
Germany within the framework of a supranational organisation and common 
military structures which might, with some license, be labelled as a ‘European 
army. e European Defence Community project was not implemented in the 
end because of the rejection of the plan by the French National Assembly in 
1954, due to the major inﬂuence the French Communist Party at that time. e 
other European security structure, the West European Union (WEU), however, 
did overcome the twists and turns of history. Originally, a defence alliance was 
established back in 1948 by France, Great Britain and other countries to safe-
guard them against Germany (the Brussels Pact, the alliance’s founding treaty, 
expired in 2002). is Western Union Defence Organisation was transformed 
into a West European Alliance in 1955 as the Federal Republic of Germany was 
remilitarised and joined NATO (WEU was under the military control of NATO 
during the Cold War).⁶⁸ e sixties and seventies saw attempts at the deepening 
of political integration of EC Member States which was, from the very begin-
ning, understood as the reason behind establishing the EC, though through 
economics.⁶⁹ e ‘Fouchet Plan’ (1961) was another attempt at this direction, 
68)  Fidler, J., Mareš, P.: Dějiny NATO. Paseka, Praha 1997.
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inspired by the ideas of French President De Gaulle on the political and security 
emancipation of France and the whole Europe from the two superpowers of the 
Cold War, superpowers that were oen – and even more so during the détente 
period – overlooking Western Europe in their negotiations.⁷⁰ e Fouchet Plan 
resembles the current CFSP in many respects, namely in foreign and security 
policy cooperation between the Member States of the European Communities. 
But this plan had to be brushed oﬀ since it might threaten the spirit de corps of 
the Western bloc in the Cold War context. A plan presented by Commissioner 
Etienne Davignon (1970) was much less ambitious and lead, in the end, to the 
establishment of the European Political Cooperation – a fairly limited mecha-
nism of EU Member State foreign policy coordination.⁷¹ 
It was only at the end of the Cold War that this situation changed. e 
transformation of the security environment, described above, and the slowly 
weakening interest of the USA in Europe put a new burden on Europe’s shoul-
ders: Europe was to become responsible for itself if nothing else. e early 
1990s saw the revival of the WEU which was to turn into a purely European 
security structure operating parallel to NATO. On the basis of this initiative 
by France and Germany, joint international units such as Eurocorps, Eurofor, 
and Euromarfor, were established with three states dominating this eﬀort: 
France, Germany and Spain. In 1992, the WEU member states deﬁned new 
tasks of this organisation – the ‘Petersberg Tasks’, focused on humanitarian 
operations, conﬂict-resolution or peacemaking, and peacekeeping. 
e revitalisation of WEU was, nevertheless, overshadowed by another 
event: the establishment of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht, 
a major step forward in Europe’s political integration, and the creation of the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security (CFSP). CFSP, however, turned out 
to be a ‘still-born baby’ soon aer its birth because the EU states were unable 
to ﬁnd a consensus vis-à-vis the boiling conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia over 
the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.⁷² e EU inability due to its political 
fragmentation and actual military capacities to prevent or manage the civil 
war in the Balkans made the USA intervene once again in the ‘European 
backyard.’ e Bosnian lesson was a ‘cold shower’ for, and a reason for great 
self-reﬂection in, the EU.⁷³ 
69)  This view is supported by the Treaty of Rome preamble identifying the aim of integration: an ever closer union. 
70)  Cameron, 1999.
71)  Cameron, 1999.
72)  Gnesotto, N.: La puissance et l’Europe. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris 1998, pp. 9-14.
73)  Otte, 2002, p. 41. 
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e 1997 Amsterdam summit saw the EU incorporating the WEU whose 
founding treaty was to expire in ﬁve years, adopting the above Petersberg 
tasks, and creating the post of an EU High Representative for CFSP (and the 
Secretary General of the Council of the EU at the same time), a post taken 
by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana two years aer that. 
In the meantime, a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) con-
cept has been created on the basis of WEU, integrated into the EU in 1999 
aer the Amsterdam Treaty became eﬀective. e ESDI project, endorsed 
already at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels and fully supported by the 
Clinton administration encouraging Europe to take over the responsibility 
for itself, was to become a ‘European NATO pillar’ of a sort. e ESDI was 
a cherished project of France, which was seeking rapprochement with NATO 
and considered returning into NATO military structures at that time. e 
ESDI project counted on the formation of European Combined Joint Task 
Force under the operational and planning command of NATO headquarters 
in Europe (SHAPE).⁷⁴ 
4.2. Birth and Development of ESDP
ings have started developing in a diﬀerent direction, though. A ‘pro-
European turn’⁷⁵ of the British foreign policy in relation to Labour Party 
leader Tony Blair becoming the UK Prime Minister brought about yet 
another initiative which has, in the end, proven more viable: an autono-
mous European Security and Defence Policy, outlined at the October 
1998 EU summit in Portsäch and deﬁned at the Franco-British summit in 
Saint-Malo in December 1998.⁷⁶ A common defence policy was born, along 
with NATO-independent joint forces deployable for the implementation of 
the Petersberg tasks under the UN mandate. is Franco-British initiative 
stemmed from the political positions of the two main actors, i.e. UK Prime 
Minister Blair and French President Chirac, which will be discussed later in 
this paper, and also from the fact that France and Great Britain have been 
the only EU countries with truly operable military capacities to execute 
modern missions. 
74)  Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 26. 
75)  Khol, R.: Velká Británie – v srdci Evropy a v čele evropské obrany? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p.18.
76)  Franco-British Summit: Declaration on European Defence, 4/12/1998.
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e Kosovo War, i.e. the NATO intervention under the US command, 
was another rude awakening for EU Member States who appeared to be 
unable to tackle problems in their ‘near abroad’. e Kosovo lesson brought 
a more speciﬁc ESDP and the Saint-Malo agreement.⁷⁷ e EU adopted 
a European Headline Goal at the 1999 Helsinki summit, following discus-
sions at the 1999 Cologne summit.⁷⁸ According to this European Headline 
Goal, (almost all) EU countries were to earmark by 2003 between 50,000 
and 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days in the radius of action of 
6,000 kilometres for one year. is EU Rapid Reaction Force was to imple-
ment the Petersberg tasks.⁷⁹ A year later, at the Nice summit ending the 
EU’s Intergovernmental Conference, ESDP was incorporated into the EU 
primary law and EU political and military institutions under the European 
Council were established.⁸⁰ ese were similar to COREPER, i.e. included 
permanent representatives of EU Member States. It is unclear, however, 
what their speciﬁc competencies are with respect to the EU Council and 
its formations as there are some overlaps between them. e same actually 
applies to the High Representative for CFSP and SHAPE. e following 
institutions are referred to:
■  Political and Security Committee (consists of permanent representatives 
of EU Member States – oen juniors compared to COREPER or NATO; 
deals predominantly with the political aspects of ESDP – monitoring 
crisis areas; provides for early warning and political leadership of ESDP 
operations; prepares documents for General Aﬀairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) meetings)
■  Military Committee (the EU’s highest military body composed of mem-
bers of the General Staﬀ of EU Member States – usually the same ones 
as in NATO; provides other EU bodies with military information needed 
for military operations)
■  EU Military Staﬀ (under the Military Committee, deals with practical 
ESDP operational issues)
■  EU Satellite Centre and EU Situation Centre 
77)  Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003. 
78)  Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 10-11 December, 1999.
79)  Van Ham, 2000.
80)  A ‘civilization shock’ metaphor is sometimes used in relation to ESDP and the EU military institutions: the EU as a civilian organisation 
is also becoming a military organisation.
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e High Representative for CFSP (and the General Secretary of the EU 
Council), currently in the person of Javier Solana, is the coordinator of many 
ESDP aspects. It is necessary to note that many of the ESDP and CFSP achieve-
ments so far are generally ascribed to Solana’s personal credit. (He has been 
the hottest candidate for the future EU Foreign Minister post – see below).
e European Constitutional Treaty means a great leap forward for ESDP, 
providing the constitutional treaty (or a future similar treaty) is ﬁnally rati-
ﬁed, of course, or the relevant provisions from the treaty are introduced into 
practice without the ratiﬁcation of the constitutional treaty. According to 
the constitution, ESDP shall get the most visible reinforcement from all 
CFSP components (a special ESDP working group was v established in 
the Convention on the Future of Europe preparing the dra constitutional 
treaty; the working group was chaired by the then French Commissioner 
Michel Barnier).
e Constitution introduces a new legal option of a ‘permanent struc-
tured (or enhanced) co-operation’ in defence which the existing treaties did 
not allow for.⁸¹ is idea was initially opposed by Great Britain who has 
threatened to veto the dra if structured co-operation was not to be open 
to all states interested in participating and meeting speciﬁc criteria, to pre-
vent the establishment of an exclusive ‘hard core’ made of some countries⁸². 
e constitution has also made a step forward in making a commitment 
to mutual defence in case of a military attack on a Member State (mutual 
defence clause) or to civil and military assistance in case of a terrorist attack 
or a natural disaster (solidarity clause).⁸³ A reference is made to Article 51 of 
the UN Charter providing for regional defence alliances. is mutual defence 
commitment, however, is quite problematic for neutral EU Member States 
some of which have an opt-out from defence co-operation as well as for some 
other EU countries which are also NATO members and are concerned about 
the potential collision with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.⁸⁴ On the other 
hand, the European Union has been an entity made of politically interlinked 
81)  Article I-41 (6) of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. 
82)  The criteria are set out in Protocol 23 to the constitutional treaty. The protocol states that Member States will have to proceed 
more intensively to develop their defence capacities through the development of their national contributions and in the activity 
of the European Defence Agency. They will have to become interoperable and achieve the 2010 Headline Goal (formation of Battle 
Groups). These are relatively undemanding conditions so the possibility of a state not being able to comply with them and being 
automatically excluded from structured co-operation is very small. 
83)  Articles I-41 (7) and I-43 of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. 
84)  The constitution includes, at the same time, a guarantee for respecting national defence policies and NATO commitments (Král, D., Pítrová, 
L., Šlosarčík, I.: Smlouva zakládající ústavu pro Evropu – komentář. Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Praha 2004, p. 68).
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states, so mutual assistance in case of an attack is quite commonplace and 
would presumably be provided even without an explicit mutual defence 
clause, irrespective of the fact that such a clause was included in the Western 
Union Brussels Pact eﬀective between 1948 and 2002, i.e. outside NATO. e 
dra European Constitutional Treaty also extends the ESDP goals beyond 
the earlier mentioned Petersberg tasks: according to the constitution and 
the international law, the EU can carry out disarmament and anti-terrorist 
operations in and provide military advice to third countries. 
ESDP can be more successful with a newly established post of an EU 
Foreign Minister, a post merging the powers of the External Relations Com-
missioner and the High Representative for CFSP in order to make the CSFP 
more coherent.⁸⁵ e newly proposed ﬂexibility in operation ﬁnancing can 
make ESDP operations more eﬀective: operations shall be ﬁnanced not only 
from the Member States contributions proportionate to their GDP, as the is 
case today, but also from a Start Up Fund administered by the EU Foreign 
Minister and ﬁnanced from Member States’ advance payments to be used in 
the time of operation. e constitution, however, does not envisage decisions 
being made on ESDP on behalf of the entire EU or the states participating 
in a structured co-operation by a qualiﬁed majority because the two major 
ESDP actors, Great Britain and France, insist on the intergovernmental 
principle and unanimity in decision-making. 
Finally, ESDP has been provided an oﬃcial and theoretical base not only in 
the Constitution but also in the 2003 European Security Strategy the implemen-
tation and practical impact on ESDP of which, however, is up for debate. 
4.3. There Is No ESDP without NATO…
e formal (or theoretical) and institutional shape of ESDP is quite advanced. 
But let us look at the implementation of the ESDP project in practice. e 
practical realisation of ESDP was a long-time hostage to the ambiguous relation-
ship between ESDP and NATO.⁸⁶ Given the fact that the EU has not had its 
own planning capacities, EU operations were to rely on NATO capacities. is 
principle was ﬁrst proposed at the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin. at is why 
85)  The establishment of the post of a Foreign Minister could be understood, as many commentators have it, as a de facto reply to the 
famous objection by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s that there is no single telephone number in Europe to call 
from Washington. 
86)  Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 356.
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this 1996 agreement between NATO and the WEU was later called a ‘Berlin+ 
arrangement’. In order for EU states to use the SHAPE military and planning 
capacities⁸⁷ for their own operations outside NATO, an agreement had to be 
made.⁸⁸ is agreement was being blocked for a long time by Turkey, a NATO 
member without the membership of the EU who did not want to open up the 
way for EU countries to NATO capacities. (Another reason for Turkey to block 
this deal was the Turkish-Greek controversy over Cyprus and the planned acces-
sion of the Greek part of Cyprus to the EU). Nevertheless, the agreement was 
reached in December 2002 with the view of planned operations under the EU 
ﬂag. e EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 
January 2003 was the ﬁrst EU operation abroad, even though it was not a true 
ESDP (military) operation.⁸⁹ It was only in March 2003, in operation Concordia 
in Macedonia (FYROM) that the Berlin+ arrangement was made the full use of. 
e EU forces took over the activities of three previous NATO operations: Allied 
Harmony, Essential Harvest, and Amber Fox. On December 2, 2004, EU units 
took over the NATO Althea operation in Bosnia (SFOR) and deployed 7,000 
troops there (EUFOR).⁹⁰ e use of the Berlin+ arrangement meant that only 
ﬂags got actually changed in both of these operations: the planning, command 
and manning remained the same. e operations have remained under the com-
mand of the NATO Deputy-SACEUR, British general John Reith.⁹¹ 
As soon as neither NATO units (KFOR) nor the UN and OSCE adminis-
tration are needed in Kosovo and the status of the province is sorted out, the 
whole Former Yugoslavia will be under the aegis of the EU which will thus 
repay its old debt of failing to intervene during the war in Yugoslavia. e EU 
role in the Balkans is further reinforced by the prospect of EU membership 
for all former Yugoslavian republics. Slovenia has already joined the EU and 
Croatia should be soon invited to start accession negotiations.⁹² 
Africa is the second area of ESDP focus. And it is Africa that is very likely 
to become the region of most ESDP activities: the USA and NATO are not 
really interested in intervening in Africa and the EU countries still have close 
ties with African countries since the colonial times.⁹³ In June 2003, two EU 
87)  For example, the AWACS surveillance planes play a major role in ESDP operations. 
88)  Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 362. 
89)  With a view to further EU police missions, several states (France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) agreed last year, during the Dutch 
presidency, that new European paramilitary police units modelled on the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri be established. 
90)  Řiháčková, V.: EU dnes přebírá od NATO misi v Bosně a Hercegovině. Integrace – kalendárium, 2/12/2004. 
91)  Tertrais, B.: Basic Concepts of European Defense Policy. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 178. 
92)  Otte, 2002, p. 41. 
93)  Pachta, L.: Role EU při prevenci a řešení konfliktů v Africe. In: Mezinárodní politika, No. 11, 2002.
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states, France and Great Britain, sent their troops (1,500 soldiers) under 
the UN Security Council mandate to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in operation Artemis. is operation was not carried out according to the 
Berlin+ arrangement but according to the lead nation principle. is principle 
determines that an operation under the EU ﬂag agreed by the entire Union 
is carried out by one or more states using their national capacities and units. 
Sadly though, it is only Great Britain and France that are actually capable 
of such missions in the EU.⁹⁴ 
4.4. From Rapid Reaction Force to Battle Groups
In spite of the ﬁrst real operations under the EU ﬂag but with the units 
previously earmarked for NATO, the achievement of the 1999 European Head-
line Goal (EHG) formulated in Helsinki was still far from reality. In 2003, the 
European Council declared the EHG achieved since 50,000 – 60,000 troops 
were really earmarked for the Rapid Reaction Force. (e force, however, was 
not operable, largely due to the lack of means for unit transport which should 
be dealt with by introducing the new Airbus A400M carrier between 2008 
and 2010 as planned).⁹⁵ e striving for compatibility between the EU Rapid 
Reaction Force and the NATO Response Force (endorsed at the Prague NATO 
summit in November 2002) made the whole matter even more challenging. 
e Helsinki European Headline Goal (EHG), achieved on paper but 
not satisfactorily met in practice, was replaced by a Headline Goal 2010, 
approved by the European Council in June 2004.⁹⁶ e practical problems 
of forming the Rapid Reaction Force are to be solved through a speedy 
formation of Battle Groups or ‘tactical groups’, ﬁnally approved by EU 
Defence Ministers in November 2004⁹⁷. (is idea was supported by the 
way the Franco-British operation Artemis in Congo was carried out in June 
2003). e total of 13 battle groups shall consist of 1,500 combat soldiers 
and three companies from three EU states. e Battle Groups shall be 
deployable within 15 days in the area of conﬂict up to 4,000 kilometres 
from Brussels and shall be sustainable for 30 days (extendable to 120 with 
94)  Khol (ed.), 2002. 
95)  A European Capabilities Action Plan was adopted at the 2001 Laeken summit to ensure faster equipment of the Rapid Reaction 
Force. (Dumoulin, Mahieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 175-176).
96)  Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 17 – 18 June, 2004. 
97)  The idea of creating small, highly operable units was debated at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet (2/2003) where the Iraq 
crisis overshadowed other issues. Barnier, M.: Actors and Witnesses. In: Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p.169.
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rotation). e Battle Groups shall become fully operable in 2007, with the 
exception of one to be operable in 2005 already.⁹⁸ 
A special, autonomous EU planning cell shall be created at SHAPE.⁹⁹ is 
reﬂects the ambitions of some EU Member States, lead by France, to cut 
European defence completely oﬀ NATO and establish a ‘European Defence 
Union’ in an avant-garde group of states. is EU planning cell was proposed 
at a ‘chocolate creams summit’ in Brussels in April 2003 which brought 
together the opponents of the Iraq war and advocates of strong European 
defence (France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg – the so called Gang 
of Four).¹⁰⁰ e establishment of the planning unit was approved, in spite of 
the opposition by the USA – and objections by Great Britain – at the ‘Naples 
Conclave,’ a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Naples in November 2003. 
It was more or less a symbolic act though. e cell, located at Tervuren, on 
the outskirts of Brussels, is at its infancy with its current 40 staﬀ and it does 
not look like developing extensively any time soon without a close link to 
SHAPE, as Great Britain expects, to say nothing of planning autonomous 
operations (jointly with the EU Military Staﬀ) without any NATO help.
4.5. Main Stumbling Block: Defence Spending
e above documents a relatively fast and dynamic development of 
ESDP¹⁰¹ – hardly ﬁve years did pass between the ﬁrst ESDP ideas and the ﬁrst 
operations. In many respects, however, ESDP is a typical European initiative: 
the centre of gravity is on paper and not on the ground – just like the estab-
lishment of the post of an EU Foreign Minister is a response to the issue of 
CFSP coherence à la EU which does not really solve the problem. e success 
of ESDP is restricted by the divergent goals and ambitions of individual EU 
Member States, namely the big ones (see below) and, more importantly, the 
actual military capacities of Europeans.¹⁰² e EU can, according to the 2002 
agreement, rely on NATO planning capacities but the armament and equip-
ment of EU states is lagging behind on all accounts, mainly in comparison 
with the USA. 
98)   Schmitt, B.: European Capabilities – How Many Divisions? In: Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 98. 
99)   Ibid, pp. 99-100.
100)   Let us mention other initiatives presented at this ‘chocolate creams summit’: a Franco-German brigade modelled on the Eurocorps 
(up to 7,000 men) and the establishment of a European Security and Defence College. (Dumoulin, A.: Europe Occidentale. In: 
Boniface,P. (ed.): L’Année stratégique 2004, IRIS, Paris 2003, p. 86). 
101)   Gnesotto, 2004, p. 11.
102)   Ibid, p. 11.
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e low spending on defence is Europe’s major problem in this respect. 
It is not the ESDP contributions by Member States (operations are paid 
by EU members in proportion to their GDP with the possibility of absence 
from an operation) but the generally low national defence budgets of the 
EU countries that make it diﬃcult. According to the Financial Times,¹⁰³ the 
European members of NATO spent USD 221 billion in 2003 (1.9% of their 
GDP), compared with the US spending of USD 405 billion (3.7% of their 
GDP). e EU countries spending most on defence, i.e. France and Britain, 
increase their defence budgets each year by 3–4% on average whereas the 
USA do so by 15%. ere is a clear gap between the ambitions (autonomous 
European defence and military readiness of Europe) and the willingness to 
pursue these goals through higher defence spending which would necessarily 
have to shake up the European welfare state model. 
4.6. European Defence Industry
Europe can boast of more achievements in defence industry. In spite of 
the largely economic reasons for this development¹⁰⁴ politics plays also an 
important role: European corporations are not, with some exceptions, in 
the hands of the state but it is crucial for the general political and military 
prestige of Europe that these corporations succeed in developing new, tech-
nologically advanced weapons systems. 
European corporations such as EADS,¹⁰⁵ ales or BAE Systems have 
already started giving jitters to their US competitors who got used to their 
monopoly in defence industry.¹⁰⁶ European corporations have started to 
implement grandiose projects such as the A400M carrier, the Euroﬁghter jet 
or the combat helicopter Tiger. Technologically, these projects are as good 
as the American ones though the acquisition costs are still higher. European 
companies have already started winning contracts from the Pentagon which 
is also an incentive since the EU states’ defence budgets are still relatively low. 
e question is what eﬀect the advised but still unconﬁrmed abandoning of 
103)   Dombey, D.: Europe must spend more on defence. Financial Times, 3/3/2005. 
104)   Maulny, J.-P.: L’industrie d’armement, acteur et bénéficiaire de l’Europe de la défense ? In: La revue internationale et stratégique, 
No. 48, 2002/2003. 
105)   European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, a new corporation established after a merger of the French Aerospatiale Matra, 
German Daimler-Chrysler and Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas in 2000.
106)   Airbus, the current major competitor to the US Boeing, is a great European achievement even though in civil aviation. The new 
A380 is a major success, in particular.
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the embargo for EU arms exports to China will have on European defence 
industry. On the one hand, Chinese demand may stimulate European sup-
ply. On the other hand, European corporations might be seriously harmed 
if Washington reacted by imposing sanctions on Europe, keeping Europeans 
oﬀ the US market. 
Europe is also relatively successful in developing modern technologies 
with no immediate but potential future military use and deﬁnite importance 
for Europe’s prestige in the world. e ﬁnalisation of the preparatory works 
for the Galileo satellite navigation system competing with the US GPS or 
the European Space Agency (ESA) exploratory initiatives can be mentioned 
in this respect. 
Europe has also made some progress in the coordination in armaments 
and military research, knowing that one state is too little in this respect.¹⁰⁷ 
Following many previous initiatives¹⁰⁸ aimed at enhancing cooperation in 
this area, a European armaments, research and military capacities agency 
(European Defence Agency) was established. e agency is provided for in 
the European constitutional treaty but, following a Council Decision, it has 
already been in full operation since July 2004, headed by Brit Nick Witney. 
e agency’s mission is to promote the enhancement of EU Member States’ 
military capacities (a commitment made, among others, in the constitutional 
treaty), coordinate military research, and monitor the fulﬁlment of Member 
States’ obligations. e overall aim is to rationalise through co-operation the 
increase of military capacities of EU states and prevent duplicities.
107)   Keohane, D.: Europe’s new defence agency. Centre for European Reform – Policy Brief, June 2004. 
108)   Western European Armaments Group – 1992, Letter of Intent – 1998, Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière d’Armement 
(OCCAR) – 1998 or approved liberalisation of trade in military material in the single market.
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5. KEY ACTORS’ PERCEPTION OF ESDP 
e various and oen contradictory visions of actors, i.e. countries involved, 
have to be taken into account when studying the ESDP project. It is only the 
diﬀerentiation between these views on ESDP that allows us to get a better 
understanding of both the real and potential impact of ESDP on the trans-
atlantic relationship. Some more pro-European and ‘EU-ambitious’ states 
perceive ESDP as a baseline for the construction of a European identity¹⁰⁹ 
and a way to secure a global role for the EU. Other states, seen as ‘Atlanticist’, 
understand ESDP (with the rather minimalist objectives) as a value added to 
NATO, and not as a replacement of the Alliance as known today.
e following chapter will deal mainly with the positions and views of the 
big EU states and major ESDP actors: Great Britain, France and Germany. 
European integration did replace the ‘European concert’, giving small states 
a voice much stronger than their size and real weight would suggest, which 
is a good example of the ‘overrepresentation’ of small states in EU institu-
tions. And yet, we can say that the real EU foreign and security legitimacy 
and potential comes from large states with their own, well-respected global 
engagements and operable armies. ere would be no ESDP if the big EU 
states did not ﬁnd agreement among themselves.¹¹⁰ We shall also turn to 
the position of the United States, a key country in terms of ESDP and the 
transatlantic relationship, and also to Russia and small EU states, particularly 
the post-communist ones. 
5.1. Great Britain – From ‘Splendid Isolation’ to ‘Lead Nation’ Role 
Great Britain plays a key role in the ESDP project. Britain’s political weight 
in the world, its position vis-à-vis the USA, and its military capacities are indis-
pensable for ESDP. Great Britain is also a country that has been able to adapt 
its military force to new challenges and has been approaching the USA with its 
109)   Chilton, P.: La défense européenne, condition nécessaire à la formation d’une identité européenne ? In: La revue internationale 
et stratégique, č. 48, 2002/2003. 
110)   This is illustrated aptly by the EU initiative in relation to the Iran nuclear programme from November 2003, promote by Foreign 
Ministers of the three largest EU countries. 
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technologies and operability of its force deployable anywhere in the world most 
of all the other NATO states.¹¹¹ At the same time, Great Britain was a country 
blocking any further, namely political integration of the EU for a considerable 
time, opposing European defence parallel with NATO. For a long time, Great 
Britain gave preference to its ‘special relationship’ with the USA before Europe 
in the area of foreign and security activities. (Nicole Gnesotto wrote that ‘For 
Britain, the United States is what Europe is for France.’).¹¹² 
A major change came with UK’s new Prime Minister Tony Blair who won the 
election in 1997. e Blair government made a U-turn in Britain’s EU policy¹¹³ 
and was quite open about its attempts to ‘put Britain in the heart of Europe’.¹¹⁴ 
Lead by Tony Blair, Great Britain has been actively involved in the European 
integration process, chieﬂy on the intergovernmental level though. Along with 
France, Britain has become the main initiator and the driving force of ESDP. 
Some authors claim that Blair is using ESDP as a trump card even towards 
the USA, to show that Britain is not that dependent on the USA. (Similarly, 
the Brits are playing the US card against Europe). ESDP is also a tool used 
in trying to inﬂuence Washington.¹¹⁵ Blair’s Britain is taking a position of 
an intermediary in the transatlantic relation, using it exquisitely for its own 
purposes as well, though one might doubt Britain’s real inﬂuence on decision-
making in Washington. 
Great Britain has adopted a very pragmatic approach towards ESDP. e 
country is aware of the need for Europeans to assume responsibility for their 
own security and the security of their neighbourhood. But it has refused to 
make ESDP highly ambitious. It has strictly adhered to a minimalist vision of 
ESDP, one designed to accomplish only the Petersberg tasks without disturbing 
and duplicating the role of NATO where the Brits play the most important role 
aer the USA and which is still considered irreplaceable by the UK. Britain is 
convinced that the ESDP should not aim at a total independence from NATO 
but that the ‘EU should be a smart client of NATO’s military services.’¹¹⁶ e 
Brits are also insisting on ESDP being open to all EU states. Britain opposes the 
EU defence hard core or avant-garde vision, reiterating the need for openness of 
111)   British strategy and armed forces were adapted on the basis of their Strategic Defence Review in 1998. Khol, R.: Velká Británie…In: 
Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 17. 
112)   Gnesotto, 1998, p. 96. 
113)   Some continuity with the unrealized plans of Prime Minister John Major might be observed here though. 
114)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 36. 
115)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 38; Schweiss, 2003, p. 230.
116)   Khol, R.: Velká Británie…In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 21.
Lukáš Pachta – ESDP in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship
103
structured co-operation in defence for other states that would like to join.¹¹⁷ e 
UK Labour politicians believe that ESDP will ultimately be better with the Brits 
in rather than out and that Britain must not absentee from this project because 
it might then ‘degenerate’ into something harmful for the transatlantic security 
relation.¹¹⁸ And the British role in ESDP should not be minimal but that of 
a leader, given Britain’s weight and military capacities.¹¹⁹ What might threaten 
this prospect is perhaps only a change on the domestic political scene because 
the conservative opposition is not in favour of ESDP at all and oen refers to 
ESDP – incorrectly and in a populist fashion – as to a ‘European army’.
5.2. France – Driving Force Hard to Control 
France is the main designer and mover of ESDP.¹²⁰ e country has 
a very speciﬁc motivation for this though. e French Fih Republic has 
always understood European integration – perceived in France as a ‘French 
child’¹²¹ – as an opportunity to advance their own interests (‘an extended 
arm of France’). And since France is rather in favour of intergovernmental 
integration,¹²² CFSP, along with its most recent top-up, ESDP, is completely 
in line with the French interests. at is why the political scene (democratic 
parties) is so united on ESDP issues. 
For France, ESDP is much more than just meeting the Petersberg tasks. 
e French vision of ESDP envisages autonomous European defence¹²³ and 
security emancipation vis-à-vis the USA and NATO the military structures of 
which France le in 1960s. In France’s view, NATO is an antiquated instrument 
of US security dominance.¹²⁴ Instead of relying on NATO, Europe should seek 
complete defence autonomy to meet the criteria of a global power, in line with 
the ‘Europe puissance’ concept.¹²⁵ France’s core assumption is that Europe 
has its legitimate interests, resting on universally valid values, which might 
diﬀer from the US interests,¹²⁶ and Europe should be able to support these 
117)   Ibid, p. 20.
118)   Grant, C.: EU Defence Takes a Step Forward. Centre for European Reform – Policy Brief, December 2003.
119)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 41. 
120)   Andréani, G.: L’Europe de la défense : y a t-il encore une ambition française ? In: Politique. étrangère, No. 4, 2002.
121)   Defarges, P.M.: La Fance et l’Europe: l’inévitable débat. In: Politique étrangère, No. 4, 2002. 
122)   Eichler, J.: Francie – důraz na mezivládní rámce CFSP a ESDP. In: Khol (ed.), 2002. 
123)   European defence (défense européenne) is frequently used in French discourse when referring to ESDP.
124)   Parmentier, 2004, p. 125.
125)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 64.
126)   Parmenier, 2004, p. 127.
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interests with adequate political power and military force. e basic premise of 
France is that the EU is a more universal security structure than NATO: it has 
a wide range of instruments available, from humanitarian aid and assistance 
to cooperation and diplomacy to military force, all perfectly in line with the 
modern understanding of comprehensive security. at is why, France believes, 
the EU has a chance of a greater success than the USA in, e.g. ﬁghting terror-
ism where pure military power does not help much.¹²⁷ 
France is therefore pushing for a fully autonomous ESDP, independent 
of NATO, i.e. with its own planning capacities, an ESDP relying on interna-
tional organisations, especially the UN. At the same time, France is a great 
believer in enhanced co-operation among those EU states that wish to go 
further in European defence than others. is hard core or avant-garde 
concept is an expression of their ‘European security and defence union’.¹²⁸ 
e above mentioned ‘chocolate creams summit’ of France, Germany, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg in April 2003 in Brussels was a prime example of 
this approach. France stipulates that ESDP must remain a project for EU 
members only. ESDP is a clear manifestation of EU political integration, 
in the eyes of France, which satisﬁes the Greeks but displeases the non-EU 
members of NATO, especially Turkey. But France, with its military potential 
comparable to that of Great Britain, is not really willing to bring its defence 
spending up which underscores its ambitious ESDP visions. 
In many respects, the French ambitions are founded. What is problematic 
though is the quite blunt assertion of these ambitions which does not win them 
much trust with most of EU countries, to say nothing of the USA. e French 
ESDP ambitions are understood as France’s attempt to reclaim its former posi-
tion of a great power and advance its interests in Europe and in the world. 
5.3. Germany – Civilian Power with Military Ambitions 
All of the post-war policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has had 
a deﬁnite European dimension. European integration has been a chance 
for Germany to get out of the grips of World War II and, given the lack of 
a global outreach of West Germany’s foreign policy, Europe has been on top 
of the German foreign policy agenda. Along with France, Germany was the 
main driving force of European integration, including political integration. 
127)   Eichler, 2002, pp. 37-38.
128)   Dumoulin, 2003, p. 87. 
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In its foreign and security policy, Germany has always preferred civilian 
instruments, multilateralism and coordination of its eﬀorts with other states, 
except for a unilateralist push for the recognition of the independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.¹²⁹ 
e German government under Gerhard Schröder has therefore been in 
favour of ESDP.¹³⁰ In spite of Germany being a great champion and active 
member of NATO which has allowed for the remilitarisation and, in a sense, 
also the rehabilitation of Germany and despite Germany preferring strategic 
partnership with the USA for a long time, the ESDP, built on a broader and 
multilateral security concept, has some appeal to Germany. (Germany would 
even welcome if the ESDP issues were decided by qualiﬁed majority which 
is opposed by Great Britain and France.) e German government perceives 
ESDP as a chance to increase the political and military weight of Germany 
in foreign policy which has not been possible so far because of Germany’s 
internal restraints. Germany’s government is also seeking a permanent chair 
in the Security Council.¹³¹ e German eﬀorts at the country’s military 
emancipation translated into Germany’s intensive involvement in KFOR in 
Kosovo (the ﬁrst deployment of German forces abroad aer WWII) or in the 
ISAF force in Afghanistan where Germany has got the lead nation position. 
Within the context of European integration, Germany is slowly shiing from 
the traditional role of communitarism and small states champion to the role 
of a European power on the par with France and Great Britain. ESDP, on the 
other hand, exerts a great pressure on the reform of the German Bundeswehr 
and the enhancement of German armed forces in general, as well as on the 
defence budget, of course. Germany, despite its ambition to be the key 
component of ESDP, might end up being dominated by France and Great 
Britain because of its actual military capacities and relatively low defence 
spending – Germany spends only 1.14% of its GDP on defence, compared 
with France’s 2.18% and Britain’s 2.58%.¹³² 
e ‘anti-American sting’ of the 2002 election campaign added yet another 
dimension to German foreign and security policy.¹³³ In line with the paciﬁst 
and anti-American public opinion in Germany, the government puts less 
emphasis now on NATO and the alliance with the USA while promoting more 
129)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 45. 
130)   Ibid, p. 50. 
131)   A ‘new German interventionism’ is sometimes referred to in this context (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 44).
132)   Boniface, P.(ed.): L’Année strategique 2005. IRIS, Paris 2004.
133)   Handl, V.: Německo – politický závazek s dlouhodobým plněním. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 50. 
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the need for European defence emancipation. e current German govern-
ment is very close to the French one in this respect. Chancellor Schröder had 
a very surprising speech at a Munich security conference in February 2005 
where he spoke of his belief that NATO was not the organisation for the 
transatlantic security partnership of the future.¹³⁴ Instead, the Chancellor 
proposed a direct dialogue between the EU and the USA. e opposition 
CDU/CSU does not appear to share this vision though. Yet, it is probable that, 
given the current public opinion in Germany, the next German government 
where CDU/CSU will be represented will not change this direction taken 
by Schröder and Fischer, a direction of exclusive promotion of ESDP at the 
expense of NATO and of the emancipation of Europe from the USA. 
 
5.4. United States of America – Ambiguous Enthusiasm 
e United States has been a supporter of European integration from the 
very beginning.¹³⁵ Political and economic co-operation of West European 
countries, bringing peaceful relations and economic prosperity while halting 
the spread of communism, was beneﬁcial for US interests during the Cold 
War. At the same time, the USA had a huge political inﬂuence over Western 
Europe, trying to control the process of European integration, which was rela-
tively easy during the Cold War, given the circumstances. European political 
integration, accelerated towards the end of the Cold War, however has not 
won a full US support, as documented by the permanent US promotion of 
Turkey’s membership in the EU. 
As the US interest in Europe started fading towards the end of the Cold 
War, the United States welcomed European initiatives aimed at assuming 
more responsibility for European security and at lessening the need for any 
future US intervention on the continent as in the case of wars in former 
Yugoslavia. e USA has thus become an active supporter of the European 
Security and Defence Identity in NATO which was to become a ‘European 
NATO pillar’, allowing for greater burden sharing among allies.¹³⁶ 
e US position on ESDP itself, however could best be termed as ‘ambigu-
ous enthusiasm’.¹³⁷ On the one hand, the US has still been quite happy with 
134)   The German Chancellor nevertheless mentioned something that has had some resonance in academia for quite some time and 
has generally been accepted. The full text of the speech can be found on www.securityconference.de.
135)   Hamilton, D.: American Views of European Security and Defense Policy. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 147.
136)   Tertrais, B.: ESDP and Global Security Challenges. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 117. 
137)   Van Ham, 2000, p. 221. 
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Europeans trying to gain more military autonomy and end their security depen-
dence on the USA, which (namely in terms of the US units in Europe) is quite 
costly for the United States and still harder to defend domestically. On the 
other hand, Clinton’s administration – and there is some continuity here even 
in the Bush administration though the latter is less interested in Europe, just 
like the mostly Republican Congress – was clearly worried that ESDP might, 
over time, torpedo NATO. e surprising pro-European turn in Britain’s policy 
certainly played a role here.¹³⁸ is worry was reﬂected in the formulation of 
three conditions under which the USA has been willing to accept ESDP. ese 
three conditions speciﬁed by the Clinton administration in December 1998 and 
known as ‘three D’ included no decoupling, no discrimination and no duplication.¹³⁹ 
is means that the USA has been against ESDP disturbing the transatlantic 
relation (no decoupling), against ESDP being an exclusively EU project closed to 
European NATO members, Turkey in particular (no discrimination), and against 
unnecessary duplication of the existing or developed NATO military and 
planning capacities (no duplication). ese conditions have more or less been 
supported by some EU Member States, including Great Britain.¹⁴⁰ e ‘no 
duplication’ requirement is, at the same time, a safeguard for a US ‘supervi-
sion’ of ESDP: Europeans should not seek to be completely independent of 
the USA and NATO in terms of planning and intelligence.¹⁴¹ We must point 
out that Europeans are not even capable of this at the moment – that is why 
the agreement on the EU’s access to NATO capacities was necessary for the 
past and present ESDP operations in Europe. 
We may say that ESDP as such, i.e. an initiative within the framework of 
NATO and with fairly limited goals (the Petersberg tasks and interventions 
where neither the USA nor NATO chose to intervene), is acceptable for 
the USA. is, however, cannot be said about some, mostly French but increas-
ingly also German, ESDP-linked ambitions. ese ambitions, seeking to make 
the EU a global power equal to the United States and defending Europe’s 
interests even in deﬁance of the USA, or to transform the EU into an arena of 
competition with the US defence industry, surely are not in line with American 
interests.¹⁴² Americans oen speak of their worries about the future of NATO 
138)   Layne, 2001.
139)   Khol, R.: Spojené státy americké… In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 67. 
140)   Hamilton, 2002, p. 147. 
141)   Americans still dominate in the key domains of effective defence policy – the so called C3I: Command, Control, Communication 
and Intelligence. 
142)   Khol, R.: Spojené státy… In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69. 
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in this respect but that is not quite frank.¹⁴³ e approach of the current US 
administration, taking NATO as an ‘obedient reservoir’ of potential US allies 
for this or that operation, devalues NATO as an organisation and alliance in 
the eyes of Europeans, at the least.¹⁴⁴ Americans are not so much worried about 
the fate of NATO with respect to ESDP and the European autonomisation 
aspirations, but rather about their dominance over Europe. 
e US approach to ESDP is, to a certain extent, based on the following 
logic: Europe and the USA are to work together through NATO and Euro-
peans are capable of less in this co-operation. Given their great burdens and 
low defence budgets, can they possibly handle the ESDP project as well?¹⁴⁵ 
is more-than-justiﬁed US doubt is, at the same time, a self-comforting 
assurance that the US political and military superiority cannot be questioned 
by Europe because the EU is simply unable to implement its visions and 
cannot even agree on these visions as it is not united. It is only logical that 
the US government of the day seeks to continue providing Europeans access 
to NATO military and planning capacities to keep them dependent on the 
USA in this respect while trampling down, in a way, the germs of European 
unity in foreign and security policy, just as Donald Rumsfeld did by talking 
of an Old and New Europe. 
5.5. Remaining ‘Old’ Member States – 
Mismatch of Ambitions and Capabilities 
e ESDP project is meeting with more or less agreement from other EU 
Member States. Most of them, however, are not able to contribute because 
of their insuﬃcient military capacities, in spite of their quite big ambitions 
(e.g. Italy).¹⁴⁶ Denmark is not taking part in ESDP and has had an opt-out 
since Maastricht and ‘neutral states’ (if one can speak of neutrality these days) 
have had quite understandable objections, especially if ESDP developed into 
a classic mutual defence; these countries must be excluded from the camp 
of clear supporters of ESDP. Most states, however, do welcome ESDP as 
a platform for carrying out the Petersberg tasks under the UN mandate (e.g. 
Sweden), or they accept this in the least (e.g. Ireland).¹⁴⁷ 
143)   Hamilton, 2002, p. 147. 
144)   Schneider, Žantovský, 2003, p. 2.
145)   Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 7. 
146)   Khol, R.: Itálie – politické ambice větší nežli možnosti. In: Khol (ed.), 2002. 
147)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 54.
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5.6. ‘New Europe’ – From Atlanticism to Europeanisation? 
New Member States recruited from post-communist countries have quite 
speciﬁc approaches to ESDP. Being more or less ‘Atlanticist’, they take the 
transatlantic relationship and NATO in particular as the cornerstone of their 
security.¹⁴⁸ ey also have warmer feelings towards the United States than 
the old Member States because they are thankful to the USA for dismantling 
communism in Europe. But that does not mean that these states, labelled 
as ‘New Europe’ by the US Defence Secretary, would not support the ESDP 
project – as long as priority is given to NATO operations. Until recently, 
states of New Europe made and wanted to make no political distinction 
between EU, NATO or ESDP as they saw no discrepancy there because they 
were willing to joint the Western ‘Euro-Atlantic’ structures.¹⁴⁹ e Iraq crisis 
may be said to have questioned their a priori non-conﬂicting approach: they 
were made to ‘chose’ and almost all of them chose the side of the USA and 
their allies. e slight departure from Atlanticism and the incremental ‘Euro-
peanisation’ of the foreign and security policy of post-communist countries 
which have joined or will join the EU are, nevertheless, inevitable in the 
future, says Janusz Bugajsky of the US Center for Strategic and International 
studies (CSIS).¹⁵⁰ 
5.7. Russia – Opportunistic and Unpredictable Partner 
It is worth to mention the position of the Russian Federation on ESDP 
as well. e Russian approach to European integration is quite inconsistent. 
Russia is aware of the beneﬁts the co-operation with Europe brings but has 
always perceived EU enlargement as a threat. At the same time, Russia is 
a master at exploiting the fact that EU Member States have very diﬀerent 
views on the country and that there is no common EU policy on Russia. at 
is why Russia has started driving a wedge between EU Member States and 
has diﬀerentiated between these states, namely between the new and the old 
members.¹⁵¹ e Russian government has had a quite positive view of ESDP. 
It has perceived ESDP as a European security structure which has taken up, 
148)   Schneider, 2005. 
149)   Král, D., Pachta, L.: Česká republika a irácká krize. EUROPEUM, Praha 2005, p. 5. 
150)   Bugajski, Teleki, 2005. 
151)   Král, D.: Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: Role of the New Members States and Candidate Countries. EUROPEUM, Praha 2005.
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in Russia’s eyes, many of the activities of OSCE, initiated de facto by Mos-
cow. Russia has seen ESDP as an initiative which may do practically no harm 
to Russian interests and might, in a certain context, weaken NATO which 
has quite suited Russia for a long time.¹⁵² e multilateralist approach and 
the emphasis on the UN in ESDP are also very much in line with Russia’s 
interests. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has several times expressed its wish 
to get directly involved in ESDP but that has more or less been rejected by 
most EU states, especially the new members. To a certain extent, the Rus-
sian interest in ESDP is conditional on Russian-US relations that had until 
recently been more than good (and have remained so, to some extent, thanks 
to the war on terror, although the US criticism of Russian domestic issues 
has been growing). In any case, Russia has clearly preferred its involvement 
in NATO which has included Russia’s voice through the mechanism of the 
NATO-Russia Council before ESDP.¹⁵³ 
152)   Soukup, O., Votápek, V.: Rusko – pozitivnější přístup, nebo zmatení pojmů? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 86. 
153)   Forsberg, T.: Russia’s Role in the ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 92.
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6. SYNTHESIS: EFFECTS OF ESDP
 ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATION 
Aer we have dealt with transatlantic relations in the security domain, with 
the development and main features of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) and the positions of key ESDP actors let us now turn to the assessment 
of the actual and possible impact of ESDP on transatlantic relations. 
6.1. ESDP Acceptable for All
We may start by claiming that the existence of ESDP has long been seen 
as inevitable, a fait accompli which means that the current ESDP, based on 
co-operation and complementarity with NATO does not principally harm 
the transatlantic relation.¹⁵⁴ e ESDP project has developed very fast and 
proved relatively high viability: it is now accepted by almost all EU states, 
including the three largest ones, as well as by the USA. First ESDP opera-
tions have successfully been carried out and ESDP as such has without major 
harms survived even the Iraq crisis. 
e general acceptability of the current ESDP is based on several precondi-
tions. rough ESDP, Europe has been repaying its debts by taking up more 
responsibility for itself and its immediate neighbourhood at a time when it 
has been enjoying relative peace and security, unlike the United States.¹⁵⁵ 
Nevertheless, the EU’s possibilities to replace NATO completely in the issues 
of European defence and security and take over the US role of the loudest 
voice and actor of Western community are still quite limited. is helps, on 
the other hand, to inhibit any possible negative approaches to ESDP. 
Also, ESDP is acceptable because it is an absolutely logical step in politi-
cal integration: ESDP is closely linked with and includes the values of EU 
states and therefore plays a certain role in building the European identity 
without a state-like community being created from the EU.¹⁵⁶ In other words, 
154)   Andréani, Betram, Grant, 2001.
155)   Joint Declaration o European Defense Integration – Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/2004. 
156)   Chilton, 2002. 
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the achievement of ESDP objectives is a chance for EU states to implement 
their foreign and defence policy in line with their values and principles, 
helping the rest of the world as well. Many politicians understand such 
global involvement of the EU not as a possibility or option but as a duty. 
ey believe that the Union has more than enough legitimacy to do so as 
a uniﬁed position of all 25 or more Member States is needed (which has some 
weight in itself) and enough means. In terms of hard power, the European 
Union cannot equal the United States but in so power the EU, thanks to 
the diversity of the EU’s and its Member States’ activities and policies, has 
some very good instruments available – from diplomacy to political and 
economic co-operation to various forms of assistance and humanitarian aid 
(the EU is the single biggest humanitarian aid donor in the world).¹⁵⁷ Last 
but not least, what ultimately helps the EU is the fact that its foreign policy 
(if there is one indeed) or the foreign policies of the Union’s Member States 
are more trust-worthy globally than US foreign policy, especially thanks to 
the general EU’s emphasis on multilateralism and international law. And it 
is the ESDP that adds the – still limited but functional – hard power element 
to the wide range of European so power tools. 
As already said, it is not possible to separate internal and external secu-
rity – or hard and so security. At the same time, complementarity and com-
bination of hard and so power elements is important for the overall success 
in foreign and security policy. In this perspective, the EU appears to become 
a universal structure capable of reacting to all types of issues and therefore 
surpassing single-purpose security organisations such as NATO or OSCE. 
To relativize the above description of ESDP and the Union’s ESDP a CFSP 
developments as the only possible and ‘easy’ alternative of further develop-
ment we must state that the concept of Europe as a global player displays 
a number of inherent contradictions.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, this Union’s aspiration 
has been undermined by Europeans themselves since they are not willing to 
spend more on defence and to reach unity in foreign policy issues because 
of diverging national interests, namely those of European powers without 
which no European foreign and security policy can be implemented. Appar-
ently, ﬁnding a common position on most conﬂicts, such as a humanitarian 
disaster or civil war in Africa, is not that diﬃcult for EU states. is unity, 
157)   Parmentier, 2004, p. 131.
158)   Nivet, B.: La défense : problématiques et dynamiques d’un chantier européen. In: La revue internationale et stratégique, No. 48, 
2002/2003, p. 100.
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however, will only last before an issue such as the war in Iraq appears which 
will split Europeans into irreconcilable camps once again. Moreover, there is 
no agreement in Europe on the nature of the relationship with the USA and 
the need for a transatlantic link in defence and security, the key concern of 
this paper. Some states, such as France, go clearly the ‘European way.’ Some, 
such as the new members from post-communist countries or Great Britain, 
prefer the emphasis on NATO and the relation with North America. e rest 
of the states are not willing to choose ‘between Europe and America’. We 
profess that it will not be possible for CFSP and ESDP to develop beyond the 
currently very limited and restricted form of co-operation without a common 
position of EU states on issues such as the war in Iraq, a common percep-
tion of the role of the United States and a transatlantic link in relation to 
European and global security. 
CFSP and ESDP largely fall within the category of European theoretical 
and institutional solutions with no real content,¹⁵⁹ with the lack of common 
interest and the will to advocate it in practice. e European Security Strategy 
is a good illustration of this. e creation of such a document which deﬁnes 
common threats and the ways of facing them surely is a step in the right 
direction. But is it really justiﬁed to worry about this achievement remaining 
just on paper because Member States are not willing to take some practical 
steps and measures on the basis of this strategy?¹⁶⁰ 
6.2. Where is the ESDP Heading?
If ESDP, in its existing limited form, is acceptable for West European 
actors and does not really upset the transatlantic relationship, the future eﬀect 
it might have on transatlantic relations will depend largely on the next steps 
and priority goals. It is almost impossible to guess the future developments 
of ESDP, just like the European integration, a project sui generis in itself. Yet, 
we may present here three scenarios of the future development of ESDP:¹⁶¹ 
1.  ‘Minimalist Option’ – ESDP will continue to develop within the current 
framework. ESDP will continue to be an autonomous project of EU states 
which will not dent the role and signiﬁcance of NATO (respecting the 
159)   Shepherd, A.: The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance. In: European Security, No. 1, 2003. 
160)   Grevi, 2004.
161)   This is a synthesis of six scenarios presented in Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 724-744.
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three D and shared burden principles), will have fairly limited tasks (i.e. 
Petersberg tasks) which will, aer all, be implemented only where there is 
no place for NATO. is scenario reﬂects the wishes of the USA, Labour-
led Great Britain and many other EU states, except the ones mentioned 
in Scenario 2.¹⁶² 
2.  ESDP as the main pillar of European defence – EU states will be able 
to achieve an autonomous European defence policy which will make 
NATO politically redundant as the Atlantic Alliance will continue to 
turn around the EU-USA axis. is scenario suits the interests of France, 
Germany (namely the current federal government), Belgium, Greece, and 
Luxembourg.¹⁶³
3.  Hard Core Defence Union – ESDP will be developing within its current 
limited framework (Scenario 1) but some states will be seeking more 
defence integration, wishing for a defence union, in an avant-garde hard 
core – if need be, even outside the EU structures. is scenario ﬁts France, 
in particular. 
We can also take into account a scenario of total ESDP failure, for what-
ever reasons. Nevertheless, stopping the project and returning back before 
1998, making European defence a ‘European pillar of NATO’ is, in our view, 
highly improbable, given its seven years of existence and the great political 
will behind this project. And as we want to turn to the impact of future ESDP 
development on transatlantic relations, the thoughts of future non-existence 
of ESDP is irrelevant to us. 
6.3. Future ESDP Developments and Transatlantic Relations 
Let us now consider the ways in which the further development of ESDP 
will inﬂuence or change the transatlantic relationships, referring to the three 
scenarios presented above. 
A lot has been written on the ESDP - NATO relationship and its comple-
mentarity or inevitable antagonism. Yet, it seems that the ESDP-NATO rela-
tionship is only secondary here.¹⁶⁴ is is mainly because the complemetarity 
of today’s ESDP with NATO was provided for by a 2002 agreement allowing 
162)   Radek Khol calls this scenario an optimistic one – Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69. 
163)   Radek Khol calls this scenario a pessimistic one – Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.
164)   Bono, G.: L’ambiguïté des relations OTAN/PESD : faux débat ou enjeu réel ? In: La revue internationale et stratégique, No. 48, 
2002/2003, p. 137.  
Lukáš Pachta – ESDP in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship
115
ESDP operations to use NATO planning capacities and to be carried out 
where the US force is not needed and where the USA itself is not willing to 
intervene, e.g. in the Balkans. What is crucial now is the relationship the EU 
is building now with the USA and NATO within the context of the develop-
ing European defence policy.¹⁶⁵ 
A minimalist ESDP as we know it today (Scenario 1) surely cannot be 
understood as a ‘Trojan horse’ in NATO as America’s UN ambassador 
candidate John Bolton remarked.¹⁶⁶ e question is, however, whether the 
future development of ESDP, though in a limited form, will not necessarily 
lead to the weakening of the current role of NATO.¹⁶⁷ NATO as an organisa-
tion – and not a defence alliance that must undoubtedly be maintained and 
is absolutely necessary – is a legacy of the Cold War and is largely a ‘service 
organisation’ for ESDP on the European continent, with the exception of 
Kosovo where NATO troops are still present, because NATO’s planning 
capacities are still irreplaceable for ESDP. NATO’s role as an organisation 
outside Europe will, however, be also problematic. e United States’ reli-
ance on NATO has been only limited and the country has perceived NATO 
more as a security organisation for Europeans, allowing Europeans to take 
part in US-lead operations (e.g. NATO units in Afghanistan or the US request 
for NATO to get involved in post-war Iraq). Presumably, many European 
states will, however, prefer operations elsewhere than in Europe and – in 
spite of carrying them out side by side with Americans – under the EU rather 
than the NATO ﬂag, for political reasons or because of a greater prestige 
(brand building) – especially if NATO provides its planning capacities and 
if ESDP remains a project of the whole Union, most members of which are 
also members of NATO, and not just of an EU hard core.¹⁶⁸ Increasingly, it 
appears that NATO as a political organisation (and not just a mutual defence 
alliance) is really losing its raison d’etre, though not in practice. It will nev-
ertheless depend on whether the USA recognises the EU as its partner, stops 
discriminating all the time in favour of NATO as against ESDP and allows 
Europeans to use more of the Alliance’s capacities¹⁶⁹ to prevent duplication¹⁷⁰ 
while being careful not to undermine their attempt to become independent on 
165)   Otte, 2002, p. 53. 
166)   Layne, C.: Iraq and Beyond. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 59.
167)   Van Ham, 2000, p. 224. 
168)   Otte, 2002, p. 50. 
169)   Van Ham, 2000, p. 227.
170)   In this respect, the complementarity between NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) still seems 
problematic.
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NATO capacities over time. For this option (basically Scenario 2) to become 
real, it is absolutely crucial and necessary that Americans are willing to co-
operate. is co-operation between the USA and Europe might, however, 
be threatened by overblown (anti-American) ambitions of EU states, namely 
of France, and the possible formation of a ‘hard core’, i.e. a defence union, 
made up of just a few member states (Scenario 3). 
e very development of the ESDP project, though related to security 
emancipation of Europe and weakening of the political signiﬁcance of NATO, 
cannot harm the transatlantic relationship in the future, providing some 
conditions are met, because the very transatlantic relationship has undergone 
some changes.¹⁷¹ In saying this, we disagree with a view presented by Jiří 
Schneider who sees maintaining the present role of NATO (for other than 
just practical reasons) as the only chance for keeping up the transatlantic 
link and providing for European security, whereas he admits that NATO’s 
position is threatened not only by ESDP but also by the US unilateralism 
and the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle.¹⁷² ESDP is a logical step on the 
way of European integration which, however, does not have much chance to 
really succeed without the existence of a transatlantic security relation and 
co-operation with the USA in planning and intelligence. Turning Europe 
into a military and political rival of the USA should not be the (dominant) 
goal of ESDP. Rather, the aim should be to make – along with some other 
actors – the transatlantic relationship more balanced by Europe taking up 
more military responsibility so that the huge military capacity gap between the 
USA and Europe closes up a little. It is this gap that makes Europe and the 
USA less and less comprehensible to each other in security and defence issues 
(the ‘dialogue of the deaf’) where each of them is choosing diﬀerent methods: 
so power versus hard power.¹⁷³ And it is ESDP that might be the stimulus 
for Europe to put more emphasis on hard power. Let us take as a point of 
departure the famous thoughts of Roberta Kagan in his Power and Weakness 
in which he claims that ‘Europe is from Venus and America is from Mars’ and 
that this absolute gap between the mentalities of Europe and America breaks 
up the transatlantic relationship since each of these actors ‘speaks a diﬀerent 
language.’ In the light of this reasoning, it might be possible to claim that it 
is the ESDP that may ensure that Europe is ‘less from Venus and more from 
171)   Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p.78. 
172)   Schneider, 2003, p. 2. 
173)   Serfaty, 2004, p. 17.
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Mars’. ESDP and all that is related to it, including the European Defence 
Agency or the building of Europe’s own planning capacities etc., is surely 
improving Europe’s strategic thinking and perhaps allowing for Europe and 
the USA to ‘speak one language’ even though the EU’s interests might vary 
still more from the American ones.¹⁷⁴ We can illustrate this on US defence 
industry: the USA and Europe are the two largest producers of weapons in the 
world and their products are of the best technical quality, though the USA is 
still ahead of Europe. e growing European competition in defence industry, 
which Americans are rather worried about now, may very well stimulate further 
research and development in defence industry and help to better equip armies 
because of reduced prices.¹⁷⁵
Yet, there are some aspects of ESDP that might harm the transatlantic rela-
tionship in the future. On the European side, these include an overambitious 
goal (of France, in fact) of transforming Europe into a great power – which is 
not linked with ESDP only – standing as a rival to the United States or ignor-
ing the US legitimate right to take part in a decision-making on the security 
of the whole West, i.e. North America and Europe – all of this spiced up by 
an anti-American rhetoric of politicians and anti-American public opinion. 
ESDP would thus appear as the crucial factor in creating a strong defence 
union which might replace the transatlantic relation.¹⁷⁶ Given that such visions 
are unenforceable in the European Union as a whole, they would have to get 
implemented within the above mentioned hard core of the ‘chosen countries’ 
(Scenario 3) which would seriously disturb the building of a balanced EU-
USA relationship (Scenario 2) as there would be two transatlantic links on 
the EU side: a tighter and a looser one. 
In general, the transatlantic relationship will not be upset by such ESDP bear-
ing European identities in a Europe-wide project; neither will it be harmed by 
such ESDP which would only be the projection of the interests or an extended 
arm of the big EU states. Many might think, however, that this is utopian.
But many things to do are up to the US. Europeans do not want to give 
up their ESDP and CFSP and if Americans do not recognise these European 
ambitions or even undermine them it will not help the transatlantic relation-
ship either.¹⁷⁷ e USA has so far been unable to genuinely recognise and 
174)   Keohane, 2004.
175)   Grant, C.: Transatlantic Alliances and the Revolution in Military Affairs. In: Ashbourne, A. (ed.).: Europe’s Defence Industry – 
A Transatlantic Future. Centre for European Reform, London 1999, pp. 63-69. 
176)   Bono, 2002, p. 137. 
177)   Layne, 2001, p. 8. 
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accept the European defence and security ambitions (hard power) and the fact 
that the typically European methods, such as the emphasis on so power, may 
bring results. 
e current unilateralism and the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle used 
in the US foreign policy is another risk factor threatening the transatlantic 
relation. American unilateralism does no good to the transatlantic relation-
ship because it arouses negative sentiments in Europe about America, both 
on the sides of public opinion and politicians, and because it is principally 
at odds with the idea of a balanced (transatlantic) partnership and dialogue. 
e ‘coalition of the willing’ doctrine contradicts the basic principle of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, i.e. seeking a common position of all 
EU Member States. In CSFP, this principle is acceptable through the above 
mentioned lead nation mechanism: some states carry out an operation but 
they are supported by the remaining ones. At a time when the EU is – or is 
trying hard to be – a relatively politically integrated entity, a policy of driving 
a wedge between EU states can only harm the transatlantic relations.
If the risks outlined in the above paragraphs do get eliminated ESDP will 
be of a great beneﬁt to the continuation of the transatlantic relation. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS
In spite of its short history, the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) is a successful project. At the same time, the present form of ESDP is 
acceptable to the vast majority of states and political actors on both sides of 
the Atlantic while being in line with the transforming transatlantic relation.¹⁷⁸ 
e acceptability of ESDP and its compliance with the transatlantic relation 
are based on a long-term need, expressed at both sides of the Atlantic, for 
Europe to end its security dependence on the USA, to take up the responsibil-
ity for what is happening in its ‘spheres of inﬂuence’ to use the old imperial 
term, and to contribute to the defence of the West.
Many of this will depend on what direction the future ESDP development 
will take. ESDP may stay within its current limited shape which would be wel-
comed by Great Britain,¹⁷⁹ the countries of ‘New Europe’ and the United States. 
According to this scenario, ESDP would remain a policy/initiative whose major 
feature is complementarity (burden sharing) and co-operation with NATO 
(conﬁrmed by the 2002 EU-NATO agreement and based on the dependence 
of Europe on the military and planning capacities of NATO), that is in the 
form of a ‘European pillar of NATO’ – though one that is more autonomous 
than the European Security and Defence Identity before 1998. 
ESDP, however, may also start evolving in the direction of a truly 
autonomous European defence policy independent of NATO and the USA, 
as more and more political actors in Europe, France and the present Ger-
man government in particular, wish. And an establishment of a hard core 
or a defence union made up of a few avant-garde EU countries cannot be 
ruled out either. 
It is quite clear that it is much more than just a ‘division of labour’ between 
NATO and the EU what is going on in the present ESDP. Moreover, the 
ESDP- NATO relationship seems only secondary today: the EU-USA must 
get into focus instead now.¹⁸⁰ 
178)   Scharioth, K.: Making ESDP Strong Will Strengthen NATO and the Transatlantic Partnership. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 165. 
179)   Great Britain prefers such concept of ESDP where the ‘EU would be a smart client of NATO’s military services’. Khol, R.: Velká 
Británie…. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 21. 
180)   Bono, 2002, p. 137. 
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e European Union has been going deeper in political integration while 
reinforcing its CFSP instruments, fully supported by European public opinion. 
e EU is a political entity which should also have a military dimension so as 
not to be incomplete. As Europe and the world in general is more and more 
interconnected, new security threats, such as terrorism, arms proliferation, as 
well as regional conﬂicts, have a more even impact on all EU Member states 
and no single state can face them alone.¹⁸¹ e European Union also has its own 
security strategy and its constitution, in spite of not having been ratiﬁed so far, 
includes a commitment to mutual defence. From a certain perspective, it seems 
that the EU of the future will be a universal security structure, completely in line 
with the requirements for a comprehensive security policy which is needed now, 
including, for example, the ﬁght against terrorism, with the use of non-military 
and other than force-based means. e European Union of today is described 
as a civilian power¹⁸² using some considerable so power instruments, such 
as diplomacy, global prestige, economic power and co-operation, assistance 
and humanitarian aid. If EU states are able to increase their military potential 
to the required level the EU will have a wide range of so and hard power 
instruments (as explained in Chapter 2) for its own security and for exerting 
its inﬂuence in the world. e global involvement of the EU is made easier by 
the fact that the Union’s foreign and security policy (or the respective policies 
of EU Member States) evokes more conﬁdence than the policy of the United 
States. is is both due to the legitimacy of a common approach of all Member 
States and due to the greater emphasis put by the EU on international law and 
multilateralism. 
e concept of the European Union as a successful global actor, however, 
hides some contradictions.¹⁸³ Firstly, it is very hard to reach a common position 
in foreign and security policy: the unity must be achieved among all Member 
States, ﬁrst and foremost among the big ones without which no European 
foreign or security initiative is legitimate and can succeed. But EU states have 
no common positions on a number of issues and, sadly for their foreign and 
security policy, these include most of the really crucial matters. EU states are 
not united on the approach to such key issues as the former Soviet Union, 
Middle East or Far East. Neither can they agree on the nature of the future 
transatlantic relation, the role of NATO in their security arrangements, and the 
181)   Cameron, 1999, p. 71. 
182)   Khol, R: Úvod. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p.9.
183)   Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 461-465.
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direction of the European Foreign and Security Policy, including ESDP. e 
bust-up during the Iraq crisis was a prime example of the combination of the 
several levels of EU divergence: there was no unity in the positions on how to 
solve the situation in such a sensitive and crucial region and no common posi-
tion on supporting the US ally. 
e unwillingness to spend more on defence is the second major ﬂaw in 
Europe’s plans of a global involvement and operational defence policy – the US 
annual defence spending is almost twice higher than that of all the EU states 
together. is unwillingness discredits the European ambitions, harming the 
European defence industry, keeping Europe subordinate to the United States 
and, in principle, disrupting the transatlantic relationship.¹⁸⁴ e still greater 
gap between the military potential of Europe and that of the USA results in 
a lack of balance and mutual distrust: Europe has no conﬁdence in the US solu-
tion based on force because it cannot fully participate in implementing it while 
the USA has no conﬁdence in the European peaceful solution as Americans do 
not take part in it. is gap in military operability between Europe and the USA 
was well described by Robert Kagan in his famous essay Power and Weakness.¹⁸⁵ 
In claiming that ‘Europe is from Venus and America from Mars’ – though it was 
the other way round before WWII – Kagan transposed this rather simpliﬁed 
distinction onto the level of diﬀerent mentalities: it is not only the potential of 
using power but rather the willingness to do so.¹⁸⁶ In the light of this, European 
ambitions in foreign and security policy seem to be acceptable for many actors 
because they are quite ‘harmless’ due to these crucial structural limits. is idea 
is based on the fact that, due to its general ‘inaptness,’ Europe is le with noth-
ing else then clinging to the transatlantic relation and remaining subordinate 
to the USA. But let us now turn to the realms of theory and pies in the sky: let 
us assume that Europe will be able to overcome these limits. 
Given the nature of the security environment today and the changes in 
the transatlantic relation as well as in American foreign and security policy 
we believe that there is no other way for Europe seeking to continue with 
its integration than to develop an autonomous defence policy and overall 
political and security emancipation even though that will require unity in 
foreign and security policy and higher defence spending.¹⁸⁷
184)   Ibid, pp. 461-465. 
185)   Kagan, 2002. 
186)   Simon Serfaty proposes a similar comparison – Europe lives in a Kantian world while the USA lives in a Hobbesian one. Serfaty, 
2004, p. 6. 
187)   Van Ham, P.: A European View of the US and ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 135.
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e need for a truly autonomous European defence policy is closely linked 
to the quite problematic future of NATO as the main pillar so far of Euro-
pean defence and the embodiment of the transatlantic security relation.¹⁸⁸ 
Although this relation, mentioned in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is 
not and should not be questioned, the political signiﬁcance of NATO as an 
organisation has been somewhat fading in the long-term perspective.¹⁸⁹ is 
statement is principally opposed by die-hard ‘Atlanticists’ from post-com-
munist countries (this paper refers to the work of Jiří Schneider and Michael 
Žantovský.¹⁹⁰ It is true that NATO is still irreplaceable in practice: recent 
ESDP operations have been dependent on NATO capacities. On the political 
level, nevertheless, it is still more diﬃcult for NATO to ﬁnd its raison d’être. 
NATO as a purely military organization does not correspond to the current 
need for comprehensive security which would combine hard security with 
so security and hard power with so power. NATO’s future role is rather 
problematic in relation to another two aspects. Besides the very development 
of European political integration, including ESDP, and the establishment of 
a direct EU-USA relationship, it is the recent development of the US foreign 
and security policy with its weakening of interest in Europe, unilateral-
ism, the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle undermining the coherence of 
NATO and turning the alliance into a ‘reservoir’ of potential allies for these 
coalitions.¹⁹¹ Even though Americans, in their rhetoric, still point out the 
perpetual signiﬁcance of NATO, their recent acts reveal that they do not need 
NATO as an organisation and will not rely on it any longer, as illustrated 
by the little appreciation by the Bush administration of the historically ﬁrst 
evocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in reaction to 9/11 attacks.¹⁹² 
e USA may thus be suspected of favouring NATO as an organisation only 
because of the dominant role they play there.¹⁹³ 
Given this quite unclear future of NATO, even the present, rather lim-
ited form of ESDP which is complementary to NATO, seems more and 
more untenable. e existing ‘division of labour’ between the USA, NATO 
and ESDP is based on the fact that Europeans themselves are capable of car-
rying out only operations they have capacities for and in locations the United 
188)   Howorth, J.: ESDP and NATO. Wedlock or Deadlock? In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003, p. 252.
189)   Van Ham, 2000, p. 224. 
190)   Schneider , Žantovský, 2003; Schneider, 2005. 
191)   Schneider, 2003, p. 2. 
192)   We might mention here that the American NATO commitment in terms of armed forces is only 8%. Heisbourg, F.: Quel rôle mondial 
pour l’Europe. Paris Conference notes, 18/9/2003 – Europartenaires, p. 3. 
193)   Layne, 2001, p. 10.
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States and their ‘coalition of the willing’ allies do not wish to intervene in. 
According to this logic, shared with the USA by European ‘Atlanticists,’ it 
is the USA and its current allies that have preference. en comes NATO 
(according to the NATO ﬁrst principle) and only then, when neither the USA 
nor NATO is willing to carry out an operation, comes the EU. First, however, 
comes the consideration of an ESDP in line with the ‘Berlin+’ logic, i.e. the 
use of NATO capacities. It is only then that an operation can be carried out 
by EU states themselves, according to the lead nation principle. In the light 
of the eﬀort to establish a more balanced relationship between the USA and 
the EU, this logic will get problematic in future. In order for ESDP to have 
some meaning, the EU should not be a priori sidetracked but should have 
the possibility to carry out operations according to its own interests and not 
just in ‘allocated’ territories such as the Balkans or Africa and for humanitar-
ian purposes only, in line with the Petersberg tasks. For this to be changed, 
Europe must, of course, be able to agree on its interests and speciﬁc opera-
tions while having the adequate military instruments available. 
At the same time, the American (and largely also British) conditions under 
which ESDP is tolerated, the above mentioned ‘3D’, must be relativised: 
these conditions are somewhat outdated since they were formulated in 1998, 
shortly aer the ‘political launch’ of ESDP. e Bush administration, unlike 
the Clinton one, is less interested in ESDP and Europe in general. Quite para-
doxically, the Bush administration is more in favour of ESDP although this is 
a rather ‘negative tolerance,’ supported by the weakening interest in Europe. 
at is why the Bush administration has formulated no new conditions which 
would reﬂect the ESDP as we know it today. We may, nevertheless, assume 
that these conditions set by the Clinton administration still give evidence of 
the main aspects of the US approach to ESDP.
e ‘no decoupling’ condition, i.e. no disturbance of the transatlantic 
relation, is politically achievable even in a balanced EU-USA relationship, 
depending largely on the US approach and tolerance of European ambi-
tions (keeping it dependent on NATO) and whether these ambitions will 
be understood as harmful to the transatlantic relationship. e other two 
conditions are more problematic, though: an ESDP accessible for European 
non-EU members of NATO¹⁹⁴ (no discrimination) and no duplication. ESDP 
is a project of the European Union which has, so far, been a quite strongly 
politically integrated entity and which is entitled to have its own interests, 
194)   The so called Non-EU European Allies (NEEA). 
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though it cannot fully deﬁne them yet. e participation (as well as decision-
making) of non-EU states in ESDP is, in principle, politically unacceptable, 
even though the number of non-EU members of NATO in Europe will be 
dropping over time. e no duplication condition is very problematic too. 
Eliminating duplication in military and planning capacities is more than 
reasonable, if just for reasons such of cost reduction etc., yet it must not be 
used as an excuse for blocking the development of European capacities and, 
in eﬀect, maintaining Europe’s subordination. 
e gradual development from the currently limited ESDP to a truly 
autonomous European defence policy is, in our view, absolutely legitimate.¹⁹⁵ 
is development, however, should not do harm to the transatlantic relation. 
Europe should not see a replacement for this relation – an a priori rivalry 
with the USA – in ESDP, nor should it question the crucial role of the USA in 
European security. Also, no small defence union made up of a European ‘hard 
core’ (as many French political actors wish) shall be created in Europe because 
it would split up Europe, could even by formed outside the EU framework 
and might deform the relationship with the USA by establishing several levels 
of partnership with some states having a closer, some looser relationship with 
the USA. is would undermine the eﬀorts to establish a balanced EU–USA 
relationship. In other words, ESDP must be a project of the entire EU, and 
not just a projection of the interests of a few (big) states. 
e United States, on the other hand, will have to recognise the EU as an 
entity with the right to have its own interests and security methods, such as 
eﬀective multilateralism and so power, while co-operating with this entity 
and not seeking to divide it by building ‘coalitions of the willing.’
e European Union of today is a civilian rather than a military power 
which makes the United States whose current security policy is largely based 
on pre-emptive wars not rely on and co-operate with Europe too much. e 
military dimension of the European Union, i.e. ESDP which stimulates the EU 
states to spend more on defence and put more emphasis on the hard power 
element of their security policy, can paradoxically draw the security mentali-
ties of Europe and the United States closer together. To paraphrase Roberta 
Kagan, Europe would be ‘less from Venus and more from Mars’. Europe could 
also become a universal security structure complying with the current security 
policy requirements for the combination of hard and so power. 
195)   Layne, 2001, p. 11. 
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And Europe as a global political and military power which will suddenly 
promote its interests in spite of the USA will not necessarily be a threat to 
Washington.¹⁹⁶ 
e transatlantic partnership today, ﬁeen years aer the end of the Cold 
War and two years aer the Iraq crisis, is at a crossroads. In order to remain 
alive in the future it has to continue to be a real partnership – a dialogue 
of equal partners, the EU and the USA, none of which is dependent on the 
other – though it has been mainly Europe who has been dependent on the 
USA – and who need one another without quite realising it.¹⁹⁷ Europe will 
presumably not acquire quite the same military power as the USA in near 
future so the alliance with North America is and will long remain vital for 
Europe. e USA is one of the world’s superpowers that does not need any-
one. But the previously great strength of America, the power of example (or 
so power),¹⁹⁸ is getting lost from its policy. What America needs, as Joseph 
Nye claims, is feedback and correction of its hegemonic temptation.¹⁹⁹ And 
that is why the USA needs Europe, its most faithful ally who has the same 
values and a similar way of thinking. 
In spite of this all, some geopolitical rivalry and divergence of interests 
between Europe and the USA appear to be inevitable.²⁰⁰ It is a natural conse-
quence of the disappearance of a common, unifying threat aer the Cold War. 
Today’s threats – though equally important for Europe and America201- do 
not have this unifying eﬀect of the old Soviet threat.²⁰²
It is quite natural for Europe and America to have their own, sometimes 
clashing interests. What is important here is that they can ﬁnd agreement. 
is, however, might not be always possible: internal discord is typical for 
democratic systems and can be found in the relations between democratic 
countries, too.²⁰³ What should be always present in the transatlantic partner-
ship though is the eﬀort on both sides to seek dialogue and consensus while 
realising that the variance of views and methods or even competition can be 
beneﬁcial for both parties and might enrich both sides alike. 
196)   Layne, 2001, p. 9; Srov. Everts, S., Grant, C.: President Bush: Why You Need the Europeans? Centre for European Reform, December 2004. 
197)   Schweiss, 2003, p. 231. 
198)   Nye, 2003, p. 9.
199)   Ibid, p. 39.
200)   Khol. R.: Spojené státy… In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 74. 
201)   As evident from the comparison of the European Security Strategy and the US National Security Strategy (see Chapter 2.2).
202)   Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 74. 
203)   Parmentier, 2004, pp. 121-122.
126
Lukáš Pachta – ESDP in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship
Variance is a sign of a mature, balanced relationship which must, however, 
be accompanied by the art of knowing how to deal with and overcome these 
divergences – though through concessions.²⁰⁴ And this art has not disap-
peared from the transatlantic community although it has not been used too 
much in recent years. Europe and the United States are still a community 
sharing the very basic interests and values, in spite of the variances in some 
interests and methods.
As stated in the introduction to Europe’s Military Revolution,²⁰⁵ all those 
concerned with the success of European integration must wish for a further-
developing ESDP and CFSP. We may add that all of those who wish to maintain 
the Western community in today’s postmodern and globalised world²⁰⁶ must 
protect and ‘nurture’ the transatlantic relation: but not at the cost of stagna-
tion and maintaining the status quo, i.e. implementing the European defence 
policy through NATO only, as seen as necessary by e.g. Jiří Schneider,²⁰⁷ but 
by adapting the alliance to new conditions. 
What has been described so far is an ideal development which, however, need 
not correspond with reality. is paper presents the reality and author’s ideas in 
mid-2005 but further developments may cast doubt over many of the presented 
assumptions. Yet, we believe that the ESDP project, just like the transatlantic 
relation, builds on a very ﬁrm base and that there are not many factors under-
mining this foundation. Surely, these factors do not include a change in the 
governments of the countries involved, even though the case of Great Britain, 
a country which is crucial for further ESDP development, might be diﬀerent 
as a potential Conservative government might change Britain’s position on 
ESDP quite substantially. Not even the failure of the European constitution 
which takes ESDP and the entire CFSP²⁰⁸ a huge step forward, should threaten 
further development of the project because many of the constitution clauses can 
be or have been introduced into practice even without the constitution itself. 
What is a real risk, however, is that European integration as a whole might be 
discredited by the constitution (or any other similar treaty) not being ratiﬁed or 
a defence hard core (which the constitution includes a safeguard against) being 
established and potentially harming the transatlantic relationship. 
204)   Solana, 2002, p. IX.
205)   Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 7. 
206)   The paradox has it that the Western community is the main driving force of globalisation while globalisation is a potential threat 
to the cohesion of the Western community. 
207)   Schneider, 2005, p. 9. 
208)   E.g. by establishing a position of EU Foreign Minister. 
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No serious crisis such as the one over Iraq should threaten to damage 
the transatlantic relation: the Iraq crisis was very grave indeed but both the 
transatlantic partnership and ESDP did get over the rupture. Europe has even 
got ‘used to’ the US unilateralism, which has become a typical feature of the 
US foreign and security policy, and can respond with a common foreign and 
defence policy without disrupting the alliance with the USA. 
Let us conclude this paper with a personal observation. Many authors 
quarrel about whether we are living in a unipolar or multipolar world at the 
dawn of the 21 century. ere are many signs pointing rather to the unipolar 
order. We may try, however, to make the whole West, and not just the United 
States, the single world’s pole.²⁰⁹ 
209)   We are inspired by the thoughts of a British political scientist Martin Shaw on a single ‘Western state’. Shaw, M.: Theory of the 
Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000. 
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8. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
European Security and Defence Policy 
in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1998. e 
project builds upon the necessity for Europeans – who have depended on 
the US for security and defence for much of the Cold War and post-Cold 
War period – to take over some of the responsibility for their own security 
and for the building of permanent peace in Europe (‘burden sharing’). e 
emergence of ESDP was stimulated by three factors. (1) e end of the Cold 
War saw the disappearance of a unifying threat to the Western Community 
and a consequent decrease in the US interest in Europe. (2) A change of the 
security milieu with its new so-called ‘asymmetric threats’; and (3) Europe’s 
incapability to react to ‘hot crises’ in the Balkans in 1990s. 
e ESDP project has already brought some considerable achievements. 
ESDP has become a part of the process of European political integration 
and EU primary law, having been provided with its own structures and 
institutions. Under ESDP, the EU is creating the Rapid Reaction Force and 
Battle Groups. Moreover, the EU has participated in three military opera-
tions: two of them in the Balkans (taking over previous NATO missions), 
with operational support from NATO (SHAPE), and one in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, largely inspired and made a reality by the two ESDP 
‘lead nations’ – France and Great Britain. 
Despite these achievements, the ESDP is ‘weakened’ by a relatively low 
defence spending in European states, as compared with the USA, and by 
internal divisions among European states that have been unable to ﬁnd 
a consensus on the very objectives and interests in their common foreign 
and security policy. is is most evident in the diﬀerent concepts of the 
future role of ESDP where there are two competing models: a minimalist one 
(preferred by the UK and ‘New Europe’) versus an ambitious one (preferred 
by France and Germany). 
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ere are three fundamental questions addressed in this study: Is ESDP 
necessarily at odds with the current or future form of the transatlantic rela-
tionship? What could be the future shape of ESDP? And what is the future 
role of NATO? is is particularly germane to the development of ESDP 
(and the whole Europe’s political integration) and to the evolution of the 
transatlantic relationship, most especially in light of America’s recent move 
toward unilateralism.
Key findings: 
■  ESDP is an acceptable project for all partners in the transatlantic com-
munity given the new geopolitical reality and also its present, rather 
limited form which makes it a complement of rather than an alternative 
to NATO. Nevertheless, ESDP cannot remain in the shape it has now 
because it is strongly linked to the process of political integration and is 
central to Europe’s legitimate ambitions to play a more important role 
in the world.
■  Today’s EU is technically dependent on NATO; in the long term, how-
ever, the EU, through its ESDP, might become a more universal common 
foreign and security structure than NATO is now. Eﬀective security policy 
is now seen to require the combined use of both so and hard security 
and/or so and hard power policy instruments and strategies. 
■  NATO’s future political role is fading: NATO is ‘only’ a military structure; 
the transatlantic relationship should be founded on a balanced EU-US 
relationship. 
■  e development of an autonomous European defence policy is realistic 
and should not cause damage to the transatlantic relationship if the fol-
lowing two conditions are met: 
a.  e United States should recognise the EU as an equal partner and it 
should not discourage the EU from achieving military capability and 
operational capacity making it independent of the USA in terms of 
security and defence. e USA should not divide Europe by America’s 
unilateral foreign policy and creation of ‘coalitions of the willing’. 
b.  e EU should be more united and spend more on defence, but it should 
not seek to become a rival to the USA and aim to replace the transatlantic 
relation by ESDP, particularly if ESDP would give birth to a ‘hard core’ 
defence group. 
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■  Europe and the USA might and do have diﬀerent interests, views, and 
foreign and security methods, but still share some fundamental values, so 
they both face the same threats. 
■  Transatlantic disputes are not something to fear but they should never 
cast doubt on the transatlantic relationship, which is still vital for both 
Europe and the USA.
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